Surely, a wench can choose her own work!  Women coal miners in Paonia, Colorado, 1976-1987 by Gearhart, Dona G
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 
1-1-1995 
"Surely, a wench can choose her own work!" Women coal miners 
in Paonia, Colorado, 1976-1987 
Dona G Gearhart 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds 
Repository Citation 
Gearhart, Dona G, ""Surely, a wench can choose her own work!" Women coal miners in Paonia, Colorado, 
1976-1987" (1995). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2995. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/83uw-c7cr 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital 
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that 
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to 
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons 
license in the record and/or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleed through, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
A Bell & Howell Information Com pany 
300 North Z eeb  Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

"SURELY, A WENCH CAN CHOOSE HER OWN WORK!" 
WOMEN COAL MINERS IN 
PAONIA, COLORADO, 1976-1987
by
Dona G. Gearhart
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History
Department of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 1996
UMI Number: 9636879
C o p y r ig h t 1996 by  
G ea rh a rt, Dona G.
All rights reserved.
UMI Microform 9636879 
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
©1996 Dona G. Gearhart 
All Rights Reserved
The Dissertation of Dona G. Gearhart for the degree of PhD  in History 
approved.
Chairperson, Hal Rothman, Ph.D.
- — — *
Examining Comnrutjfee Member, Joanne Goodwin Ph.D.
Examining ̂ o im iit^ ^ ^ b e r^ a y ^ C o iJay jCoughtry Ph.D.
t  L
- j .-----
, / C  £ir
Graduate Faculty Representative, Rick Tilman Ph.D.
Dean of the Graduate College, Ronald W. Smith Ph.D.
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas 
May, 1996
ABSTRACT
In 1842 the British Parliament passed the Mines and Collieries Act which 
excluded women from working in underground mines. The legislation created a 
gender based, industry-wide segmentation of labor that persisted in Great Britain 
and the United States for 130 years. Post-World War II social and legal changes 
created a context from which women reappropriated their choice to seek jobs as 
underground coal miners. Women's representation in the industry increased into 
the 1980s, peaking at between eight and eleven percent of the workforce, but by 
1983 their numbers began to substantially decline. After the coal boom of the 
1970s ended, hundreds of coal miners were layed off, accounting for much of the 
decline. But other women chose to leave the occupation.
Although women continue to work underground, the occupation has been 
resegregated. How and why has that happened? The purpose of this study is to 
examine the dynamics of the original segregation of the coal industry by sex, its 
persistence, desegregation in the 1970s, and finally its resegregation. Experiences 
of women interviewed for this study raised the issue of choice. Coal company 
documents and oral interviews of women miners associated with the Orchard 
Valley Mine in Paonia, Colorado, raise the possibility that despite efforts by 
women and the industry, there are occupations that are appropriately sex 
segregated.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Until 1973, women in the United States were denied the opportunity to 
work in underground mines. Although a few women worked in family mines 
throughout the twentieth century, their labor remained hidden to all but those 
directly involved. Underground mining had been established as inappropriate work 
for women through law and custom originating in nineteenth-century England.
In 1842 the British Parliament passed the Mines and Collieries Act which, 
among other things, excluded women from working in underground mines. The 
legislation, in one grand gesture, created a gender-based, industry-wide 
segmentation of labor that persisted in Great Britain and the United States for 130 
years. The social, political, and economic discourse surrounding the exclusion 
legislation was rooted in fundamental changes accompanying the industrialization 
process, specifically the emerging prescriptions concerning the stabilization of the 
family and women's role within it. Although an investigative effort into the 
conditions of work for women and children preceded the Mines and Collieries Act, 
it became much more than an attempt to protect their health and safety. The image 
of the underground woman miner as portrayed by enthusiastic investigators 
through sexual imagery and metaphor was inconsistent with the virtuous woman 
that middle-class reformers and working-class activists attempted to create with
1
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the new domestic ideology. One way to square image with reality was to remove 
women from the underground mine.1
The United States established its own version of domestic ideology, not 
substantially different from that of Great Britain, and although the barrier to 
women working in American mines did not include federal legal sanctions, women 
were nonetheless prohibited from working underground through a combination of 
social prescriptions of appropriate work for women, state laws, and a powerful 
superstition based on long-standing mine-culture beliefs originating in England and 
Wales. Customs and traditions accompanied English, Scotch, and Welsh 
immigrants to American coal fields and helped reinforce practices already emerging 
in the United States. The gender segregation of the coal industry proved persistent 
throughout most of the twentieth century. Even the labor shortages of two world 
wars failed to alter the entrenched barrier to women's underground work.
Post-World War II technology, social, and legal transformations created a 
context in which women reappropriated their choice to seek jobs as underground 
coal miners. Liberated from the idea that women must adhere to prescribed roles, 
scores of women began applying for coal-mining jobs in the early 1970s. They 
trickled in uy ones and twos, assisted by the threat posed by the Civil Rights Act 
and Affirmative Action policies. By 1978 hundreds of women were working 
underground, but they continued to represent only a tiny percentage of the 
underground mining workforce. Outraged by what appeared to be gender 
discrimination on a grand scale, a newly organized interest group for coal mining
1 Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal 
Mines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) and Anna Clark, "The Rhetoric 
o f Chartist Domesticity: Gender, Language, and Class in the 1830s and 1840s," 
Journal o f British Studies 31, no. 1 (January 1992): 62-88.
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women filed a class action lawsuit against the nation's largest coal producers. As a 
result of the negotiated settlement, the coal operataors agreed to hire women at an 
increased rate until they represented twenty percent of the underground 
workforce.
Women's representation in the industry increased into the 1980s, peaking at 
between eight and eleven percent of the workforce, but by 1983 their numbers 
began to substantially decline. The coal boom that began in the mid-1970s came 
to an end after less than ten years, and coal operators began laying off hundreds of 
miners. There is no reason to believe that lay-offs disproportionately affected 
women, but the industry's economic woes probably accounted for the large number 
o f women who left the occupation during these years. Many of those unaffected 
by the lay-offs chose to leave the occupation for reasons of health, stress, or 
expanding opportunities for women in less challenging fields. Hundreds of women 
succeeded in this dangerous and physically-challenging occupation, yet they failed 
to integrate it. Underground coal mining continues to be gender segregated today, 
although it remains open to women.
The dynamics of the original segregation of the coal industry by sex, its 
persistence, desegregation, and finally its resegregation show important trends 
about the sexual division o f labor. Labor market segmentation is important 
because of the inequalities inherent in its structure. Economists and feminists have 
struggled with the concept, some asking why it occurs, others attempting to 
fashion public policy designed to dismantle it. Still others examine it to discover 
how it operates. The most persistent theories of labor market segmentation fall 
into categories of dual labor systems, captitalist/patriarchal models, or the neo­
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classical economic theories.2 A contemporary study of the woman coal miner's 
experience with sex segregation must take these models into account. Even so, the 
experiences o f the women interviewed for this study raised the issue of choice. 
Women's choice played a major role in the resegregation of the occupation, and 
most labor segmentation theorists consider individual choice meaningless to their 
models.
The gender segregation of the coal industry occurred out of the need to 
create order in a rapidly disordering society, through the stabilization of the family. 
The dominant cultural beliefs of mid-nineteenth-century England included the idea 
that women's role in that stabilizing process was best accomplished within the 
home. Those women who were forced to work out of necessity, could not fulfill 
that societal role by laboring in the mines. The underground environment, the 
physically-challenging work, and the sexual danger associated with underground 
mining, made the occupation too extreme, too deviant for women.
The desegregation of the coal industry occurred because changing beliefs 
about women's roles helped open new opportunities for work in male-dominated 
industries, including one o f the most extreme—underground mining. Once 
admitted into the masculine world of the coal mine in the 1970s, women faced 
unexpected barriers. Despite the emerging belief, fed by the rhetoric of the 
women's movement, that women could do anything that a man could do, sex
2David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, Segmented Work, 
Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation o f Labor in the United States 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Francine Blau and Carol L. 
Jusenius, "Economists' Approaches to Sex Segregation in the Labor Market: An 
Appraisal," Signs 1, no. 3 (spring 1976): 181-199; and Heidi Hartmann, 
"Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex," in Women and the 
Workplace: The Implications o f Occupational Segregation, eds. Martha Blaxall 
and Barbara Reagan (Chcago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
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difference did matter to the woman coal miner. Physical differences embedded in 
reproductive functions, size/strength disparity, and gender role expectations in a 
masculine environment made it clear that women faced limitations that men did 
not. Women began leaving the occupation in significant numbers in the early 
1980s. Some resigned, many were laid off, but some chose to stay in the 
occupation. Those who stayed in the longest may have been damaged by the 
experience. Although women continue to work in underground mines today, they 
represent only a tiny perentage of the mining workforce. Many coal operators 
continue to seek out women to apply for underground jobs, but it appears that 
women are excersizing their choice to discriminate against an occupation that most 
consider undesirable.
Labor historian Ava Baron has insisted that gender and work be 
conceptualized in order to grasp what is natural and what is social, and incorporate 
both into the process of work. This study attempts to do that by examining the 
experiences of women coal miners who worked underground in a small, isolated 
community on the western slope of the Colorado Rockies. From 1976 to 1987, 
the Orchard Valley Mine in Paonia, Colorado employed more women as a 
percentage of the workforce than did most mines in the United States. By late 
1987 the last woman left the mine, leading to an important social question: are 
there occupations that are appropriately segregated by gender.3
3 Ava Baron, ed., Work Engendered: Toward a New History o f American Labor 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
CHAPTER 2
EXCLUSION
Coal mining offers a rare glimpse into the process by which occupations 
are gender segregated. The movement to exclude women from the occupation of 
underground mining represented a deliberate segmentation of labor based on sex 
difference. The process began in nineteenth-century England with the 
investigations into working conditions of women and children, and resulted in the 
Mines and Collieries Act of 1842 which made it illegal for women to work 
underground. Government officials, social reformers, and oddly, the working 
class itself cooperated to pass the exclusion act in a campaign laden with language 
concerning the appropriate role of women. There appeared not be to a significant 
cry of protest even from the women most affected—the pit lass. The movement to 
exclude women from mining emerged from political, economic, and social 
concerns over the consequences of industrialization, and the fruits o f its labor was 
the construction of underground mining as a male occupation. Exclusion became 
the law in England, but it arrived in the United States as custom, transported by 
English, Welsh, and Scottish immigrants. Custom, tradition, and state laws all but 
insured that until the 1970s mining would remain off-limits to women in the United 
States. The process, begun in nineteenth-century England, produced a persistent 
segmentation of labor.1
1 Other factors influenced gender segregation in the American coal industry. The 
industrial structure, its location in the competitive sector, patterns o f labor
6
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A British coal industry observer in 1813 captured the social significance of 
permitting women to work in mines by linking the practice to gendered notions of 
propriety. He wrote, "The estimation in which women are held is one test of the 
civilisation of a people and it is somewhat scandalous in a country of gallant men, 
to see them sacrificed to the rough drudgery of coal mines."2 His words expressed 
the sentiment that dominated the effort to bar women from mining in the 1840s. 
Although the effort to exclude appeared to be motivated by concern for women's 
health and safety, it contained significant meaning in terms of fundamental gender 
relations. Once the investigative process began to reveal the sordid conditions 
under which the women worked, officials were pressured to bring the mining 
population under the spreading social umbrella of a new domestic ideology 
designed to restore social order.
Female mine labor had actually been declining since the early years of the 
century because o f increased opportunities in other industries. In 1840, women 
worked in pits of only four major mining areas in England, Scotland, and Wales.
By then women and mining shared a long history. Women's participation in 
underground mining dates from an early reference to the fatality of a woman in a 
firedamp explosion in Derbyshire in 1322. Additional evidence exists o f women 
working at a Winlaton Colliery in 1587, but little is known of these women except 
that they contributed significantly to the family economy. Reference to women's 
early employment surfaced only in disaster reports and coroner's inquests until the
mobilization are factors that appear in labor segmentation literature. Union 
resistance to female employment also played an influential role in the 
discrimination against women in the industrial sector. Ruth Milkman, Gender and 
Work: The Dynamics o f Job Segregation by Sex in WWII  (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987), 4-7.
2 Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal 
Mines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 31.
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eighteenth century so the nature of their work and their status within the family
remains speculative.
Observations that commented upon the indignities suffered by women
began to appear more frequently as the British coal industry grew in size and
importance. The language used in these descriptions became familiar to those who
followed the later exclusion movement. Richard Ayton, one of the most famous
observers of the industry offered detailed descriptions of the lack of sanitary
arrangements, the scanty clothing, and the blackness, yet he seemed obsessed by
the sexual imagery and symbolism of women's presence underground.
[they],...lose every quality that is graceful in women, and become a set 
of coarse, licentious wretches, scorning all kinds of restraint, and 
yielding themselves up, with shameless audacity to the most detestable 
sensuality.3
Ayton's disclosure of the degrading conditions provoked only minimal public and 
industry response. But some miners had begun to voice opposition to female 
miners based on the moral concern that the mine was not a proper place for a 
woman to work. The miner's complaints revealed the complexity associated with 
the emerging movement to exlcude women from mining.
Most women miners worked under the direction and protection of male 
family members and their wage #as absorbed into the family income. To many 
men, losing the labor of a wife, daughter, mother, or sister meant losing badly 
needed wages. Women seldom served an apprentice role that was reserved for 
male family members and were rarely allowed to work at the face where the coal 
was extracted. Before 1900 most women miners labored as drawers, pulling or 
dragging tubs of coal along the mine floor. A belt of leather or rope encircled the
3Ibid., 31.
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waist or shoulder of the drawer. A chain extending from the harness and passing 
between the drawer's legs, was hooked to the tub. Although the sexual division of 
labor within the mine placed a significant physical burden on the women, the work 
was considered less dangerous than working at the face.
By the mid-19th century, horses began to replace the human drawer, but 
the practice continued in some mines until the 1840s. Women's underground 
employment appeared not to threaten male jobs, so concerns about what 
constituted appropriate work for women influenced many miners to demand that 
women be excluded from the occupation. But without an organization or effective 
union they held little hope of ending the practice.4
The isolation of the coal communities kept the existence of female colliers 
virtually hidden until mid- 19th century. At that time a number of developments 
exposed the "pit-lass" and eventually thrust her into the national spotlight. The 
rapid increase in the size and importance of the coal industry, the 1841 census, 
early trades union activity, and the emergence of moral and industrial reform 
movements exposed the isolated, self-contained coal communities to public 
scrutiny. The exposure produced conflicting results. It generated investigations 
designed to improve conditions for mining families, yet in the process, intrusive 
and paternalistic notions of appropriate behavior eventually removed women from 
the mines and their opportunity to contribute to the family economy.5
The Children's Employment Commission became the initiating force behind 
the movement to exclude women from mines once the public discovered their 
existence. The Commission was originally charged with looking into conditions of 
children employed in mining and manufacturing in October of 1840, but quickly
4Ibid„ 23-24.
5Ibid., 20-23.
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shifted its focus from children to women. Horrified at the conditions under which 
women worked underground in the nation's collieries, investigators sought to 
accelerate the process in order to end the offensive practice. Middle-class notions 
of respectability stiffened the investigators' attacks on the morals of the mining 
communities. Ignorant of a different lifestyle, they were prepared to condemn 
practices which deviated from their own "familiar pattern of conformity."6
Investigations revealed that girls and boys began work underground as 
early as the age of six. Apparently employers favored girls over boys because they 
seemed able to grasp the nature of their tasks more quickly. Women often 
worked past the age of fifty. The interviews noted the physical effects of years of 
mine work on women—deformed spines, swollen legs, tiredness, listlessness. 
Investigators' observations became the most compelling tool to effect the ultimate 
goal of women's exclusion from mining.
The observations created the social context in which the Commission and 
reformers were finally able to succeed in excluding women from underground 
work. Middle-class reformers agreed that children needed protection from poor 
working conditions, but the sight of women laboring in such a degrading 
environment threatened the notion of women's appropriate role in society. 
Commission reports seemed fixated on sexual imagery and examples of deviation 
from that notion Protecting women from such an environment quickly took 
precedence over the working conditions of children. Girls and women worked 
while scantily clad. Illicit male/female relationships developed—"shameless 
indecencies, filthy abominations, and cruel slavery."7 Such language mirrored 
Ayton's earlier descriptions, but the official nature of the investigation provoked
6Ibid„ 37.
7Ibid„ 43.
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immediate response. The press picked up the story when sketches of the women 
accompanied a report by one of the investigators. Media attention and the graphic 
nature of the illustrations added pressure to find a solution to the situation.
What disturbed the investigators, reformers, and policy makers most was 
the potential danger that women miners posed to the new domestic ideology. 
Women had to be removed from underground work to fulfill their domestic roles 
and to see to the socialization of the children. In this morally charged atmosphere, 
reformers and officials believed that women must be placed back in the home. 
Many feared industrialization had created an unstable society and that the state 
must be protected from the growth of an "ignorant, depraved and dangerous 
population."8 One protective measure would be to stop females from working 
underground.
This kind of language provided the opportunity for the Chartists, a 
working-class movement fighting to gain manhood suffrage, to move in as an 
unexpected ally in the movement to exclude women from mining. The Chartists 
knew that in order to achieve their goal, they would have to dispel this very 
perception of a dangerous working class whose symbol had suddenly become the 
woman miner. Mobilization of public opinion to exclude women from mining 
would benefit from the cooperation of the Chartists, and they believed they would 
benefit as well. Thus, the effort to exclude women from underground work 
became a social movement that transcended class distinctions.9 Chartist rhetoric 
identified domesticity as a necessary response to industrialism's disruption of the 
home. By invoking a middle-class notion, Chartists believed they could eventually 
win concessions from the state. In order to obtain manhood suffrage they would
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
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have to reinvigorate the idea of working-class manhood, create a positive working- 
class identity worthy of suffrage, and in the process sell the idea of domesticity to 
working-class women. By appealing to domesticity they hoped to heal sexual 
antagonism within the working class and put forth a defense of its morality within 
the wider political context.
The Mines and Collieries Act was important to Chartists because the ideal 
of the virtuous woman played an essential role in the new domestic ideology. 
Gendered notions of virtue had become one of the definitive lines separating the 
middle-class from the working-class, defining the latter as different and inferior. 
Chartists could blur class lines by embracing the ideal of the virtuous woman, 
thereby making the working class worthy of suffrage.10
Some members of the middle class believed the working class created their 
own misery by overbreeding, and that working men had no business marrying 
unless they could support a family. Working people considered this an unrealistic 
expectation they could not afford. The negative perception of the working class 
had to be overcome if they were to attain manhood suffrage. Chartists believed 
they could show that the working-class was capable of living up to middle-class 
values if they could assert sexual difference. By asserting difference they could 
represent themselves as "fully human rather than animals or machines." Chartist 
rhetorical efforts became gender specific in two important ways—by asserting the 
masculinity of the working-class and commending the virtues of separate 
spheres.11
10Anna Clark, "The Rhetoric of Chartist Domesticity: Gender, Language, and 
Class in the 1830s and 1840s," Journal o f British Studies 31, no. 1 (January 
1992): 66.
11Ibid., 69.
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The need to restore a sense of masculinity to the image of the working man 
emerged as a response to his loss of control in the new industrial setting. Not only 
had he lost control over the conditions of his labor, he feared losing power in the 
home. Chartists publications often referred to how the manly virtues of working 
men suffered from loss of control in the home. One Chartist spokesman claimed 
that women "should be in subjection to her own husband...not millowners....nor 
the coal pit masters." The rhetoric threatened to put working men in a 
complicated bind. Miners benefited from the contributions o f wives to the family 
economy through pit work, yet they were encouraged to oppose the practice in 
order to achieve political gains for their class.12
One way out of this bind lay in the Chartist goal of the family wage that fit 
naturally into the middle-class notion of separate spheres. If  working-class women 
resisted the notions of separate spheres and domesticity, how could women be 
persuaded to suddenly embrace them? One tactic was the argument for the 
breadwinner wage and its benefit to the family. Another tactic offered women a 
vision of what middle-class marriage could become once working-men gained 
political power. Instead of coming home drunk, the newly empowered husband 
would be content and sober through a sense of good government at home.
Chartists expected women to respond to this rhetoric out of a hope for a better 
life.13
In another rhetorically inspired argument, Chartists made the idea of 
separate spheres palatable to women by politicizing the family. They used the 
knowledge of working-class women's participation in the public sphere to urge 
political activism to achieve class goals such as mass demonstrations, petition
12Ibid., 72.
13Ibid„ 74.
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gathering, and strikes. The family, women were told, was a political resource to 
be represented by their own militant domesticity. Women needed little 
encouragement to accept the role and began to use the public sphere in this way. 
They demonstrated, struck, organized, and rioted, and justified their behavior by 
providing their own definition of motherhood. Their role was not merely to 
nurture children, but to labor to feed them and to organize to better their lives.14
The middle class defined the new domestic ideology by more rigidly 
delineating the separation between public and private spheres of activity.
Domestic ideology pervaded even the industrialist class and produced the 
underpinnings of paternalistic management. The upper classes did not remain 
indifferent to the need to assert a declining masculinity. One textile manufacturer 
elevated the manly notion of earning himself and his family a decent income over 
clothing his customers or benefiting his laborers. His worldview linked his status 
and manliness as a family breadwinner to his business practices. Although class 
distinctions remained firmly in place, a common movement to elevate domesticity 
and restore manliness united men from diverse occupational backgrounds and 
social environments through the gendered content of their rhetoric. The ironic 
unity resulted in the construction of a matemalistic ideology that identified all 
women as potential mothers, responsible for the private world of the home, and 
the admonishment that men were bad husbands if they failed to provide a family 
wage.15
The movement to remove women from the depravity of the mines 
resonated across class lines. To the Chartists, exclusion was like a gift from the
14Ibid., 76.
15Sonya Rose, Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century 
England (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 147.
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middle class, and they used it to arouse sympathy for their own goals. Chartists
skillfully presented to the governing classes a perception that their movement
sought a solution to the degradation of womanhood. They were, after all, seeking
to protect the ideal of the virtuous woman and the whole structure of domesticity.
Thus exclusion became a unified effort, at least among the men.16
Exclusion held different meaning for women. The majority of the women
interviewed by the sub-commissioners expressed opposition to working
underground. They said it was hard work. It tired them and it frightened them,
but they recognized that there were few alternatives. Interviews of women lack a
sense of what working underground meant to them in terms of their female
identity, but most felt they were adequately protected by male family members
under whose direction they worked. Even so, it must have been a relief that
underground work had been removed as a choice.17
Arthur Munby, nineteenth-century diarist, social critic, and romantic
chronicler of working women, would have disagreed that women might have
subconsciously welcomed exclusion. In a poem expressing the feelings o f a pit lass
following exclusion, Munby had this to say about choice.
Never with your leave, they tell'd us all to go; TheyVe took the bread 
clean oot on oor mooths, aye, every mother and maid. An all for to 
pleasure the menfolk, as wants to steal oor trade! Well, it's hard an 
mucky, who knows that better than me? But I like it, and it was my 
living~as so it had to be— Surely, a wench can choose her work!18
Munby's pit lass was not alone in lamenting her lost choice. Hundreds of women 
circumvented the law and kept working underground. Aided in many cases by
16Clark, "The Rhetoric of Chartist Domesticity," 84.
17Ibid., 42.
18John, By the Sweat o f Their Brow, 54.
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employers, they continued their work illegally. The exclusion act lacked an 
effective enforcement mechanism and the practice persisted for nearly twenty-five 
years. The passage of time and negative publicity from accidents eventually 
caused the decline of the evasion. Employers became less willing to look the other 
way, and the miners themselves began to exert pressure to put an end to the 
practice. Miners began to believe that women pit workers were part of a system 
that kept wages low and the miner's union took a public stand that reflected 
middle-class values. The miner's union expressed the belief that a working man 
should earn a wage substantial enough to support a wife and child. Pressure from 
miners eventually brought an end to the evasion of the Mine and Collieries Act.19
The movement to establish an occupation based on gender difference 
required a mobilization effort that crossed class and gender lines. Working-class 
men and women collaborated with middle-class men and women to exclude 
women from working underground. Labor historian Ava Baron has argued that 
analyzing the gendering of work requires asking why and when sexual differences 
become culturally and politically significant. Ruth Milkman does this in her study 
of the peristence of sex-segregation in the auto and electrical industries, but leaves 
unanswered why those industries became segmented in the first place. This is 
precisely what needs to be explained and the purposeful exclusion of women from 
coal mining is that rare instance when this can actually be examined.
The combination of both natural and socially-constructed difference 
combined to bestow compelling gender meaning to the exclusion of women from 
mines. Although reformers used the language of sexual imagery and couched their 
arguments in the rhetoric of domesticity, they never lost sight of the physical
I9Ibid., 58.
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challenges under which women labored in the mines. Men and women alike 
sought to define the job as inappropriate for women. Invoking biological sex 
differences to justify sex-segmentation of work has historically reinforced 
economic inequality based on gender, but the construction of underground mining 
as male-only in nineteenth-century England seemed rational.within the social, 
political, and economic context that it occurred.20
Once constructed, the sex-segregation of coal mining persisted through 
custom and tradition. There is no reason to believe that its transmission to the 
United States became inevitable, or that other countries would not develop their 
own exclusionary policies regarding underground mining. The custom of 
exclusion did in fact make its way via British, Scotch, and Welsh immigrants and 
it encountered little resistance from nineteenth-century American culture.
Although an early-twentieth-century industrial reform movement aroused passions 
concerning working conditions o f women and children, investigators never 
concerned themselves with women and underground mining. Women in the 
United States did work in mines. There is evidence that women worked with 
fathers and brothers in isolated family operations, but the practice never caught 
public attention.
The social and political struggle over domestic ideology in America 
mirrored the reform activities in Great Britain. Cultural parallels ensured that both 
countries would face the social disruptions of industrialization in a similar manner 
with analogous results. American created its own version of domestic ideology 
and separate spheres, but they did not lead to a Federal law banning women from 
underground work. Women did not have a history of mine work, but their
20Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics o f History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988).
exclusion stemmed from social sanctions against the practice. A number of states 
adopted laws excluding women from mining but custom and tradition proved as 
strong as British legal sanctions, signifying the potency of America's domestic 
ideology.
The United States experienced its first major economic downturn in the 
1830s, and the social and economic conditions that emerged encouraged the 
creation of a new gendered ideology. The new domestic code sought to sanctify 
woman as virtuous, responsible for preserving the home as a sanctuary where her 
husband could retreat from his labors in a chaotic industrial world. The role was 
embedded in her special sphere of the home. The domestic ideology placed the 
burden of family support on the man in the form of the family wage. The purpose 
in creating the separate spheres was to maintain the social order by sustaining 
stable families. Within this cultural and intellectual frame, coal mining developed 
as a male occupation, continuing the ideal construction of a masculine culture of 
mining.21
The first American coal mines were worked by black slaves in Virginia 
around 1750. In the mid-nineteenth century English miners brought new mining 
techniques and cultural traditions to the industry that became the key to the 
emerging industrial revolution in the United States. Their artisanal tradition 
dominated the early industry and it was into this masculine culture that later groups 
of eastern and southern European immigrants attempted to assimilate.22 Although
21 Alice Kessier-Harris, Out to Work: A History o f Wage-Earning Women in the 
United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
22Many of the eastern and southern immigrants by-passed the eastern mines and 
sought work in the west where craft tradition was less dominant. But the 
masculine culture of underground mining prevailed in both regions. Priscilla Long, 
Where the Sun Never Shines: A History o f America's Bloody Coal Industry (New 
York: Paragon House, 1989); George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge,
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traditions and customs immigrated intact, British miners expected more in the way 
of elevated status once they arrived in America. The mining population in the 
Pennsylvania anthracite fields reflected a "moral" condition superior to that of the 
same class in other countries. The roots of this moral superiority can be traced to 
the reciprocal interests linking the miners to the operators in that region. British 
miners placed great stock in the republican ideal and believed that the value of 
their product lay in their labor. They perceived themselves as equal contributors 
with capitalists in the creation of social wealth. For awhile it seemed so, but 
following the economic crisis of 1837 one scholar found that "the material 
circumstances of a wage earner's life belied those egalitarian claims." As a more 
mature industrial system emerged, the artisanal tradition of the miner began to 
erode.23
It was against this erosion and other injustices at the hands of coal 
operators that spawned the early efforts at union organizing. During the later 
decades of the nineteenth century coal mining experienced its most rapid growth, 
and the time appeared ripe for a miner's union. Because of prior artisanal 
traditions of the British and southern and eastern Europeans' lack of experience 
with working-class political and cultural organizations, miners resisted early 
organization efforts.
The Great Coalfield War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Elizabeth Jameson, 
"Imperfect Unions: Class and Gender in Cripple Creek 1894-1904," Frontiers 1, 
no. 2 (Spring 1976); and George Suggs, Colorado's War on M ilitant Unionism 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972).
23Grace Palladino, Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the 
Anthracite Regions o f Pennsylvania, 1840-1868 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1990), 9, 44. JanePoulos, "United Mine Workers of America," 
(unpublished manuscript. Paonia, Colorado, 1991).
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Even as miners' status as skilled laborers declined, they maintained their 
individualism. Mining methods contributed to this sense of autonomy. The pre­
industrial room and pillar method continued well into the twentieth century, 
allowing miners to work alone or in small groups in their own area, under only 
minimal supervision.24 The informal approach to work undergirded the cherished 
"miner's freedom" and served to undermine the development of a class 
consciousness among miners. Miners' collective sense had already been weakened 
by ethnic and religious divisions, and their isolation from urban industrial 
crosscurrents.25
By the 1890s organization efforts began to pay off. The depression of the 
1870s brought awareness of the desparate conditions of labor nationwide to even 
the isolated coal communities. Hundreds o f thousands o f coal miners began 
joining local and national labor organizations. The United Mine Workers of 
America emerged as the miner's national representative during the same years that 
the coal industry experienced its most rapid growth. The industry's rapid growth 
exploded into cut-throat competition that one government official characterized as 
"a great army of antagonistic elements and unorganized forces." Out of this chaos, 
the bituminous coal industry that had so long resisted unionization made the 
conscious decision to accept the union. William Graebner found that "as early as 
1897, labor was in a small way integrated in the coal industry's scheme of things 
and had adopted the major assumptions of the search for order."26
24See glossary o f mining terms, Appendix I.
25Eric D. Weitz, "Class Formation and Labor Protest in the Mining Communities 
of Southern Illinois and the Ruhr, 1890-1925," Labor History 27, no. 1 (Winter 
1985-86): 85-105.
26William Graebner, "Great Expectations: The Search for Order in Bituminous 
Coal, 1890-1917," Business History Review XVIII, no. 1 (spring 1974).
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Although wages and shorter hours motivated miners to organize, they also
responded to the virtual destruction of their entire way of life and their traditional
manner of surviving in the world. Although the room and pillar method of mining
sustained their individual spirit, miners forced to live in company towns lost
control of their everyday lives. They responded collectively through organizing,
but it also seemed more important than ever that the world of the coal miner
remain a masculine world. Coal mining women had no quarrel with class solidarity
that was once again forced to regain its manliness. There is no reason to believe
that cultural homogeniety accompanied the sense of shared consciousness in the
coal communities, but there appeared to be common assumptions about gender
relations. Masculinity prevailed, and it remained an essentia! concept associated
with the coal miner throughout the twentieth century.27
Class issues took precedence over women's concerns in the coal
communities and there is no evidence that women would have wanted it otherwise.
Coal mining women played a substantial role in defense of working-class goals and
values. Women in the coal camps of America subscribed to the same militant
domesticity demonstrated by women in the British coal fields. Fiercely protective
of home and family, they took great risks to prove their class solidarity. Their
militance during strikes often led them to violent, aggressive behavior, often at the
risk of injury or death. United Mine Worker's President Michael Ratchford
honored these women in 1897.
Noble women, mothers to whom our success is due in no small 
measure, led the marchers under the burning summer sun, with their 
babe on one arm and the flag or banner in the other. They bore their 
share of that memorable struggle without a murmur of complaint and
27Long, Where the Sun Never Shines, 21.
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at its close were found in the forefront battling for home and dear
ones.28
Militance combined with motherhood ran deep and wide in the coalfields and 
formed a central core of the worldview of coal miners.29
Union organizer Mary "Mother" Jones embodied this concept of militant 
domesticity. She was loved by men and women alike, and could radicalize an 
entire community by calling out the miners wives. Caught between the rights of 
women workers to organize and the plight of her working class brothers, she 
usually chose to devote her energies to the men. Her ambiguous feelings towards 
working women emerged from a belief that women were supposed to be wives and 
mothers, not workers. One biographer has said that "the lifestyle of the militant, 
devoted miner's wife was most in accord with [Jones's] views on both class and 
sex..." 30
Few women familiar with coal mining would have considered working in 
the masculine environment of their husbands, brothers, and sons. Few women 
unfamiliar with the culture of mining would have considered it a desirable 
occupational choice. If compelling social sanctions and the nature of the work 
itself failed to discourage women from working underground, firmly entrenched 
superstition would have stopped them. Miners held on to their superstitions long 
after scientific knowledge made the belief seem irrational. The idea that a woman 
in the mine meant bad luck was one of the most universal and enduring 
superstitions of mining culture. Bad things would happen if a woman went 
underground, not only to the individual who saw her but to the entire crew.
28Ibid„ 156.
29Ibid.
30Priscilla Long, Mother Jones, Woman Organizer (Cambridge: Red Sun Press, 
1976), 27, 35.
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Miners took the superstition seriously enough that they would refuse to go 
underground or would go out of the mine if a woman were allowed to enter. The 
myth cannot be traced to English folklore, but it has been documented in Welsh 
folk literature. The superstition became embedded in mining culture and endured 
into the 1970s.31
The domestic ideology of nineteenth-century America, the weight of 
British coal mining tradition, and the loss of power and autonomy of the American 
coal miner combined to create a sexual division of labor in the coal industry that 
persisted into the 1970s. Miners, employers, and union leadership objected to 
underground work for women even during the labor shortages of two world wars. 
But women's political and economic status improved significantly during the first 
half of the twentieth century. After 1900, the lines between the public and private 
spheres became less defined. More women worked outside the home and their 
participation in the progressive reform movements began to bring a female 
influence into the political sphere. Women were on the verge of gaining full 
political rights on the eve of America's entry into the World War I. The war 
related manpower shortages pulled women into the industrial labor market which 
had traditionally shunned their participation. Many war-related industries were 
willing to accommodate women workers to offset labor shortages. Work deemed 
inappropriate for women suddenly became available to them, and traditional 
gender roles became relaxed at least for the duration of the war.
Although women obtained jobs in traditionally male-dominated industries, 
often these positions represented lower paid jobs designated as suitable for
3 Marianne Fraser, "Warm Winters and White Rabbits: Folklore of Welsh and
English Coal Miners," Utah Historical Quarterly 51, no. 3 (summer 1983): 247-
257.
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women. The sexual division of labor persisted within most of these industries. In 
the railroad industry women filled jobs that before the war had been reserved for 
men only. Well-meaning reformers introduced legislation to protect the women 
from the physically demanding work and the railroad union failed to provide the 
women the same protection it offered men. So even though women broke some 
barriers into male occupations, they remained on the fringe of the occupations.
For most even these gains ended with demobilization.32
The perception of appropriate roles for women had not changed 
dramatically enough for society to fully accept women's wholesale movement in 
jobs reserved for men. People feared whatever strayed too far outside the norm of 
women's primary family role. During the confusion of demobilization and the 
concern with getting men back to work, the fear was expressed in what many 
referred to as the "third sex." The issue arose when women street car conductors 
were replaced by men following the war. Single women working for themselves 
and considering that they had separate interests from women in the home and men 
workers supporting families, were labled as the third sex. The idea that women 
worked for reasons other than the support of a family and took the job away from 
a man in the process, became the focus of the debate. So although women gained 
new experience outside the realm of traditional women's work, fundamental gender 
assumptions remained firmly entrenched. Even though women gained entrance 
into many male-dominated industries during the war, the barrier against women in 
the coal industry remained firmly intact.33
32Maurine Weiner Greenwald, Women War and Work: The Impact o f World War I  
on Women workers in the United States (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1980), 115.
33"Third Sex in Industry? No, Only One," The New York Times Magazine, 27 
April 1919.
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Evidence exists of at least one attempt to hire women for mine work during 
World War I. The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company was willing to buck 
tradition and superstition in order to maintain production in the face of mounting 
labor shortages. Lehigh hired women and girls to work around its mining plants in 
Pennsylvania. No woman would be allowed to work underground, and none 
would be used to replace a man. Coal Age, the leading coal industry publication, 
hinted that miner's conservatism was too great to withstand the shock of women 
working at the mine site. Miners and union leaders protested the hiring, calling 
attention to an 1891 state law prohibiting employment of women in and around 
mines. In order to comply with the law, the chief mine inspector issued orders for 
the "girls" to be suspended. A coal industry spokesman called the union's protest a 
victory for the "Huns." It was not a lack of patriotism that provoked the miner's 
union to protest but a belief that women did not belong in the mining occupation. 
The women were disappointed as they had been enthusiastic about their new jobs 
and were "loathe to give them up."34
World War I meant gains in the field of industrial labor for women, but in 
the coal industry it meant no gains at all. Women fared only slightly better during 
World War II. Between the two wars economic conditions forced people into 
roles that otherwise might have been thought inappropriate and a few women 
made it into the mines. They went underground to help families survive depressed 
economic conditions.
Several of these women were interviewed in 1982 and their words evoke 
the complexity of their experience.35 They spoke of the hard physical labor and
34R. Dawson Hall, "The Labor Situation," Coal Age 13, no. 19 (11 May 1918): 
886. Greenwald, Women War and Work, 125.
35Marat Moore conducted approximately forty interviews with women coal miners
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the hazards inherent in an underground mine, but they typically tried to minimize
those aspects of their experience. Most remembered taking precautions to prevent
knowledge of their work from spreading beyond the family. In states where laws
prohibited female mine work, the family feared discovery by mine inspectors. But
in some cases families sought to conceal the non-traditional work arrangement to
prevent community sanction for breaking custom and tradition. The benefits the
work provided in terms of pride in assisting the family through difficult economic
conditions, gaining their father's approval, and developing a work ethic were
consistently emphasized by the women.
Elizabeth Leach worked in a small mine leased for family production during
the depression. A girl of twelve or thirteen at the time, she helped her father work
the mine for three winters. They mined in low coal and she remembers walking
"stooped over with our heads bent." They never knew when the mine inspector
would show up but when they heard that he was coming, she would hide. They
believed that they would have been arrested for having women in the mine.
Reflecting on the experience, she said:
Mother cut my hair off so nobody would recognize me as a girl. They 
just cut it off, and I stuck it up under the hat and went off to work. It 
made me feel good that I could work and do something to support the 
family. They taught us all to work and live honest. Don't want to owe 
nobody nothing.
from 1980 to 1986. Moore interviewed two groups of women: women who 
worked in the mines between 1920 and 1940, and those who worked as miners 
from 1970 through 1986. The Leach and Smith interviews represent the group 
that Moore called the "pioneers." Marat Moore Collection, Accession 316, 
Archives and Special Collections, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, 
Tennessee (hereafter cited as Moore Collection).
36Leach interview, Moore Collection.
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Ethyl Smith, a Kentucky woman and early woman miner, worked with her 
father and brother in small mines in the late 1920s. Beginning at the age of 15, 
she was forced to keep her identity as a woman secret. "They never did know I 
worked in there." she later said. "If they had, they would have cut my dad 
off ...because women weren't supposed to go into the coal mines at that time."
She understood the power of the miner's superstition about women, but it seemed 
to have little power over her family. "Old folks believed it was bad luck for 
women to go into the mines..but my dad had worked us children at so much....that 
it just seemed like another job to me." Although she spoke with pride about her 
unusual occupation, she said she would never consider doing it again. In fact she 
believed that women should not go into the mines and based her belief on biblical 
prophecy. Knowing that women were then working underground made her feel 
"that the end time is coming closer," and that the Bible was fulfilling itself eveiy 
day. She was not ashamed of what she did because work was nothing to be 
ashamed of. But if she was forced to do it again, she stated emphatically that she 
would not "go in there with that bunch of men." What seemed to make mine work 
appropriate for her was being under the protection of her father and brother.37
The Marat Moore interview collection contains stories o f other women 
who worked in small, family operations during the depression. Their stories reveal 
the complex emotions and beliefs about stepping outside their assigned gender 
roles. The most common concern during their employment seemed to be keeping 
it secret. The depression opened opportunities to these women to gain new work 
experience, but clearly it was an opportunity to contribute to the family economy. 
World War II brought the country out of the depression and offered the same type
37Smith interview, Moore Collection.
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of dual opportunity. This time women were encouraged to contribute to their 
country's war needs. The war opened abundant economic opportunities in 
industries traditionally closed to women. Gender prohibitions in the coal industry 
even loosened a bit.
Many of the opportunities for women in the mining industry during World 
War II occurred in the West. In 1942, the United States Employment Service 
issued a report on labor needs in the Eleventh Regional Labor Supply District.
The report signified the growing manpower shortage in the western coalfields and 
the Employment Service announced it would assist the coal operators in acquiring 
additional laborers. Many of the western mine operators responded favorably to 
the Employment Service suggestion to hire women to fill jobs traditionally held by 
men.38
A mine in Alma, Colorado, began hiring women to fill jobs vacated by 
service-bound mine workers. They hired six women to work at the mine's sorting 
plant. The women would work on the surface and not go underground. In Globe, 
Arizona, the Miami Copper Company responded to the Employment Service call 
by hiring ninety-two women to assume mechanical jobs at its concentrating plant. 
The general superintendent of the company said of the unusual hiring, "It's hard 
dirty work and we don't want the glamourous type... ." In Rock Springs,
Wyoming, the Union Pacific Coal Company hired twenty-two women to work in 
the mine shops and to pick slate at its mine tipples. The evidence suggests that the
38Department of the Interior Information Service Press Release, 13 October 1942. 
The United States Department o f Labor. Records o f the Women's Bureau, 
Microfilm Collection, Part II, Women in world War II, Series B.
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industry, at least in the western states, was willing to ease its labor shortage by 
hiring women.39
Some states even had to overcome legal barriers to put women to work. 
Laws prohibiting the employment of women in or around mines remained on the 
books in many states and they had to be removed in order to bring women into the 
coal industry's war effort. In 1943 a Utah law banning the employment of women 
and children in the mines was ammended to allow women to work at surface 
facilities on mine property. Such action demonstrated at least the promise of 
change for women in the mining industry. The willingness to amend legislation to 
accommodate women during World War II contrasted significantly to the use of 
legislation to bar women from mine work during World War I.40
Evidence of women working in the eastern coal fields suggests less 
enthusiasm for easing restrictions on mine work outside of the West. In Beckley, 
West Virginia, the Algoma Coal and Coke Company hired five women to work at 
a surface facility sorting coal. Upon hearing of the company's decision, the 
UMWA called for the immediate discharge of the women. The demand followed 
similar procedures the union applied during World War I in Pennsylvania.
Although the coal industry and the women cooperated to ease wartime shortages, 
again the miners and their union fought against hiring women to work around 
mines. Small, non-union mines hired women without much publicity or 
opposition. Two women claimed in 1975 that they contracted black lung from 
working underground at the Loral Creek Mines in the Appalachian fields between
39Baltimore Sun, 25 August 1942; Deseret News, Salt Lake City, Utah, 13 
September 1942.
40Eleventh Regional Labor Supply Committee Confidential Report, dated 21 
August 1942. Records of the Women's Bureau.
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1940 and 1952. The women failed to convince Social Security officials of their 
underground employment as the company records had disappeared. Yet their oral 
testimony confirmed their wartime employment as coal miners.
Their plight demonstrates the difficulty of documenting the existence of 
women miners during most of the twentieth century. The few who worked 
underground did so anonymously in small mines and away from public attention. 
The opportunity for women to work in the coal industry proved minimal and 
temporary during World War II, and those who took advantage of it returned to 
more traditional pursuits when the war ended.
The decade following the war saw women settling back into traditional 
roles associated with the home and family. Yet the impression that women were 
willing to return to the old, traditional ways proved misleading. Women were 
poised to alter society's landscape in fundamental ways, and women coal miners 
would play a visible role in society's reconfiguration. Post-World War II social, 
economic, and political transformations meant that after 130 years of persistent 
sex-segregation, the coal industry would be forced to open its portals to women.41
In the late twentieth century, underground coal miners earned wages that 
were among the highest in the industrial sector, and until the 1970s women had 
been denied the opportunity to earn them. Exclusion had been constructed on the 
gendered perception of the ideal, appropriate role for women, a construction that 
by the 1970s appeared archaic and laden with hopelessly outdated expectations.
It became clear that constraints based solely on gender difference maintained the 
economic inequality of women. In the politically charged, affirmative action 
context of the 1970s, the fact that women constituted only .2% of the United
4177h? New York Times, 20 November 1942; M S (April 1975): 19.
31
States underground workforce meant blatant discrimination of a magnitude that 
could only be remedied through legal action. So what began as a legal remedy in 
1842 to remove women from coal mines, would be undone in a similar manner 130 
years later. The window of opportunity into the mines would open to women in 
the 1970s, ending a century and a half of exclusion.
CHAPTER 3
WINDOW OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
By the middle of the twentieth century barriers to women working in or 
even entering underground mines, had been in place for more than a century. 
Carefully constructed as social and economic response to industrialization's 
demands on the family and its economic role in society, barriers remained long 
after twentieth-century modernization began to hint at their obsolescence. The 
formal barriers that kept American women out of mines could have been ignored, 
at least during war-time production. But informal restraints on women's 
underground work permeated the culture and would be the most difficult to 
dismantle if women ever chose to pursue the occupation. These were barriers 
constructed in response to gendered assumptions about what constituted 
appropriate work for women. The institutionalized discrimination against women 
working underground required the type o f technological, legal, and social remedies 
that could be implemented only in an era of great social change.
Until World War n, social forces in the United States maintained the sex- 
segregation of underground coal mining, but after the war, cultural and social 
movements began to chip away at the justification for those barriers. In the 1960s 
these movements crystallized into active steps to remove them, and by the 1970s 
significant changes opened a window of opportunity for women to enter the 
occupation. Technological, legal, and the most sweeping of all, social and cultural 
transformations began to question the fundamental relations o f sex and gender.
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The formal barriers were more easily dismantled by technology and legal change, 
but the informal ones were less easily breached. Mechanization mitigated most of 
the heavy burden of mine work, the civil rights movement brought forth the law, 
policy, and enforcement required to equalize opportunity for all Americans, and 
the women's movement, in its most radical form yet, energized a massive 
redefinition of social relations and the interest groups to translate new definitions 
into action.
Had women been allowed to work in underground mines before these 
changes occurred, few would have considered the occupation desirable. Coal 
mining was dirty, dangerous, and physically-demanding work. But the full 
mechanization of mining after World War II, eased the most burdensome labor of 
the underground miner. Mechanization came late to mining, not because the 
industry lacked the technology but because o f the unique environment o f the 
underground mine, the tradition of the "miner's freedom," and the power of the 
miner's union.1
As early as the 14th century, miners attempted to substitute human labor 
with alternative energy sources. Animals provided the muscle needed to operate 
primitive pumps, ventilation devices, and haulage equipment. Wood fires and 
water produced energy to assume some of the more onorous tasks of early mining. 
Similar to other facets of the industrialization process, mining witnessed its first 
real mechanization era with the development of the steam engine. Punching into 
the hillside to exploit the most accessible coal could not satisfy the production
^ h e  term "miner's freedom" refers to the control miners had over their job in the 
room assigned to them underground. Knowledge of the mining process belonged 
to the miner and his knowledge was passed on through the apprenticeship system. 
Keith Dix, What's a Coal Miner to Do?: The Mechanization o f Coal Mining 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 12-13.
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requirements for an industrializing world, but the steam engine powered the 
extention of mines to greater depth with enough energy for drilling, cutting, 
loading, hauling, hoisting, and pumping water. The steam engine set the stage for 
mechanization to move ahead at a rapid pace in most industries. But the mine was 
not a factory. Methods and innovations to speed up production in a textile mill 
could occur rapidly in a manipulable environment, but technological advancement 
generally moved at a slower pace in the mine.2
Industrial reorganization and change in relations of production that proved 
most useful in factory and office settings adapted less well to the mine 
environment. Factory workers labored under the supervision of one person 
charged with decision-making in a controlled environment. In the room and pillar, 
hand-loading method of mining, one miner used his judgment to assess the 
production and safety requirements existing in the room that was his area of 
responsibility.3 He rarely saw a supervisor more than once and day. Since he 
was paid by the amount o f coal he mined, he was able to set the pace of 
production in his room. The "miner's freedom" to exercize this judgement 
maintained the craft tradition of his occupation.4
The contract process of the hand-loading, room and piller era conformed to 
a craft oriented world-view and may have accounted for the miner's reluctance to 
embrace mechanization.5 Interviews with miners who experienced the transition
2Robert L. Marovelli and John M. Karhnak, "The Mechanization of Mining," in 
The Mechanization o f Work (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company,
1982.), 31-44.
3 See glossary of mining terms in Appendix I.
4Curtis Seltzer, Fire in the Hole. Miners and Managers in the American Coal 
Industry (The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 11.
5Priscilla Long, Where the Sun Never Shines. A History o f America's Blooky Coal 
Industry (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 133. Descriptive material on the
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to machine mining and wage work, failed to confirm a recognition of handloading 
as a craft or remorse over having to give it up. But there appears to be little doubt 
that "miner's freedom" influenced the slow pace of mine mechanization until after 
World War I I 6
Union policy toward mechanization remained ambiguous during the first 
half of the twentieth century. The United Mine Workers (UMWA) allowed the 
problems associated with mechanization to be addressed at the local level. 
Eventually the coal operators and the UMWA moved closer to agreement on the 
issue. During the 1950 contract negotiations with the Bituminous Coal Operators 
Association (BCOA), UMWA President John L. Lewis agreed to replace the 
"drill-and-shoot" method with the continuous mining machine, completing the 
mechanization of the coal mining industry.7 Full mechanical mining would strip 
the individual miner of his autonomy and actually decrease the number of miners 
required to produce coal, but miners adapted to the new process.8
Fears of declining quality and safety concerns also acted to slow the 
mechanization of mining. The first innovations relieved the miner of the most 
tedious and time consuming tasks. Undercutting machines and face drills, widely 
used in the early 1900s, eliminated much of the required pick work and manual 
drilling. By 1947, nearly two-thirds of America's underground coal was 
mechanically loaded, and manufacturers began testing early models of the 
continuous mining machines by 1948. The continuous miner promised a safer 
method of mining by chewing the coal from the face rather than using explosives,
room and pillar method appears in Appendix I.
6Barry P. Michrina, Pennsylvania Mining Families: The Search fo r  Dignity in the 
Coalfields (The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 62-81.
7See glossary of mining terms, Appendix I.
8Seltzer, Fire in the Hole,65.
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and increased productivity as well. Even so, industry remained skeptical, claiming 
that the machines fractured the coal into smaller than desired pieces and the cost of 
purchasing and maintaining the continuous miner lessened the advantage of higher 
productivity. The improved models overcame industry's skepticism and by the late 
1950s, almost two-thirds of all underground tonnage was extracted in this 
manner.9
Mechanization relieved miners of the heaviest physical burdens and 
increased productivity but at significant cost. Even though higher productivity 
justified the sizeable capital investment, mechanization introduced new hazards 
into an already dangerous environment. The early undercutting machines 
increased the rate of methane liberation as the coal was cut at a faster rate than a 
miner with a pick could have ever imagined. The continuous miner, chewing into 
the face at an even higher rate of speed, created an even greater potential for 
sudden and dangerous methane liberation. Not only was the coal cut faster, it was 
pulverized into finer particles creating additional amounts o f potentially explosive 
dust. As is typical, health and safety restraints followed slowly on the heels of 
technical innovation. Continuous miners are now equipped with water sprays that 
hold down the dust, and methane sensors that shut the machine down before the 
concentration of gas reaches a dangerous level. Miners and operators had every 
reason to be concerned with a rapid rate of mechanization.10
Eventually the longwall system of mining was introduced, making it 
possible to mine more and more coal with less and less human labor. Strip mining 
had become an even more efficient and safer method o f producing coal, 
threatening to eliminate underground mining altogether. But machines have not
9Marovelli, "The Mechanization o f Mining," 34-37.
10Ibid„ 40-41.
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eliminated the underground miner. At some point in the future, the coal operator 
may find that too much capital has been invested in the machine and the pace of 
mechanization will decrease. Surface mining will eventually approach the cost of 
underground mining as it attempts to reach deeper seams and when that happens, 
the industry should experience a reverse in the half-century decline in underground 
mining.11
At the peak of mechanization following World War II, few envisioned a 
decline in underground mining. Although miners and operators remained skeptical 
of the new machines, it was obvious that much of the hard, physical labor 
associated with the occupation had been ameliorated. As women began to 
consider mining in the 1970s, mechanization became critical in deciding whether 
or not to seek work underground, demonstrating the social implications of 
technology. But few women would have attempted to apply for a job in an 
underground coal mine had it not been for the legal and social transformations 
which touched all Americans after World War II.
The end of World War II brought not only the end of hostilities in Europe 
and Asia, it also brought into being what Stewart Bums has labeled "the post-war 
charter." Americans, specifically white males, were promised middle-class 
prosperity in exchange for conformity. But many appeared to be excluded from 
the contract. This was the reality o f post-war America. The ideal was a vision of 
opportunity and abundance for all. Closing the gap between the ideal and the real 
finally touched grass-roots America; not theories, goals, visions, and tactics o f the 
movements-but closing this particular gap. The civil rights movement emerged 
out of the outrage at inequality for blacks, but before the end of the 1960s it
n Ibid., 42.
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spawned the anti-war movement, the radical feminist movement, and others.
Before the dust settled women and blacks found a formidable legal base from 
which to fight against institutionalized inequality.12
Beginning in the 1950s, a series of legal steps established a foundation from 
which women launched an assault against employment discrimination in the coal 
industry. The Supreme Court's Brown v. Board o f Education decision nullified the 
constitutionally protected Separate but Equal concept in 1954, paving the way for 
the most comprehensive civil rights law since Reconstruction. The Equal Pay Act 
of 1963 made it illegal for employers to pay women and men at different rates for 
the same work. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited job discrimination on the 
basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, age, and physical disability, and created 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to administer its provisions. 
President Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order 11246 issued the following year 
repeated the affirmative action and nondiscrimination language of the Civil Rights 
Act, but required all government contractors to prohibit discrimination and act 
affirmatively to ensure that workers be employed regardless of race, creed, or 
color. The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act extended the affirmative 
action requirement to state and local governments.13
12Stewart Bums, Social Movements o f the 1960s: Searching fo r Democracy 
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), xiv; David Halberstam, The Fifties (New 
York: Villard Books, 1993); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years o f Hope, Days o f 
Rage, rev. ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1993); David Farber, The Age o f Great 
Dreams: America in the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994).
13Sara M. Evans, Born fo r Liberty: A History o f Women in America (New York: 
The Free Press, 1989), 275. George Berkley, John Rouse, and Ray Begovich, The 
Craft o f Public Administration, 5th ed. (Boston: Wm. C. Brown, Publishers,
1991), 122-129.
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By the early 1970s, tools existed to facilitate not only the quest for equality 
of opportunity, but also equality of results. Affirmative action evolved into a 
strategy that focused on race and sex disparities within institutions and 
occupations. Private sector employers began to recognize the impact of equal 
rights legislation and the will of the courts to find in favor of individual and class- 
action litigants. Many corporations voluntarily established affirmative action 
programs to ensure that they stayed in compliance with the law. The intense civil 
rights activities in all branches of the federal government helped produce the legal 
climate in which women could demand jobs in a previously sex-segregated 
industry. Coal operators like Westmoreland Coal Company developed affirmative 
action programs in the early 1970s, probably not in the spirit of welcoming women 
into the occupation but more likely to avoid possible litigation. Perhaps as 
important, Executive Order 11246 provided the vehicle to force the largest coal 
companies in the United States to begin hiring women. The visibility o f the 
affirmative action issue heightened awareness o f employment discrimination in the 
coal industry and opened opportunities that most women had never before 
considered.14
The civil rights movement was responsible for many of the changes 
experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, but the women's movement produced the 
most significant gains toward equalizing the sexes. It was the entire social context 
that emerged after 1945 that gave this second wave of feminism the potential to 
create fundamental changes in the status of women. The feminist movement 
proved more effective the second time around because it was able to build the 
mass constituency necessary to effect change, and the goals, programs, and tactics
14Tom Spangler, telephone interview by author. Colorado Springs, CO 15 
November 1995.
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of the movement conformed to post-war realities. War-time employment invested 
real value in women's work outside the home, much of it in non-traditional 
occupations previously closed to them. Many women developed new attitudes 
toward what a women's place should mean—calling into question the very ground 
on which gender relations had been constructed. What appeared to be driving the 
new feminist movement was its relationship to the struggle for equality that 
pervaded the current social trends.15
World War II produced in women new expectations and new grievances. 
War work provided many women a valued role in the economy, yet when the war 
ended women were expected to retreat into the home and shore up the battered 
American family. In the late 1950s Betty Friedan confronted the contradiction by 
exposing "the problem that has no name," and in her 1963 book, Feminine 
Mystique, she demonstrated that for many women, creating the perfect home and 
family left them unfulfilled. Response to Friedan's book and the subsequent 
formation of the National Organization for Women (NOW) marked the beginning 
of the second wave of feminism. By the end of the 1960s the women's movement 
split into two prominent factions—the liberal wing and the radical wing. Though 
painful to feminists, the diversity of the movement accounted for its later success. 
The liberal wing, represented by NOW, sought change primarily through legal and 
political reform. Radical feminism, rooted in the civil rights movement and the 
New Left, eventually repudiated liberalism for attempting to repair a broken
15William H. Chafe, "Feminism in the 1970s," Dissent (fall, 1974): 509. For an 
analysis o f the early feminist movement see Nancy Cott, The Grounding o f 
Modern Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Halberstam, The 
Fifties, 591-597.
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system. They insisted, instead, on revolutionary restructuring of all societal 
institutions.16
The radical wing can be credited with the theoretical groundwork that 
began to chip away at the underlying justifications for the informal barriers to 
women working underground. Although grounded in the New Left, radical 
feminists sought an autonomous movement that identified the male system of 
power as the primary enemy. While male members of the New Left searched for 
revolutionary credentials of oppression, women radicals needed no such 
justification. Feminists linked the personal and the political and brought their 
message to every woman through consciousness-raising groups and 
confrontational activities.17
Disruptive confrontations on Wall Street, in Congressional hearing rooms, 
and at bridal fairs prompted men and women to dismiss radical feminism as a 
"lunatic fringe," but they helped stimulate a national debate over traditional gender 
assumptions. Their outrageous activities made them a mobilizing agent, drawing 
members into the mainstream, liberal wing presided over by the National 
Organization for Women. The second wave of feminism became a social 
movement represented by the collective weight of American women who began to 
confront the thousands of small pieces o f inequality. The liberal wing of the 
diverse movement capitalized on the ideas that emerged from the radical wing by
16Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: Norton & Co. Inc., 1963). 
Alice Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America, 1967-1975 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 15. Echols and others have 
argued that radical feminism was rooted in the 60s movement, but Nancy Cott has 
shown that the earlier movement in the 1910s prefigured much of the second 
radical feminist movement. Nancy F. Cott The Grounding o f M odem Feminism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
17 Echols, Daring to Be Bad, 83; Evans, Born fo r Liberty, 288-289.
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translating them into policy and law. A mass movement was capable of reaching 
into all segments of society and ultimately touched the material reality of the lives 
of working women. Working-class women were not traditionally susceptible to 
feminist ideas, but these were different times.18
Post-war changes in the make-up of the workforce made working-class 
women more receptive to feminism. By the early 1970s consciousness-raising 
groups began to appear in urban working class communities and in rural 
communities across the United States. A 1973 nationwide survey reported a 
significant shift in the attitudes of blue-collar wives over the previous decade.
These women confessed they no longer accepted the notion of female subservience 
and many stated that if they were to start over, they would not choose the 
traditional role o f housewife. A full third stated that women's liberation was "the 
best thing that has happened to us in ages." The power of feminist ideas shook 
long-held assumptions about what it meant to be female and male. Women’s 
liberation, or its more commonly used contraction—"Women's Lib," appeared 
frequently in conversations within the working class as women sought non- 
traditional responses to traditional inequality.19
The post-war technical and legal transitions opened a new window of 
opportunity for women, but the feminist movement was the necessary catalyst that 
spurred women to question the gender-role assumptions that grounded much of 
the justification for occupational barriers. The consequences of the sexual 
revolution and fundamental changes in divorce laws added a sense of urgency to
18Flora Davis, Moving the Mountain: The Women's Movement in America since 
1960 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Barbara Ryan, Feminism and the 
Women’s Movement, Ideology, and Activism (New York: Routledge, 1992);
Evans, Born fo r  Liberty, 287-295.
19"Ms. Blue Collar," Time, 6 May 1974, 80.
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push formerly forbidden boundaries. Women experimented with the newly- 
discovered liberation. Some sought sexual freedom that had previously been 
acceptable for only men. Others took advantage of new, no-fault divorce laws to 
break free of stifling and suffocating marriage bonds.20
Social commentators presented contradicting analyses concerning the 
rapidly shifting ground beneath traditional customs and beliefs. Some saw the 
changes as a degeneration into moral anarchy, but others welcomed what they 
viewed as the end of the sexual repression of women. By the early 1970s rising 
divorce and illegitimacy rates produced an alarming feminization of an expanding 
poverty class. No-fault divorce laws bore unexpected consequences. The legal 
reform intended to create more equitable settlements for women but instead 
impoverished many women and children. More and more women found that 
liberation in a still unequal economic world could be a mixed blessing. Few men 
could be expected to cheer women on in the struggle for equality because it 
seemed that the emerging battle between the sexes held perceived, zero-sum 
consequences. Men suspected that with every gain women made toward an equal 
share of opportunity, there appeared a corresponding loss of male power and 
prestige, setting up what Anne Steinmann and David Fox termed "the male 
dilemma."21
20Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and 
Economic Consequences fo r  Women and Children in America (New York: The 
Free Press, 1985); Edwin M. Schur ed., The Family and the Sexual Revolution 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
21Pitirim Sorokin worried that sexual freedom had begun to expand beyond the 
limits of safety and called for an "awakening from our ignorance," and Richard 
Klemer recognized that parents could no longer hope for premarital sexual 
morality and that the only way to help children protect themselves was to dispense 
contraceptive advice. Sorokin and Klemer participated in a 1962 symposium on 
the sexual revolution and the family. The Family and the Sexual Revolution,
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When the dust of the 1960s revolutionary activity began to settle, there had 
been no miraculous leveling of the occupational playing field, but legal and 
technical impediments had lost some of their power to deny women opportunity. 
Additionally, women began to feel a sense of their own power--the kind of power 
that resonated through shared consciousness. Women sought change in big ways 
and little ways, affirming the linkage of the personal and political. Attitudinal 
change occurred in bits and pieces, often escaping the attention of movement 
activists. Women's apparent failure to perceive their own enslavement concerned 
radical feminists in the early years of the movement, but a Marxist analysis 
attributed their lack of awareness to "false consciousness." Activist Elinor Langer 
later questioned that attribution. In a 1989 restrospective she admitted that 
consciousness, "not coincident with immediate material interests will not produce a 
revolutionary movement." She was right. A shared consciousness did emerge 
when the material interests of thousands of women became intimately connected to 
the ideas o f the women’s movement.22
Men did not share women's desire for change. Fundamental institutional 
assumptions based on gender were being dismantled, and thousands of men feared 
their lives would be forever diminished if these assumptions were undermined. In 
most cases, their fears were justified. Men, indeed, had much to lose. So the 
occupational playing field became a battlefield between the sexes. As women
Edwin M. Schur ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964). Lenore J. 
Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences fo r  Women and Children in America (New York: The Free Press, 
1985). Anne Steinmann and David J. Fox, The Male Dilemma: Haw to Survive the 
Sexual Revolutioin, (New York: Jason Aronson, 1974).
22Elinor Langer, "Notes for Next Time: A Memoir of the 1960s," in Toward a  
History o f the New Left: Essays from  within the Movement R. David Myers ed. 
(New York: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989).
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pushed toward greater opportunity, men reacted at best sullenly, at worst with 
hostility. But the timing was right. Women believed they could do the job, and 
that discriminatory barriers could not keep them out. They also cared less that a 
job might be considered inappropriate for a woman than they cared about earning a 
good living.23
The first steps toward dismantling the gender-barriers to underground 
mining were tentative, yet no matter how insignificant, each step received national 
media attention. In September of 1972, a New York Times headline announced, "4 
Women Seek Jobs as Miners, And Man's World is in conflict." Four women 
applied for work underground at the Clinchfield Coal Company in Cleveland, 
Virginia. The startling announcement enumerated the enduring beliefs about 
women in mines, including the long-standing myth that women brought bad luck in 
a mine and that a miner could always rely on his buddy. "But what if this buddy 
were a woman?" asked the writer. Men's responses were mixed but a Clinchfield 
official was quoted as saying that no man would be hired there until the "woman 
question" was settled.
The women were confident. Two of the women were mother and 
daughter, and their confidence stemmed from homemaking and childrearing 
experience. They believed they could handle the job because mechanization had 
replaced the "common shovel-wielder" with repairmen and operators. The mother, 
Katie Alderson, whose disabled husband supported his wife's effort, admitted to 
being motivated by the money. As a garment factory worker earning $2.10 an 
hour, her pay had recently been reduced to $1.65 after she took a two-week sick 
leave. She got angry.
23Steinmann, The Male Dilemma, xi.
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We were sitting around in the cafeteria, talking about equal rights.. . I 
had been watching a show on television the night before. There was 
one of those women's lib people on from New York. When I thought 
of men making all that money in the mines, I figured we could too.
Both Alderson and her daughter, Catherine Tompa, described their 
expectations of mining in terms of their homemaking experience. The younger 
woman believed that confronting a crisis several miles inside a mountain could not 
be any worse than the perils she encountered in raising four children. Alderson 
hinted that mining might even be a bit easier. After working at the factory, coming 
home to clean out the barn, then staying up all night taking care of her six children, 
she thought she would "like to come home from the mine at 3:30 p.m. and sit 
around on the porch." There may have been a touch of bravado in Katie 
Alderson's words because she surely realized that no matter what job she held, she 
would not spend much time sitting on the porch. She also knew the physical 
requirements of underground mining. Her husband assured the reporter that Mrs. 
Alderson "was raised by the drift mouth....she knows all about it."24
The debate concerning the women continued in the The United Mine 
Workers Journal. In the section titled "The Rank & File Speaks," the journal 
asked miners from UMWA Local 1098 what they thought of the possibility of 
working with women. The response was mixed. One man rejected the idea that a 
man should keep a woman home, "just like a slave," but he blamed Women's Lib 
for causing the climbing divorce rate that allowed kids to run wild. He suggested 
that most women could not do the kind of work required in the mine, and that 
instead, women working in the "bloomer (garment) factories" should organize a 
union to address the wage issue. Another man mentioned the superstition against
24The New York Times, 9 September 1972.
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women being underground, saying "I wouldn't go down there if a woman was
there." He also feared that if women were hired they would have to shower with
the men and he said "you know that ain't right." A third man brought up the sexual
implications of women working underground.
Women are just not as tied to their husbands when they start working....Who 
does she spend her day with?....a woman and a man might be working alone on 
a job for a couple hours....who knows what would happen in a situation like 
that?
Men's response characterized the resistence that women would face once they got
underground, not only from co-workers but within the union itself. The attitudes
also reveal how men reacted to the cultural changes swirling about them.25
It is unclear if Mrs. Alderson and Mrs. Tompa were ever hired by
Clinchfield, but the UMWA announced that eight months after applying, the
women still had not heard from the mine and had become discouraged. UMWA
miners were facing layoffs, and because of union seniority rules those hired would
have to be union men. It appeared that neither the coal company nor the union
would go out of their way to support the women. The rank and file miners
generally appeared to be bitterly against the idea. Catherine Tompa responded:
The people who say a woman's place is in the home are the people who can 
afford to. We want these jobs for one reason: money. We work hard now and 
we expect to be given the same jobs as the men have. If we can't do it, we'll 
admit we're wrong.26
In December of 1973, two women in Jenkins, Kentucky, became the first 
women hired as underground coal miners. Again the event was heralded in the
25"Should Women Be Coal Miners?" United Mine Workers Journal, 15 May 
1973,13.
26"Textile Workers Seek Jobs in Mines," United Mine Workers Journal, 15 May 
1973, 12.
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national media, this time on the "Family, Food, Fashions, Furnishings" section of 
The New York Times. Diana Baldwin and Anita Cherry, single women with 
dependent children, came from coal-mining families and wanted to be miners 
because of the high wages. Their success and Alderson's and Tompa's failure 
probably resulted from the timing of the event. Large coal companies had begun 
to realize by 1973 that voluntary compliance with the Civil Rights Act and 
Affirmative Action made better sense than a lawsuit. Beth-Elkhom, a subsidiary of 
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, hired the women, according to a company official,
"in accordance with our equal employment policy." He admitted that there was 
government pressure to do so, but they recognized that "women are becoming 
more conscious of and willing to obtain jobs like....coal miner, which offer higher 
rates of pay."
The experience of Baldwin and Cherry prefigured those of future women 
coal miners. Men had been forewarned of the coming changes, and although the 
two women were not welcomed with unconditional acceptance, the women did 
find support. Their co-workers grudgingly admitted being surprised at how well 
they worked in the mines. "I've seen a whole lot worse...and, of course, I've seen 
some better," one co-worker commented. Some response was curiously 
ambiguous, like the section foreman who said, "if they got enough guts to come in 
her, I say buddy, let 'em come. I think there ought to be two of'em on every 
section. They really perk up the men."
Co-workers' wives voiced the lion's share o f complaints about the women. 
Miners attempted to blunt any threat the women might pose by telling their wives 
that the women were "big, fat and ugly." But the ruse failed when pictures of the 
women appeared in the local newspapers. Baldwin was told by the miners' wives 
that mining was not a woman's job and that she and Cherry should "get husbands
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and let them support us." Baldwin reflected the tenor of the times by stating that 
although she had three children and had never married, she did not much believe in 
marriage. She stated proudly, "I can support myself without any help from 
anybody."27
The hiring of the Kentucky women brought grudging support from the 
UMWA. Announcing their employment, the UMWA journal emphasized the 
proud union tradition of the new miners, saying, "Both women like their jobs and 
recommend it to other women who would like to make good money and also have 
the great protection our union can provide for them." The article went on to say 
the women's jobs seemed to have no apparent negative effect on their families, and 
that both women were active in union affairs and "may someday seek office." The 
lack of resistance to the employment o f Cherry and Baldwin contrasted the earlier 
opposition faced by Alderson and Tompa. The attitude change on the part of the 
coal operator and union demonstrated the potentcy of recently enacted anti- 
discrimination policies.28
An article in The New York Times in February of 1976 provided a rare 
follow-up to the women's story. Cherry quit the mine and subsequently married a 
foreman at Mine 19. Baldwin sought and was granted a promotion to a surface 
job as clerk. But the breach of the long-standing barrier to the employment of 
women miners resonated far beyond the short careers of the two women. By 1976 
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation employed 80 underground female miners and the 
UMWA reported that of the 148,000 miners employed in the United States, 207
27"In Coal Mine No. 19, Two Women Work Alongside the Men," The New York 
Times, 18 May 1974,16.
28"First Women Get Jobs Underground," United Mine Workers Journal, 16 
January 1974, 7.
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were women. Baldwin and Cherry’s careers were short, but they represented a
significant boost to working women. Women began to trickle into the occupation,
not only because of the relaxed standards of coal company employment, changing
attitudes on the part of women and men, and the pull o f high wages, but because
women had done it.29
The historic opening of non-traditional, high-wage occupations also
reached across racial lines. Traditional mining districts in the eastern United States
contained not only white women seeking higher paying jobs, thousands of black
women sought them too. Olivia Rowe of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, mother of
eight, struggled to sppport her family on $ 50 dollars a week, drawing heavily on
relief, until she became aware that a local mine was developing a policy of hiring
women She applied for a coal-mining job at the Nanty Glo mine and was hired in
October of 1974. Ebony magazine profiled Rowe as a pioneer whose southern
roots had provided little opportunity. "Back home in Georgia, when times were
hard," she said, "we'd all pick cotton for $17 a week." Working as a coal miner
allowed her to break free o f low-wage jobs and dependence on others. Rowe
claimed she encountered few problems with co-workers, but admitted to being
something of a loner by discouraging friendships, "especially among the miners."
She was philosophical about her work environment.
In a job like this there are certain kinds of things that you have to contend with, 
like bad language, wisecracks and so on. That's part of the iob-part of working 
in the mines. But taking a bath....well, I do that at home.3
National media interest in women miners continued past mid-decade. In 
Nobember 1976, the Wall Street Journal carried a front page story entitled
29The New York Times, 22 February 1976, 29.
30"Lady Miner Digs Her Job," Ebony, 19 October 1974,116.
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"Women in the Pits," in November of 1976. The estimated number of women 
working in mines had risen from 207 at the beginning of the year to 700 by 
November. The media watched the numbers closely. The article featured a 
woman miner from Jenkins, Kentucky, but suggested that even though she was not 
typical, neither was she a novelty. The story noted the usual comments concerning 
male resistence but new elements made it appear as though these women were 
finally being taken seriously. Coal operator response received a more 
comprehensive examination than had appeared in previous stories. As a result of 
intense government pressure to comply with anitdiscrimination legislation, many of 
the large coal companies had begun hiring women. But others hoped to resist such 
pressure and openly criticized operators like Bethlehem Steel and Westmoreland 
Coal. Sociologist Helen Lewis, of Clinch Valley College in Wise, West Virginia, 
noted that many coal companies did not want women working underground 
because "they feel they have enough labor problems without adding further 
dissension and conflict."31
Now that more than just a handful of women worked underground, coal 
operators could better assess whether affirmative action compliance justified 
industry criticism. The executive vice president of Westmoreland Coal stated that 
women had become a welcome source of labor for the company. At 
Westmoreland's Stonega division, seven of the nine women miners had enrolled in 
training programs to become foremen. Women did not just want to become 
miners, the official noted, "they want to learn to become first-rate professional 
miners." Even so, women continued to face significant resistance. In Logan, West 
Virginia, a group of miner's wives staged a rally protesting the hiring of women at
31 Wall Street Journal, 29 November 1976, 1.
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a local mine, forcing a temporary mine shut-down. One rally participant 
proclaimed that women working underground were immoral, and that "no decent 
woman would want to work there." After all, she continued, "Distance is 
decency." The miners' wives exposed an issue that confounded women miners 
during these early years and into the 1980s. They faced male hostility 
underground that could set them apart from their co-workers, and opposition from 
miners' wives threatened to isolate them from their community.32
The 1976 article made it clear that even though women miners continued 
to confront hostility and resistence, many were making a place for themselves in 
the culture of mining. Their numbers were rising and coal-mine employers 
appeared willing to hire and promote them. Those willing to stick it out long 
enough were beginning to earn the respect of their male co-workers. The words 
of some of these women evoke a much richer description of what it was like 
during these years than the national media was able to convey. They entered the 
occupation when the window of opportunity began to open and it proved to be a 
lonely experience.33
Vira Rose represents the successful breach of the gender barrier in the coal 
industry and how women would eventually manage other informal obstacles 
existing in an underground mine. Rose applied for a mining job in 1975 through an 
unemployment agency. Applying in the traditional manner had failed to produce 
an interview and she realized that companies would be forced to deal with her 
once she handed them an unemployment slip. After reviewing her background, the 
company decided that Rose would be "tough enough to take it." When she went
32Ibid.
33Moore Collection.
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into the mine she was married, but divorced soon after. With a daughter to
support, Rose understood the options.
....with all the bills piling up and with [her daughter's] medical problems, well 
he [her husband], just wasn't concerned. I knew 1 had to do something. I had 
just got over pneumonia when I took the physical for the mines. By the grace 
of God 1 passed. That's what 1 believed in.34
Rose had worked with her brothers in a family mine as an adolescent and 
knew at least the way a mine worked, but not the culture of mining. Her co­
workers ignored her during her first three weeks of employment. One man finally 
broke the ice, and "little by little they came around," once they realized that she 
carried her share of the load. After a year underground, Rose knew she had 
passed an important hurdle when one of the bosses traded two men for her, but 
resentment from miner's wives was not as easily overcome. But she worried less 
about the wives than their husbands—she had to work with the men:
....the wives think we're all prostitutes....If I see them I grin to myself because I 
know what the men have said about them...They think we're awful, that we're a 
disgrace. I don't go to church. I go to PTA when I get time. But mostly I live 
in my own world, and don't deal with the community here.3 ̂
Women miners often confronted hostility from co-workers' wives. Rose employed 
a common coping strategy of limiting social activities to avoid appearance of 
impropriety. The result was self-imposed isolation from community support.
After gaining experience and training, Rose received her mine foreman 
papers and began "bossing." She was a production foreman in a pillar section, 
one of the most dangerous operations in underground mining. Eventually she
34Vira Rose interview by Marat Moore., Skygusty, West Virginia, 1 February
1983, Moore Collection
35Ibid.
54
supervised a down-shift crew and her management philosophy illustrates why she
was a successful miner.
I never put my crews doing something I wouldn't do I say. "Hey, let me spare
you with that shovel,.... or let me help you move that rock.” And they say.
"Hell, if that little old woman can do that, and me a big old six-foot 
something " and it works.
But her words also evoke the sense of physical vulnerability that haunts most
miners. She experienced lung problems, and after six surgeries in seven years to
correct other physical problems, she began to understand her body's limitations.
She hoped to be out from underground one year after the interview. Rose was
confident she had opened doors for other women and considered herself part of
the women's movement. "The ones that aren’t,” she said, "who come to work
with make-up on, they're not here for the work. They don't make it." She believed
that women had become more accepted and that they were not harassed as much.
At her mine, they had put a stop to it. They simply would not allow it. "You have
to hold the line with harassment. Stick to your guns, and call their bluff."
Rose went into the mines with the idea that she would pay off her bills and
then quit in three years. But she stayed because o f the money. Even though she
would miss the people and the work, being a miner was not a long-term option.
A year from now I'll be in school lull time and become a federal mine 
inspector, and then I'll open my own mines, and I'll know how to get around 
them all then. I won’t need nobody.37
West Virginian Shirley Boone went to work underground in 1976 and, 
after three years, became a boss. Her father, uncles, and cousins worked in the 
mines, and Boone understood early that mining was something that women did not
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
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do. Her father died when she was seventeen, but when she went to work
underground she wore his hardhat. She also kept his lunch pail, watch, and knife:
He didn't really enjoy the mines, he just worked. A person had to have a job to
live, so it was a job he worked at. That's the way he looked at it 1 expected
to be worked to death. But the mine is a whole totally different world. It's so 
dark, but in there, I really liked being closed around.
Boone expressed the ambivalent response to the underground environment not
uncommen in conversations with other miners. The mine represented danger as
well as comfort, but ultimately it was a job. The men were friendly to her and her
crew looked out for one another. But when they saw her outside of the mine, they
passed her without speaking, hoping to avoid problems with their wives.38
Boone believed the company promoted her to foreman because they had to
have a woman boss. "I was a symbol," she said, "and that got to me. I didn't want
to be a symbol." And so she set about proving herself. Boone did not regret
working in the mine but eventually felt she should not have become a boss. Being
a foreman meant leaving the union, and the union could have protected her from
being laid off. Boone believed that foremen were pressured to cut legal comers
and without union support, a boss could be fired for refusing an order.
Like other women miners, Boone's feelings about the women's movement
were complex. She felt like a "women's libber" and realized she was breaking new
ground. But at times she questioned the entire concept:
Do those women in the women's movement even know what they're talking 
about when they talk about women miners? I don't think they do. Sometimes
when I was down there working my tail off, I'd think, Damn women's lib.
If it wasn't for them, I wouldn't be down here working my tail off.39
38Shirley Boone interview by Marat Moore, Crichton, West Virginia, 22 
September 1983, Moore Collection.
39Ibid.
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The excitement of being a "pioneer" woman miner could not be sustained
indefinitely. The reality of the physical challenges women faced underground often
brought the feeling of "specialness" to an abrupt end, leading many to question
why they were working there. "Women's Lib" might have seemed an acceptable
scapegoat to Boone.
Boone had a series of operations to correct physical problems, and during
one period of extended sick leave, the company laid her off. She filed suit against
them but at the time of the interview the case had not been heard. She missed the
mine but was proud of what she accomplished.
You have to have grit and determination to make good as a coal miner. You've 
got to want it, and like it a little bit. I've had my good times in there. In the
mines, you're always looking out for the other guy On those assembly’
lines...you don't care about the next guy down, as long as you get yours done.
Although most women miners were in their twenties and thirties, their 
ranks included some who were older. Elizabeth Laird began work at an Alabama 
mine at the age of fifty-four. Like so many of the others, Laird came from a family 
of miners and was bom in a mining camp in the late 1920s. Her father mined coal 
until the age o f seventy. Divorced after twenty six years of marriage, Laird was 
left to support a son confined to a wheelchair. Remarriage did not seem like much 
of an option and instead of working the two jobs she was accustomed to, she went 
into the mines in 1976.
Perhaps because of her maturity, Laird's mining experience in some ways 
differed from the younger women. For example miners' wives accepted her work 
relationship with their husbands. She "ate out" frequently and insisted that her co-
40Ibid.
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workers would come and sit with her to visit regardless of their marital status She
did not believe that older women miners were perceived as less sexually desirable:
Between you and me and the gatepost, I think the older women are as bad to go 
with the men as the younger ones...I don't really have any close women friends 
down there, because I'm kind of drifting back into my own age bracket. We 
have girls who don't care what they say. and it's embarrassing to me.4 ^
Laird believed that her demeanor earned the respect of her co-workers. "I don't 
horse-play and I don't talk nasty," she said, "and I feel they respect me because I'm 
a lady." She also believed that her co-workers felt they could count on her in 
underground emergencies. Like other, older women miners, Laird may have been 
viewed as a symbol of motherhood. Male miners often discussed how they would 
react if a female family member worked in a mine. Because of the sexually-explicit 
language, hard physical work, and hazardous conditions, it was difficult for them 
to imagine their own mother working underground. Older women miners made 
the image more concrete, and their age appeared to grant them certain benefits not 
enjoyed by the younger women. It is perhaps best not to make too much o f these 
dubious benefits in light of the hard physical work required of male and female 
miners, young and old alike.42
Laird wished she had gone into the mines earlier so that she could have 
retired sooner. She continued to work underground at age sixty-one only because 
she needed the money, otherwise she would have chosen not to work. "I had an 
ideal life until I was divorced," she said, "and I loved my home." Laird intended to 
retire at age sixty-five after ten years in the mine. An experienced woman miner,
4 Elizabeth Laird interview by Marat Moore, Cordova, Alabama, 23 August 1983, 
Moore Collection.
42Ibid.
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or even a male miner, would have winced at the thought of being sixty years old
and still mining coal.43
Linda Raisovich entered the occupation after graduating from high school,
and her experience reflects the perspective of a different generation. Raisovich
began working at a West Virginia mine in 1977 despite objections raised by her
coal-miner father. Raisovich was assigned to her father’s crew and instead of
helping her adjust to her new environment, he seemed determined to make her job
more difficult. Women miners expected this type of behavior from co-workers but
not family members. It was the miner's tradition to act as mentor to sons and
brothers, but Raisovich discovered that the tradition did not necessarily apply to
daughters. The shift supervisor eventually told her father, "Look we've got to
have a woman here, and I'm not going to let you run her off." The foreman put
Raisovich on another crew and her father eventually abandonend his opposition.
Her father's approval mattered a great deal to Raisovich:
....my dad realized, she's here to stay, she's made up her mind to stick with it.
So he never gave me a hard time after that. He'd help me, or if I had any 
questions, he was always eager to help me. He was proud me, ....I never had 
any problem with the men....I had it easier, I had a big dad that worked 
there.44
Even so, Raisovich struggled to become accepted, and recognized that 
there would be those besides her father who needed to be won over. Regardless of 
how hard she worked or how "good" she did, some of the men failed to accept 
her. She would joke with them at first and attempt to "laugh things off1' but if they 
continued to bother her, "you'd have to get rough right back with them, and
43Ibid.
44Linda Raisovich interview by Marat Moore, Welch, Virginia, 12 August 1982, 
Moore Collection.
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threaten to see the foreman." Raisovich believed, in 1982, that women had just 
begun to be accepted in the coal industry and looked forward to the day that a 
woman would be elected as president of the "international" [UMWA], To 
Raisovich, election to a union position represented a symbol of success to the 
woman miner.45
Like most women miners raised in the union tradition, Raisovich attached
significant meaning to the UMWA's role in protecting the rights of coal miners,
even women. Her union heritage had deep roots. Her grandfather immigrated
from Yugoslavia to work in the coal mines of America, and helped establish a
UMWA local in the early 1930s. The historical irony was not lost on Raisovich:
He was one of the first from this area to join the union. When they joined the
union in those days, they were thrown out of their company houses my
grandfather worked in the old mines directly below the mines that I worked in, 
the seam below the one I worked in. They lived up in the exact same holler 
where I worked. I think it makes you a stronger union person, when your 
whole family has struggled and gone through all this....You feel you got to 
hang onto it and do the most you can to preserve it.46
The union apparently tested the faith of women miners during these early 
years. The UMWA, like the coal industry, would be forced through legal means to 
open their doors to women. In 1980, the EEOC pressured them into appointing 
women to positions within the union, and as a result Raisovich was selected as a 
member o f the UMWA's Safety Division. The appointment changed her 
relationship to mining. Part of her job now required that she participate in the 
investigation o f mining fatalities. Although often painful and disturbing, the 
position gave her the opportunity to make a real contribution to coal mine safety.
45Ibid.
46Ibid.
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In addition to investigating mine fatalities, Raisovich and her committee initiated 
programs designed to prevent accidents.
Raisovich began to see men differently after she began investigating 
fatalities. She discovered that men were not as strong as "a man is supposed to 
be." She found that "a lot of them are a lot weaker than women. Emotionally 
things will disturb them that wouldn't disturb me. I think its fear that's always 
there underground...that something could happen to one of you." Raisovich's 
relationship to death in the mines did not exist for most women. But she never 
investigated the fatality of a woman, an event that most women miners assumed 
would someday happen.47
Underground coal mining had long been deemed one of the most 
dangerous occupations in the industrialized world, and women would sooner or 
later become part of the statistics. In 1979, Marilyn McCusker became the first. 
Pinned beneath an eighteen-foot section of roof, McCusker died from apparent 
asphyxiation on October 4, 1979, at the Rushton Mine in central Pennsylvania. 
Re-bolting an intersection next to a mined-out area, McCusker noticed the roof 
working, alerting the other operator to flee. She never made it out. The roof-fall 
killed her, but apparently she was not crushed. McCusker suffered no broken 
bones but one of her knees was bent upward against the windpipe. The fatality 
was widely reported in the media at a time when national reports of coal mine 
accidents were reserved for disasters involving multiple deaths. The death of a 
woman miner seemed to be significant.
Marilyn McCusker, then Marilyn Williams, applied for a job with the 
Rushton Mining Company in 1975. Denied employment, McCusker and three
47Ibid.
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other women filed a lawsuit claiming sex discrimination. The lawsuit was 
eventually settled in 1977 when McCusker received a cash settlement and a job 
offer as part of an out-of-court settlement. Prior to going into the mines, 
McCusker, a divorced mother working as a nurse's aide, remarried shortly after 
securing employment at the mine and her husband spoke of her relationship to her 
occupation:
She loved it from the the first day. All her life, though, basically she'd never 
had a good day's pay. She was just doing menial work. When she came back 
the first day, she was smiling from ear to ear. She just loved it.48
Ironically, Alan McCusker had to file suit to receive survivor's benefits 
from his wife's death. Mining company officials told him that Pennslvania worker's 
compensation law contained a provision that said a widower was entitled to full 
benefits only if he was dependent upon the deceased worker and incapable of 
supporting himself. The twenty-eight-year-old, able-bodied man, accused the 
company of treating his wife unequally in death as well as in life. "Marilyn didn't 
win everything she thought she did," he said. "The legal battle may not be over." 
Eventually the company agreed to pay the $227 weekly benefits before the case 
came before a workmen's compensation hearing, but the husband vowed to 
challenge the state law that discriminated against widowers. Marilyn McCusker's 
death represented the extreme rite of passage that each woman coal miner in the 
early 1970s hoped she would not be the one to perform. But it fit into the entire 
mosaic. Coal miners earned significantly higher wages than other laborers
48"U.S. Journal: Central PA., Called at Rushton," The New Yorker, 12 November 
1979, 182-189; The New York Times, 5 October 1979.
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primarily because of the hazards inherent in an underground environment and most 
women understood this, but McCusker was the one who brought it home.49
Other male-dominated, high risk occupations held a dirty little secret. Men 
who labored under hazardous conditions, like ground combat troops, forest 
firefighters, and loggers received certain benefits for the risk they endured. 
Historically, society attempted to protect nurturers of future generations by 
making these occupations off-limits to mothers and future mothers. But by 
constructing these barriers, society prevented one-half of the population from 
achieving the same benefits and rights accorded to the other. The tangled web of 
that thinking helped produce the inequality that women addressed in the 1970s by 
pushing their way into what appeared to be the most discriminatory occupation in 
industrial America. Marilyn McCusker's death was a consequence.
Media attention made it seem that women rushed to coal-mining jobs in 
droves—battering down the bastions of male privilege. While it is true that 
hundreds of women sought these jobs, they continued to represent an insignificant 
percentage of the total coal mining population. An accurate picture of 
underground coal-mine employment statistics broken down by sex was as difficult 
to compose in 1975-1980 as it is today, though the numbers were easier to track in 
the 1970s. During the latter part of the decade, The National Insititute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) provided figures on the number of 
women who began coal mining careers. Contacted recently, NIOSH reports that it 
is no longer able to accurately provide the same type of information today. But in 
1978, their figures were used to confirm that indeed, hundreds of women were 
entering the occupation.
4977zc New Yorker, 12 November 1979, 184.
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NIOSH began keeping records in 1969 but no women appear until 1973. 
Between 1973 and 1978, 2,000 had begun mining careers. Records show that 
between 1977 and 1978. the number o f women coal miners more than doubled. 
West Virginia led the nation in the number of women miners, followed by 
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Virginia. Western states also reported a 
significant growth in the number of women entering the mines. But as a 
percentage o f the total coal-mining workforce, the numbers seemed less 
impressive. They remained statistically insignificant and by 1978 it appeared as 
though the discriminatory hiring practices needed to be addressed, not by ones and 
twos, but on the class-action level. The power of the political interest group was 
waiting in the wings to bring the issue to such a level.50
Mass communication and consciousness-raising groups spread feminist 
ideas of empowerment, creating a tiny bubble of individual attempts by women to 
gain work in underground coal mines. But the social transformations of the 1960s 
and early 1970s also advanced the belief in group power. Elinor Langer 
articulated the feminist take on the concept. "Our responsibility was always to our 
collective sisterhood, always to work in a group, always to brings others 
along.... to (do) otherwise... was itself evidence of the great scarlet stain: Privilege." 
Individual women succeeded in breaking the gender barrier in the coal industry but 
many experienced problems adapting to the culture. More important, a statistically 
significant disparity between men and women underground miners continued to 
exist. An interest group was needed to lobby for women's entry into the
50"Number o f Women Coal Miners Doubles During 1977-1978." Coal Mining 
Women’s Support Team News 1, no. 4 (September-October 1978): 1. Coal 
Employment Project Records, Accession No. 355, East Tennessee State 
University, Johnson City, Tennessee (hereafter cited as CEP Records).
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profession on a grand scale, and in 1978, the Coal Employment Project formed to 
fill that need51.
The genesis of the project was one woman's confrontation with the myth 
that allowing a women to enter an underground mine brought bad luck. Activists 
from two Tennessee public interest groups attempted to tour an underground mine 
in April of 1977 in order to better understand the deep mining operations of 
Appalachia's dominant industry. The local mine operator agreed to the tour but 
refused to allow a female staff member of the East Tennessee Research 
Corporation to enter with the group. Stung by an apparent act of discrimination, 
the ETRC staff immediately began to brainstorm about the implications of the 
rebuke. Although they understood the mythical origins of the coal operator's 
decision, they reasoned that if women could not even enter a mine, neither would 
they stand much of a chance of being hired to work in one. Without the chance of 
employment, women would thus be denied economic equality in a region 
dominated by the coal industry.
Attorney Betty Jean Hall volunteered to research the issue and determined 
that federal laws prohibited, if not the intent of coal industry employment 
practices, then the consequences of long-standing, traditional exclusion of women 
in underground mining. The remedy lay in Executive Order 11246, as amended, 
that prohibited companies with federal contracts from discriminating in hiring on 
the basis of sex. Making the research conclusions especially relevant was the fact 
that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) based in Knoxville, Tennessee, 
purchased the largest amount of coal produced in the United States. Hall
5 danger, Toward A History o f the New Left, 117.
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discovered, too, that the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) could enforce the executive order.
Hall knew discrimination existed. Her study revealed two fundamental 
realities. The records indicated that 99.8 percent of all coal miners in the U.S. 
were men, and the federal government projected that as many as 45,000 new coal 
mining jobs would become available each year until 1985. By this time it seemed 
clear that a full-time interest group, dedicated to correcting such obvious 
discrimination, was needed so the Coal Employment Project became an 
independent operation. Originally funded by a small grant from the Ms 
Foundation, in early 1978 CEP received grants from the Playboy Foundation and 
the John Hay Witney Foundation. In May 1978, armed with the documentation 
citing the industry's discriminatory practices and based on Executive Order 11246, 
the CEP filed a complaint against 153 coal companies with the OFCCP.
The complaint stated that the named coal companies had failed to perform 
their mandatory duties as required under the executive order, that they maintained 
a record of blatant discrimination against women and had failed to engage in 
affirmative action, and that the plaintiffs sought to have the OFCCP order the 
respondents to implement affirmative action programs through goals and 
timetables designed to rectify the descrimination. Such goals and timetables would 
require that "the offending companies" hire one female entry level coal miner for 
every three male entry level coal miners until women constituted at least 20% of 
their blue collar-work forces. The complaint also asked that the respondents be 
forced to advertise every job opening in the "dominant local media" at least three 
days prior to filling the job.52
52Coal Mining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 1 (June 1978): 1-3, OFCCP 
Complaint. CEP Records; Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, The Coal
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The complaint included Beth-Elkhom Corporation of Jenkins, Kentucky as 
a respondent, claiming that because only ten of its 1,221 coal miners were women, 
it continued a pattern and practice o f discrimination against women in its hiring 
practices. Basing its information on EEO-1 reports submitted to federal officials, 
CEP was able to statistically prove that the company was guilty of "blatant 
discrimination" against women. Ironically, it was Beth-Elkhom who hired Baldwin 
and Cherry in 1973 as the first women officially recognized to have worked in an 
underground mine. Company officials had hoped that voluntary compliance with 
new federal affirmative action and equal opportunity guidelines, would deflect 
future litigation. In 1976, a spokesman for the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, of 
which Beth-Elkhom is a subsidiary, announced that the company employed eighty 
women as underground miners. Coal company officials failed to account for the 
quotas, goals, and timetables that eventually became implicit in evolving 
affirmative action policies.53
Hall, who had become director of the CEP, and the complaint against the 
coal companies both attracted immediate attention from the press. The day after 
the complaint was filed, The New York Times announced, "Feminist Group Assails 
Coal Industry." The 99.8 percent figure highlighted the "blatant" discrimination 
practiced by the coal industry that was preventing women from claiming 
"economic equality" in the coal fields. Wall Street Journal provided a tongue-in- 
cheek twist to its coverage of CEPs action.
Just when it seemed as if you couldn't find a voice among the progressive force
of this country to defend a system that dehumanizes managers and oppresses
Employment Project—How Women Can Make Breakthroughs into Nontraditional 
Industries (Washington DC: US Dept, of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1985), 2-4.
53The New York Times, 18 May 1974 and 22 February 1976.
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workers, along came new life for the American dream in the form of the 
women's movement.
The Journal found it ironic that after a decade o f being assailed by the progressive
forces, suddenly corporate boardrooms and executive suites were beginning to
"look pretty good again" as women demanded entry into them. "And now," the
article continued, "women's rights advocates are demanding another step forward.
the right for women to be properly represented in the country's coal mines."54
Neither the CEP nor Betty Jean Hall objected to the coverage. The press
brought the issue of women miners to national attention and sparked debate that
could only work to the CEP's advantage. Advocacy groups thrived on media
coverage. The coal industry attempted to defend itself, but faced with CEP
statistics and the aggressive enforcement policies o f the Carter administration, it
faced a tough public relations campaign. There was some merit to industry
objections at being characterized as "one of the most blatantly discriminatory"
employers in the nation. Coal company spokesmen in Kentucky and West
Virginia argued that the 1,000 women hired since 1973 represented a significant
accomplishment by the operators. The executive secretary of the Kanawha Coal
Operators' Association objected to the language of the complaint.
....there have been a great many women employed in the coal industry. I hate 
to say that the coal industry is one of the most blatantly discriminatory; I just 
don't think it's right. I don't think it's a factual statement.55
A Kentucky operator claimed that it was difficult to find women to apply. 
"You have to remember that we’re talking about finding women to do really
54The New York Times, 12 May 1978; "American Dream," Wall Street Journal, 6 
July 1978.
55 The New York Times, 12 August 1978. Supplementary Material from: The New 
York Times News Service and the Associated Press.
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crummy, dirty work and we're trying to find them in an area where women still
want to do traditional things " His comment addressed the significance of the
gender disparity represented in the coal industry employment statistics. Although
the industry had reluctantly opened its doors to women in 1973, their
representation rose to only .2% by 1978. The coal operator's complaint that few
women considered the occupation desirable suggested the possibility that choice
played a role in the sex segregation of mining.56
The CEP succeeded in exposing "blatant" discrimination as the cause of the
disparity, and their role as an advocacy group required that they encourage women
to apply for mining jobs. Besides trying to loosen the male bonds that wrapped up
the coal industry, the CEP also sought to raise awareness among area women
about coal-mining opportunities. Using a network of women miners, they
advanced the idea that entering the mines was a good economic choice. Harlan
County Kentucky miner Melba Strong suggested that "if women were just
educated as to what a good job could do for them, many would apply." Mamie
Monk of Dante, Virginia, agreed that plenty of women would apply for mining
jobs, "if they knew what it was and about how much they could make." A mental
health worker in Ashland, Kentucky, who knew many of the area's women miners
suggested an additional motivation:
They all seem so satisfied with jobs, and they all talk positively about what they 
are doing with their lives. One of the biggest problems I have found with 
women in this region is their low self-esteem. If going into a coal mine can 
help counter that, I'm all for it.57
It was clear that there was more to the dearth of women coal miners than 
discrimination by coal operators. But the OFCCP complaint adressed the issue of
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
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getting women into the mines, later the CEP could face the task o f keeping them 
there. The most striking result of the complaint was the settlement with 
Consolidation Coal Company, the nation's second largest coal producer. Labor 
Department officials called it the largest settlement ever reached in the coal 
industry. The company was required to pay $360,000 in back wages and benefits 
to seventy-eight women and to hire at least one entry level woman for every four 
entry level men until women constituted 32.8% of its mining work-force. An 
attorney who had participated in the negotiations commended Consolidation Coal 
because it admitted the problem and expressed a willingness to make amends. No 
litigation was involved in the settlement, according to the The New York Times. In 
its newsletter, the CEP announced that Consolidated had agreed to set aside 
$10,000 to fund a special program to attract females. The CEP also urged all 
women applying at "Consol" facilities to keep the them informed about any 
"footdragging" so that OFCCP could be notified.58
Other lawsuits followed— some originating with the OFCCP complaint, 
some disconnected from it. Women, empowered by the activities of the CEP 
sought legal redress from recalcitrant coal operators at an increased rate. In 
February 1979, a suit filed against four major Birmingham, Alabama, coal 
producers, claimed that women constituted no more than two percent of the 
miners employed by four major Birmingham employers, despite the fact that some 
mines had been hiring women for five years. The association filing the complaint 
on behalf of the Alabama women conceded that the complaint alone would not 
solve the problems women faced.59
5&Wall Street Journal, 27 December 1978; The New York Times, 26 November 
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The flurry of legal action against coal operators continued through 1979 
and 1980, but the organization began to recognize that other issues affected 
women once they had been hired as miners. The focus on litigation to force the 
industry to hire women fulfilled CEPs advocacy role and continued to occupy their 
attention during the early years. At a League o f Women Voters Conference in 
June of 1978 in Washington D C., CEP outlined items slated for possible future 
action. The list included filing requests under the Freedom o f Information Act for 
reports from coal companies to "show they are out of compliance; forcing the 
TVA to require affirmative action agreements from coal companies holding TVA 
contracts; pressuring OFCCP for an enforcement timetable ordering coal industry 
compliance; encouraging affirmative action hiring and advertising of positions by 
industry; suing companies which do not comply; forcing the President's 
Commission on Coal to acknowledge and work on problem; working with the 
UMWA on litigation; suing federal agencies for failure to enforce the laws and 
regulations prohibiting discrimination; and developing a network of those 
interested in the problem to press for compliance and trade information and results. 
A suggestion to establish outreach and training programs was embedded in the 
center of the list.
In September 1979, CEP staff planned an organization effort on behalf of 
Kentucky and Virginia coal mining women. Westmoreland miner Connie Weiss 
stressed the seldom-mentioned role of the union in promoting careers of mining 
women:
Women have had too many problems in the coal industry. It's time that we ban 
together and support one another. And we want to make it clear that this is not 
a move away from the union—it's a move toward the union. We believe that we
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will be able to work with the unions to assure that there is equal opportunity for 
all in the coal industry.**0
Re-emphasizing the theme that what was good for women was also good for men, 
an inter-office memo elaborated on the up-coming campaign for health and safety 
issues for women miners. The memo stressed that the three major topics—job 
assignment based on sex, health standards for a two-sex workforce, and sexual 
harassment as safety issue—were applicable to women in the workforce generally, 
and not just women coal miners. It emphasized that CEP was not advocating 
protective legislation but a stronger health and safety program for everyone.61
It is clear that the CEP intended to expand its role. In the early summer 
1979, it began developing a coal-mining training program for women. Funded by 
an eight-month grant from the Women's Bureau of the United States Labor 
Department, the CEP put together a comprehensive, two-week training regimen 
designed to prepare women to better adjust to the work and environment of 
underground mining. Since the pilot training program was to be a model for other 
industries, CEP staff carefully screened applicants using criteria such as job 
references, reaction to the underground environment, age and physical size, 
physical condition, family history, employment history, skills/experience, and 
personal attitudes. The two-week agenda included instruction in mine safety, first 
aid, gas detection, proper nutrition to maintain health, tool identification and use, 
legal rights, physical conditioning, and assertiveness training. The women received 
information on establishing support groups and job-search strategies.62
60CoalM ining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 2 (July 1978); and 1, no. 4, 
(September and October 1978), CEP Records.
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62Women's Bureau, The Coal Employment Project, 20-23. Coal Employment 
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The Coal Employment Project sought support and involvement from coal 
operators and provided concrete suggestions for developing a nonsexist coal 
training program for female and male miners. A CEP document sent to industry 
representatives made clear the group's belief that the culture of mining itself— 
traditionally and overpoweringly male—could be changed to accommodate women. 
One suggestion was to include, as part of the training program, a short history on 
the ways women have proven their strength: for example, lifiting and carrying 
children, factory and farm work, houshold chores. Another called for training 
programs to "keep up with changing social mores and the changing needs of 
miners as it does to keep up with changing mining technology."63
Many of the larger coal companies expressed interest in the CEP training 
program. Westmoreland Coal Company and AMAX Coal Company established 
similar programs to facilitate women miners' success. In April of 1979, CEP staff 
members were invited to participate in the third annual National Mining Training 
and Development Conference. Coal company executives, training instructors, and 
MSHA personnel responded positively to the women's message. Although 
lawsuits to force coal operators to hire more women continued into the next 
decade, the Coal Employment Project moved toward using its advocacy position 
to ameliorate the very real problems women experienced once they began working 
underground.64
CEP Records.
63"Suggestions for Developing a Nonsexist Coal Training Program," undated 
memo, CEP Records; Allana M. Sullivan, "Women Train for Coal Mining Jobs," 
Coal Age 84, no. 10 (October 1979): 168-173.
^  Coal M ining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 9 (April-May 1979): 4, CEP 
Records.
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Women who sought employment in underground mines in the 1970s 
benefitted from the advocacy of the Coal Employment Project, but the 
desegregation of the coal industry would not have happened without the post- 
World War II social, legal, and technological transformations. Women who 
believed their future might possibly lie in underground mining were able to 
overcome long-standing barriers that had kept women out of the high-wage 
occupation for 130 years. Women came to believe, through consciousness-raising 
and advocacy groups, that whatever men could do, women could also do. Many 
of those who applied this belief to coal mining, succeeded in a very difficult 
occupation. Some women miners chose to leave the industry after a few years and 
many were laid off in the early 1980s, but some continue to work underground 
despite the physical costs of the occupation-even in an age of full mechanization.
CHAPTER 4
PAONIA AND THE NORTH FORK VALLEY
The climate of change that emerged following World War II greatly 
expanded the range of occupations open to women. Those who chose to exercize 
newly-acquired employment options by seeking jobs in underground mines found 
those new opportunities in small, isolated communities like Paonia, Colorado. 
Paonia was not a typical coal-mining community, but rather a western town whose 
frontier roots identified more with agriculture and ranching than mining.
Situated on the North Fork of the Gunnison River in western Colorado, 
Paonia is surrounded by mountains to the northeast and high mesas and desert 
plains to the south and west. The geography of the region suited the subsistence 
economy of the valley's earliest inhabitants, the Ute Indian tribes. For centuries 
they fished the North Fork, hunted large and small game in the high country, and 
grew com on the valley floor. In the winter, they moved onto the plains to the 
southwest where the towns of Montrose and Delta are now located.1
The Utes may have encountered European explorers by the mid-eighteenth 
century, but the Dominguez-Escalante Expedition brought the first whites into the 
valley in 1776. The penetration of the whites into the North Fork Valley appears 
to have been an unwelcome detour for the party led by Father Dominguez.
Instead of traveling north as planned, the expedition went east into the North Fork
^ h e  Colorado System-Based Curriculum Project, The North Fork Valley: A 
Community Social Profile (1976, mimeographed), 3-5.
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Valley, providing the first written descriptions of the area. Father Escalante kept a 
comprehensive diary of the expedition, and his notes described the valley as 
favorably suited for settlement.2
The Utes continued their idyllic existence in the North Fork Valley for 
more than a century before the United States acquired the surrounding territory 
from Mexico in 1848. Although the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo ceded the 
western half of what is now the state of Colorado to the United States, the Utes 
considered the Rocky Mountains their land. The growing pressure of the frontier 
eventually convinced them of the futility of fighting the white man, and in a series 
of treaties beginning in 1868, Chief Ouray and other Ute leaders agreed to vacate 
the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains. In 1873 Ouray accepted treaty 
obligations to leave the San Juan Mountains, and a final treaty removed the Utes 
from the area surrounding the North Fork Valley in 1881. Government troops 
supervised their removal to the Utah territory and the southwest comer of 
Colorado.3
White settlers scouted the area before the removal o f the Utes was 
complete, hoping to appropriate the most fertile land. Several months prior to the 
official opening of the area to settlement, Samual Wade and Enos Hotchkiss 
entered the North Fork Valley to identify the most favorable claims. When the 
United States government officially opened the area in June 1882, Wade and 
Hotchkiss, founders of the North Fork Valley towns of Paonia and Hotchkiss, 
proceeded directly to their pre-selected sites.
2Carl Ubbelohde, Maxine Benson, and Duane A. Smith, A Colorado History 
(Boulder: Pruett Publishing Co., 1988), 16-17; The North Fork Valley, 6.
3Ubbelohde, A Colorado History, 192; The North Fork Valley, 9-10.
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Samual Wade's initial encroachment into the valley convinced him that its 
climate and soil conditions favored orchard development. Mercantile experience in 
the mining community of Lake City, Colorado, had shown him that fruit 
commanded high prices in the Rocky Mountain mining towns. Wade and three 
other settlers claimed the valley floor that would soon become the town of Paonia. 
Grand Avenue, Paonia’s present-day commercial center, marks the original 
boundary line between Wade's claim and that of Will Clark. The settlers 
immediately planted young fruit trees, and by 1882 were satisfied the trees would 
thrive. They brought in thousands of root-grafts to fill expectant nurseries, and the 
North Fork fruit industry was bom. By 1885 the trees began to bear the quality of 
fruit that in 1893 won Samual Wade and W.S. Cobum several first place ribbons at 
the World's Columbian Exposition.4
The Paonians' success was precisely the type of celebratory 
accomplishment that motivated the extravagant festivities in Chicago. The 
exposition symbolized nineteenth-century America’s need for self-congratulation at 
a time of national doubt and despair. The West became a symbol of hope, an 
antidote to a severe, economic depression, political and labor upheavals, and the 
nasty excesses of the post-bellum era. Historian Frederick Jackson Turner chose 
the occasion to suggest that the frontier, as a national experience o f opportunity, 
had come to a close. But he also claimed the West as a place where unique 
characteristics of American institutions were formed by the frontier process. The 
Paonia prize-winning fruit represented both affirmation and contradiction of 
Turner's theory. Wade and Cobum fit his description of the individualist 
frontiersmen yet their success stimulated further movement onto the Colorado
*The North Fork Valley, 10.
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frontier in what one local historian has termed "the rush to the North Fork." The 
frontier had not closed after all.5
By 1890, most of the land suitable for growing crops had been taken up by 
homesteaders eager to exploit the fertile river bottom. Fruit growers became 
involved in the cattle industry until their trees matured to the crop bearing stage. 
Until the turn of the century, the local economy depended primarily on cattle.
Soon sheepmen began to challenge the cattle ranchers for pasture, and throughout 
the 1890s, bitter conflict raged between sheep and cattle interests. As cattle 
ranching declined, the fruit industry entered its most productive period.
After 1910 the "fruit bubble" of the North Fork was close to bursting. 
Several factors contributed to the collapse of the industry. Fruit-damaging pests 
finally made their way into the valley orchards, the Northwest fruit industry glutted 
the national market, and, most significantly, the valley's first hard freeze wiped out 
most of the peach orchards in 1912. By 1913 the accumulated effect plunged the 
North Fork Valley into a depression that cost many fruit growers their orchards. 
Some orchards were plowed under and planted in hay. The industry never 
recovered the level of production of its proudest decade. Subsequent fruit 
production remained at a mere one-third to one-quarter of the tum-of-the-century 
boom. Most if not all of the larger holdings were broken up into smaller orchards, 
leading some observers to conclude that the intensive development which the
5William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: 
W.W.Norton & Co., 1991). Martin Ridge, "Frederick Jackson Turner and His 
Ghost: The Writing of Western History," Proceedings o f the American 
Antiquarian Society 101 (April 1991): 65-76. Laura S. Clock, Cabin and a 
Clothesline: A Saga o f the North Fork High Country and Its People (Newell, 
Iowa: Bireline Publishing Company, 1983), 399.
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smaller orchards represented, bore responsibility for the decline in an industry that 
once promised a bright future.6
Farmers and cattle ranchers continued to migrate to the valley from within 
the United States, establishing Paonia's anglo/western European population. But 
the area's rich coal reserves around the neighboring town of Somerset attracted 
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Somerset lies twelve miles east of 
Paonia, and it is there that the present-day visitor is introduced to the North Fork's 
historical mining roots. Evidence to past and present coal operations is visible on 
both sides of the highway.
The North Fork Valley narrows as it follows the Gunnison River toward 
higher country and finally, the mountains. Today's traveler follows the river along 
State Highway 133 through Somerset, passing between remodeled company 
houses and the towering train load-out facility, and further upward to the Paonia 
Dam and Reservoir. Before approaching the dam, the traveler must decide to 
remain on Highway 133 leading to McClure Pass and the historic towns of Marble, 
Redstone, Carbondale, Basalt, and Aspen, or to take the fork heading over Kebler 
Pass to the old mining town of Crested Butte. The fork represents the North Fork 
Valley's connection to Colorado's mining frontier. Before a road existed, many of 
the valley's early miners came over the mountain seeking jobs in the growing 
mining industry around Somerset.7
6Steven G. Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey fo r  the Orchard Valley Mine, 
Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., Paonia, Delta County, CO: An 
Historical/Archaeological Transect in the North Fork Drainage o f the Gunnison 
River, Prepared for: Thome Ecological Institute, Boulder, CO. (Montrose, CO: 
Centuries Research, Inc., 1977), 23.
7Clock, Cabin and a Clothesline, 285.
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The most promising of the newly discovered coal veins rose above the 
North Fork of the Gunnison near the present site of Somerset. Geologist Quimby 
Sanborn filed the first claims in this part of the valley in 1883. Sanborn lacked the 
capital to develop the claim and produced only enough to supply the blacksmiths 
of the neighboring mining communities. Small mines like Sanborn's Somerset Coal 
mine also supplied coal to the silver smelters in Leadville and other mining towns, 
but lack of adequate transportation and the Panic of 1893 dried up even this 
market. Sanborn abandoned his claim after 1893.
In 1902, the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad completed a spur 
line connecting Somerset to future markets, making mining in the upper North 
•Fork valley profitable. A Denver and Rio Grande subsidiary, Colorado Fuel and 
Iron Company, purchased the rights to Sanborn's mine 1902. The Utah Fuel and 
Iron Company acquired the rights in 1903 and began producing coal. First used to 
power railroad locomotives, Somerset coal was eventually shipped to Utah to 
produce steel. Utah Fuel and Iron began constructing a company town in 1903. A 
two-story saloon appeared first then four room cottages replaced the tents which 
had housed miners in the original camp. By 1912, the town had eighty-five 
cottages, a boarding house for single miners, a hospital, and a post office to serve 
its 600 residents.
The company town became the home of immigrants whose culture, habits, 
and social life were quite different from those in the growing town of Paonia at the 
other end of the valley. Somerset's immigrant miners came primarily from eastern 
and central Europe, and names familiar to current North Fork Valley residents 
evoke the rich historical diversity of the valley's culture. By the 1920s eleven 
nationalities were represented in Somerset and the surrounding area. Instead of 
the enclaves and conflict that one might expect from the collision of diverse
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language and habits in so small a community, miners' families formed a close knit
group, isolated from the dominant culture of the farmers and ranchers o f the North
Fork Valley. They created a social life that encompassed all nationalities. Informal
dances accompanied by accordion and fiddle, referred to as "kitchen sweats" from
an old German tradition, were held on a regular basis in miners' homes. "First
footin''—visiting everyone's home in a single evening—became an established
tradition, especially during the holiday season and to celebrate weddings.8
Baseball drew the community together as no other form of entertainment could.
Somerset became known for its baseball teams and the ability to play well could
almost assure a man a job with the "Company."9
After the railroad made travel to Paonia more efficient in 1903, miners and
their families felt less isolated and began to form a relationship with the rest of the
valley. The following excerpt from the recollections of a long-time Paonia resident
revealed the nature of those early contacts.
...they were from many foreign countries like Yugoslavia and...they could 
hardly speak English.They all smoked curved stemmed pipes with a lid on 
them. And they would come down to Paonia from Somerset on the train in the 
morning after a payday and spend the entire day in Paonia....they would just 
have our store black with smoke from their pipes. They would buy 
merchandise, pile them up in the comer, put their name on them and then go 
across to Jim Smith's Saloon. And about the time the train was coming in 
they'd come over and get their packages...get on the train and go back to 
Somerset....they'd pay those fellows all off in gold. And when they’d come 
down to our store...we'd have, a drawer full of gold at the end of the day.
Paonia got a lot of business out of Somerset."*®
8Lois Hawk, "A History of Somerset - Part I," The Paonian, 28 July 1977.
9Mabel Livingston "Document 2 - The Frank Majnik Story," Coal M ining o f the 
North Fork Valley, an Unpublished Manuscript, Paonia, Colorado, 1990.
10Jean Bailey, Linda Bacigalupi and Mark Warner, Local Citizens' Participation in 
Coal Development: A Descriptive Process in the North Fork Valley (Denver: 
Foundation for Urban and Neighborhood Development, 1975), 46.
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Although miners and their families developed what seems to be a satisfying
web of social relations within their own community, the reality of the Company
town constrained economic and social choices. Miners were paid in gold and scrip
but were required to make most of their purchases at the Company store until the
1920s. The above quotation contained no dates, and it is difficult to say whether
the timing of the incidents had been confused over time or whether miners had
discovered ways to circumvent the company's vigilence over them. Mary Rametti's
recollection suggests the former.
We were required to use the Wasatch Store (the company store) in those days.
When the Somerset people got off the train, our baggage would be checked. If 
those checking felt a passenger had returned with too many goods from Paonia, 
they'd take them. By 1919, peddlers of fruit, milk, etc. were allowed but until 
that time even these goods were to be bought at the store or grown....11
Company regulations constrained miners' political activities through 
restrictive regulations forbidding political or social gatherings which opposed the 
company. The very nature o f the Colorado coal miner in the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century demanded that he oppose the company, and such meetings 
were bound to occur. Bloody battles marked the struggle between capital and 
labor in the Colorado coal fields at the veiy moment the Utah Fuel Company began 
to establish the company town of Somerset. Conditions in Colorado’s coal mines, 
believed to be the most dangerous in the nation, fueled the union organization 
effort. The United Mine Workers of America emerged out of the conflict between 
the Knights o f Labor and the Molly Maguires in 1890. Three years later the first 
major strike was called in the Colorado coal field. The miners in Somerset, 
through contact with miners from other areas of the state remained aware of the 
labor conflict elsewhere. By 1903 labor disputes broke out in Somerset even
11 The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
82
before the new cottages had been completed. The town marshall prevented 
organizers from entering the town and disgruntled workers were ordered away 
from the mine. The incident ended peacefully when the miners returned to work— 
without the union.12
During the 1920s Louis Penko went over the mountain to Crested Butte to 
convince the international UMWA agent to come to the coal mining community of 
Somerset to organize the miners. The agent declined, but word of Penko's effort 
reached company officials in Somerset, putting his job in jeopardy. He was 
advised to stay in Crested Butte if he wanted to work for a union mine, but his 
father interceded with Utah Fuel and Penko was "allowed back in the mine." It 
was not until 1933 that the miners of the upper North Fork Valley were able to 
successfully form a UMWA local, and by World War II all of the significant coal 
producers were under union contract. The North Fork Valley and Delta County, 
Colorado, were tied economically and sociologically to coal production, but local 
miners were unable to fully integrate union philosophy and solidarity into the social 
and economic web of the valley. The UMWA remained essentially alienated from 
the community it served.13 Though miners had estabished a close relationship 
with the rest of the valley, it appears that the town of Paonia, even during the 
boom period of the 1970s never really considered itself a union town.
The social relationship between Somerset and Paonia developed because of 
proximity and the railroad, but primarily because of the interdependence that 
existed between the two legs of the valley's economic base. During the 
fluctuations in the fruit and cattle market, agricultural workers turned to coal
12Hawk, "A History of Somerset"; Jane Poulos, "United Mine Workers of 
America," An unpublished manuscript in the hands of author, 1991; 22.
13Poulos, "United Mine Workers"; The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
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mining and coal miners often supplemented their income during the summer 
months by working in the orchards and ranches. A number of miners started small 
farms and orchards, leaving them in the care of wives and children during the 
winter months when the mines were in full production.. Opportunities for mobility 
existed in the valley that allowed individuals to take advantage of the diverse 
economic industries. A few immigrant miners were able to file claims on coal 
properties and then develop them, and orchardists maintained agricultural holdings 
by working in the mines to keep small agricultural claims productive.
Once an irrigation system was established and the railroad penetrated the 
valley to move coal and fruit to market, the decline in one industry could be 
substituted for the other to keep the valley in a viable economic position. 
Throughout the initital development period, active coal mines appeared along the 
mesas and hills surrounding the valley. Some developed into substantial 
producers. Others became wagon mines that operated as family enterprises to 
supply heat for homes and coal for the valley's forges. Few of these mines 
penetrated far enough underground to require significant capital to attract outside 
investors. There were some exceptions. Significant production at the Oliver Mine 
and Juanita Coal and Coke initiated the need for capital investment and the 
creation o f company towns that resembled Somerset.14
The valley's diverse economy did not completely eliminate the risk of 
economic crisis. It suffered through the depression years along with the rest of the 
country, and coal and agriculture interests cooperated to hold the community 
together during those years. Yet tension over the union existed beneath the 
surface. During World War II, conflict arose over what many viewed an
14Livingston, Coal Mining o f the North Fork Valley.
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unpatriotic act by UMWA leader John L. Lewis. Lewis's call for a national coal
srike created dissension between the community of Paonia and UMWA Local
6417. On July 1, 1943, the daily newspaper printed a letter from a local soldier
stationed "somewhere in Africa" to his grandfather in the North Fork Valley.
Patriotism and a slap at the UMWA may have motivated the editor to print
excerpts from the letter and give it prominent space on the front page:
I'm glad you did not lose any time during the strike. Frankly, this is a hell of a 
poor time to strike, and the unions certainly are not earning themselves any 
laurels. It is a damn poor thing when a man will quibble over a little personal 
gain. I don't think it helps a soldier a bit to know that any group at home is 
slowing production by fighting for more money while the soldier is fighting for 
his life. It amounts to treason, and the group instigating a strike at a time like 
this should be treated in accordance....A saboteur would be shot for causing 
one-thousandth the damage to the war effort that John L. Lewis has caused by 
calling a strike in the coal industry. ̂
The soldier voiced the anti-union bias representative of the valley's agricultural 
population. But union miners loyally and aggresively defended the embattled 
Lewis's action. Local union activist Frank Kamely, serving on a naval vessel 
during the war in the Pacific, participated in a number of fights aboard ship over 
the unpatriotic actions o f John Lewis in an aggressive demonstration of solidarity 
with UMWA activity.16
The Valley's coal production peaked during World War II, and it would be 
misleading to suggest that Paonian's patriotism produced hostility to the coal 
miners whose labor helped stabilize the economy of the town. Criticism was 
directed at the union, not the miners. By this time, the interaction between the two 
communities had produced an integrated community. Many miners retired to 
Paonia, some purchased land and participated in the local agricultural economy.
15 The Paonian, 1 July 1943.
16Poulos, "United Mine Workers," 2.
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Many fruit farmers, and ranch hands held on to their farms by working as coal 
miners. The mines became an integral part of the local economy but Paonia could 
still not be termed a coal town or a union town. That distinction would become 
important as outside forces began to impact Paonia beginning in the 1960s.
The war brought the North Fork Valley out of the depression as it did 
elsewhere in the United States. Demand for coal increased significantly and miners 
worked full time in the mines. Farmers could once again supplement their income 
with part-time mine work. But the boom was short-lived. The end of the war saw 
the demand for coal decline. Changes in the coal industry this time were 
fundamental and more complex than simply a soft coal market. Natural gas 
became the fuel of choice for heating homes, businesses, and factories and 
railroads began to power locomotives with diesel rather than steam produced from 
coal.17
These developments reflect a decline in demand for coal at the same time
that changes in the coal-mining process itself led to a decline in demand for the
coal miner. Mechanization finally came to the North Fork Valley coal mines at
mid-century. Most of the miners employed in area mines began their careers using
a pick and shovel and changes affected them in a number of ways. One miner
described the process in its relationship to his ability to earn wages:
When I went to work there it was mule and pick and shovel mining and, of 
course, they had a few short-wall cutting machines. They'd cut the walls and 
shoot them but they was all hand loading and all the pillar work was pick and 
shovel. I went through all that in five years. We....actually made more money
17Ubbelohde, A Colorado History, 340; Duane A. Smith, Mining in America: The 
Industry and the Environment, 1800-1980 (University Press of Kansas, 1987), 
130-135.
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than we're making now. It was contract work. Well, not making more money.
but we were making quite a bit more at the time than the company was. 18
Conveyor systems brought an end to the practice of using mules to haul coal out of 
the mines. A power driven, under-cutting machine replaced the pick, and the 
loading machine eliminated the hand loading of the coal after the face had been 
shot.19 Eventually the idea of chewing the coal from the face with a continuous 
miner replaced the drill and shoot method. Suddenly new skills were needed and 
the mechanic and electrician became a necessary addition to the mining work 
force. The continuous miner was introduced in the North Fork Valley in the early 
1960s and a local coal miner described the machine as "a lot of valves and a lot of 
learning how to do it. You don't learn it all in one shift. Of course there's always 
some wise guys that come along and learn it all in two or three shifts." The 
continuous miner represented a fundamental change that left many of the old 
miners sidelined with unneeded skills.20
The implications for efficiency and safety are obvious, yet the 
overwhelming consequence of mechanization was that the process would require 
fewer miners to mine coal. Labor historians have agrued that the process of 
mechanization in coal mining threatened the miner's sense of manhood and pride of 
craft. Whether this was true in the case o f North Fork Valley miners is hard to 
say, but local miners spoke mostly of the improved safety conditions which 
accompanied the changes. Some did comment on how the noise produced by the 
machines interfered with a miner's ability to hear the sounds that warn of imminent 
danger.21
18Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 51.
19See glossary of mining terms, Apendix I.
20Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 52.
2 Elizabeth Moen et al, Women and Energy Development: Impact and Response-
87
Mechanization produced not only the changes in safety and employment, it 
also set the stage for women to enter the industry in the 1970s by eliminating many 
of the most physically limiting aspects of the job. The heightened environmental 
awareness that followed World War II also transformed the way Americans 
perceived mining nationwide, and impinged on the valley's long protected right to 
decide economic matters at the local level. Environmental degradation connected 
to mining had aroused passionate criticism from the time placer mining advanced 
to hydraulic methods in the nineteenth-century California gold fields.22 Americans 
became acutely aware of environmental issues beginning in the 1950s, but until 
then critics found little support for their efforts to stop the worst practices. 
Powerful mining companies employed compelling justification for these practices 
during the first half of the twentieth century, and the federal government chose not 
to become actively involved in mining regulation on a large scale. Mobilization for 
war necessitated the forging of a partnership between the mining industry and the 
federal government, but the bonds failed to address the issue o f environmental 
degradation.23
Interference by the federal government in the national interest had a 
significant impact on the mining industry. Gold and silver mines were closed to 
free up production in coal, copper, and molybdenum operations. Mining historian 
Duane Smith found that "national interest outweighed private interests" and that
A Report to the People o f Craig and Paonia, Colorado and to the Fleischmann 
Foundation (Boulder: University o f Colorado, Institute o f Behavioral Science,
1979), 82.
22Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None o f M y Own: "A History o f the 
American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 232.
23 Smith, Mining in America, 131; Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics 
and the Coal Coalition (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press,
1980), 130.
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"earlier-day miners would have arisen in horrified indignation and wrath" at the 
government's reach into privately-held mining operations. Mining was losing its 
freedom from outside pressure while the intense pace of mining during the war 
years resulted in even more environmental destruction. Most of the destructive 
effects of coal mining occurred during the process of strip mining. But even 
underground mines caused water pollution, and the unsightly construction of the 
mine's surface facilities often blighted the natural beauty of mountain hill-sides.24
During the 1960s activists began to challenge the federal and local 
governments to intervene on behalf of the environment. The environmental 
movements of the 1960s changed the industry in two significant ways. Beginning 
with the Clean Air Act in 1963 Congress began to enact legislation which would 
fundamentally transform the way the mining industry did business. Additionally, 
activists carried their environmental crusade to the streets, the television screen, 
and any medium that would display their message. The campaign resulted in a 
very ugly perception of the mining industry in general and coal mining in 
particular.25
To a community dependent on coal as a primary economic base, that 
perception became acute in light of other forces bearing down on the valley—the 
in-migration of "hippies" and urban professionals, and the growing anticipation of 
a new boom. Newcomers to the valley were attracted by the quality o f life offered 
by the moderate climate and mountain setting and, in many cases, by the 
opportunities of the agricultural industry. The decline in coal employment meant 
that fruit and cattle again emerged as the North Fork's most important industries, 
and newcomers arrived to participate in what appeared to be a resurgence of
24Smith, M ining in America, 125.
25Ibid., 141.
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agriculture opportunity. But prospects for a new fruit boom proved an illusion. 
Although Paonia remained the fruit capital of Colorado, fruit production never 
matched earlier production levels. Even so, newcomers pouring into the valley 
were not only motivated by dreams o f being wealthy farmers. In many cases they 
bought whatever acreage became available in hopes of finding a better way of 
life.26
The practice of selling off orchard land that began with the industry's 
collapse after 1913, continued into the post-war years as newcomers sought to 
fulfill dreams of living in an environment unspoiled by urbanization. Not all 
newcomers invested in orchards and it would be unfair to say that their presence 
negatively impacted an already fragile industry. Some in the valley, though, do 
consider them partly culpable. Oldtimers complained that newcomers arrived in 
the valley with dreams of owning a farm but without the skills to make it 
successful. "They get out here on a farm and they don't know what they're doing 
and they don't do a very good job," one oldtimer complained.27
Some feared that dividing the land in smaller and smaller parcels would 
deplete precious water reserves. A long time fruit farmer was concerned about 
what the land division would mean to his own operation. "Anybody that comes in 
hurts my operation. It takes more water to raise a family on an acre than it does a 
crop. They're tapping into all the springs on the mesa." The fanner admitted 
though, that he was being selfish. He said, "People have to go someplace."28
The newcomers told another side of the story. They talked of wanting to 
own a little farm, to leave the city and become self sufficient. Many later realized
26Bailey, A Descriptive Process o f the North Fork Valley, 23-36.
27Ibid., 36.
28Ibid., 36.
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that the romantic notion of agrarian self-sufficiency turned out to be an unrealistic 
expectation. One urban transplant recalled that, "we had a dream...of being able to 
live independently, to grow our own food. But I think we are more realistic now." 
Overcrowded cities with declining social conditions drove some newcomers out of 
urban areas and into small mountain towns in the West. Many looked to recapture 
the rural simplicity of an earlier era, and a large number of them looked to the 
North Fork Valley to fulfill that dream.29
The migration of urban newcomers to the rural community posed a threat 
to longtime residents who wanted to preserve their way of life. A sociological 
study of Paonia, published in 1979, characterized the community as 
"...geographically isolated, conservative, and often described as 'redneck'."
Although longtime residents might see themselves otherwise, change comes slowly 
to the isolated valley and often against resistence. So the charge of conservatism 
carries at least some sense of reality. The confrontation between longtime 
residents and newcomers from different social and economic environments 
produced the context in which the energy boom emerged in the mid-1970s.30
Most migrants were urban-dwellers, displaced farmers, retirees, or 
members of the "hippie culture." Older and more affluent newcomers moved in as 
young valley residents were forced to leave the area because of the lack of 
employment opportunity. The consequence was an age structure in Paonia that 
looked different from that in the rest of the state. By the late 1970s, a larger 
percentage of the population was 65 or older than in the 20-34 age classification,
29Ibid„ 22.
30Moen, Women and Energy Development, 25
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but the influx of newcomers added a diverse character to the personality of the 
community.31
Migrants from urban settings sought a quieter, simpler life yet brought 
urban values and practices which often clashed with prevailing ones. Prior to the 
influx of counter-culture types, most migrants attempted to fit into the community 
structure. They built new houses or redecorated older ones to reflect the 
architectural values of existing rural and small town homes. Children of 
newcomers generally discovered a vital and community-supported school system. 
Retirees found churches and associations not unlike those attended in their home 
communities. Some newcomers, though, found much that was abrasive about their 
new environment. Conflict arose within this milieu but it is unclear if it involved 
the influx of all newcomers or only those representing antithetical values. 
Sociologists focused their energy impact study on the longtimer/newcomer 
dichotomy. The study helps explain how new migration in the 1950s and 1960s 
affected Paonia and the decisions it would be forced make during the impending 
energy boom.32
The Moen study represents the interest accorded Paonia during the 1970s 
when it became clear that several communities in the West would be significantly 
impacted by the increased demand for alternate energy sources. The likelihood of 
intense energy development in Colorado communities brought hundreds of 
researchers to towns like Craig, Crested Butte and Paonia, in an attempt to steer 
residents toward informed decisions and wise planning. They left in their wake, a 
wealth o f studies which provide oral history projects, archaeological data, 
psychological and sociological explanations, and profiles valuable to corporate
31Ibid., 32; The Paonian, 1970.
32Moen, Women and Energy Development.
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planners. Multiple interests are respresented in the collection and out of the data
should emerge a balanced picture of these communities. The Moen study
represents one perspective.33
The report focused on how energy development impacted women in
Paonia and Craig, Colorado. Leading into the discussion of women, the
researchers described the history of the community and the relationship between
longtimers and newcomers. Their description illustrates how outsiders perceptions
of a community fundamentally differed from local residents own view. The
phenomenon is hardly new yet it illustrates the conflictual context within which
Paonia attempted to deal with the coming boom:
....newcomers appreciate Paonia's beautiful scenery, rich natural resources, and 
temperate climate....the physical environment was a prime factor motivating 
their move to Paonia. Consequently, they have brought strong values for 
environmental conservation as well as for better education and government 
reform. The education issue is perhaps the major newcomer-longtimer conflict 
and some of the newcomers have established alternative schools. Newcomers 
also want to open up the city and county government and administration to 
wider participation and thus end the "old boy" system and closed decision­
making that presently characterizes local politics.34
Ed Marston, publisher of the local newspaper and an urban migrant in the early 
1970s, printed a page-long editorial in the North Fork Times attacking the report 
as biased. He accused the researchers of knowing little about how a small town 
like Paonia operates. "Worse," his critique continued, "they seem to have had 
little curiosity about small towns; it appears they came here mainly to reinforce 
their own prejudices." Curiously, Marston often took editorial stands during
33Smith, M ining in America; Raymond L. Gold, Ranching, Mining, and the 
Human Impact o f Natural Resource Development (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Books, 1985).
34Moen, Women and Energy Development, 33.
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Paonia's struggle with energy development, which appeared to be at odds with 
opinions expressed by long time residents.35
The authors failed to adeqately represent longtimers' less negative 
perspective. Instead they cast the traditional community values as reactionary 
response to change. Missing from the report's pages were descriptions of an 
established community whose historical relationship to the land made them 
unafraid of underground mining, yet concerned enough about their quality of life 
and confident enough in their history of grass-roots political participation, to 
question unrestrained development and growth. Longtime residents of the North 
Fork Valley viewed the land differently from newcomers because they had lived 
close to it and worked within it. Their intimate relationship to the land had taught 
them that nature usually had the last word. They learned this bitter lesson from 
hard freezes, prolonged droughts, the consequences of overproduction, unplanned 
cave-ins in an underground mine, or by the loss of precious water to subsidence 
into a poorly planned mine. Because of their dependence on the land, Paonians 
developed suspicion of those who instead depended on government assistance or 
control.36
Within this framework of community reaction against urban to rural 
migration, Paonia's later response to the counter-culture invasion appears typical 
o f reaction in areas somewhat isolated from the urban turmoil of the 1960s. Many 
residents reacted with stereotypical beliefs that the long hair, unwashed bodies, and 
drug use of hippies respresented the antithesis to long-held values based on "hard
35Ed Marston, "Study of Energy Impacts on Women in Paonia is Flawed by Bias," 
The North Fork Times, 17 May 1979.
36 77fe North Fork Valley, 18.
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work and high standards of order and cleanliness."37 Reactions were often 
aggressive. Some Paonia merchants refused to sell goods to "hippies" and many 
residents objected to outsiders using public facilities. The local newspaper printed 
angry articles reflecting the passion that townspeople felt concerning the counter­
culture invasion.
The conflict was about more than reaction to unwashed bodies and long
hair. Some hippies, seeking an opportunity to "get back to the land," purchased
land and embarked on a romantic, subsistance lifestyle. Local residents believed
that most hippies were subsidized by affluent families and that these agricultural
"newcomers" frequently possessed more cash than farming skills. They doubted
that hippies understood the hard work, long hours, or discipline that farming
required. Instead of welcoming the available cash they were willing to spend, rural
residents often resented the fact that hippies "had more cash to spend in town than
most of the long-timers."38
In a 1994 retrospective of Paonia's boom years, Ed Marston linked
community reaction against urban newcomers with its later response to the
counter-culture migration.
When we arrived in 1974, we joined people perceived as "hippies" as we settled 
happily in an ideal Western town. One o f the other newcomers....said Paonia 
was a wonderful place: "It's like a college campus, except there are no classes."
....the local prejudice had us urbanites living off trust funds--"trustafarians" is 
the phrase today-or drug money or food stamps....
Marston argued that when mining declined in 1984-85, "every-body left" including 
miners and hippies. But most observers agree that a large percentage of hippies 
left the valley as early as 1978. Those who remained began to fit into the general
37Moen, Women and Energy Development, 34.
38Ibid.; The Paonian, 5 November 1970; 19 November 1970.
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framework of community values. Some tidied up their farms and constructed 
improvements on them, some opened small businesses and those who chose to 
remain helped make up the total fabric of Paonia society. Memories of the tension 
between longtime residents and newcomers representing different values and 
priorities, stayed fresh in the collective mind as it began to struggle with the 
meaning of the energy boom and the pressure of external forces.
The 1960s produced not only the counter-culture, it also accelerated the 
change in women's roles. Paonia was not so isolated that it remained ignorant of 
the revolutionary implication of the woman's movement, and these fundamental 
transformations held meaning for the community. Up to this point in the 
examination of the valley's economic and social history, women fail to appear in 
the narrative. A distinct web o f women's social and economic relationships 
remained separate from those o f men, and women miners could have been 
expected to reach into this web for support. Common ground existed between the 
two groups. The history of the North Fork Valley exposes the presence of 
women accustomed to assuming nontraditional gender roles—especially economic 
ones. This is not to say that had valley residents known about these women, they 
would have linked them to contemporary women miners. It became more 
complicated than that within the 1970s environment of rapid and fundamental 
social change. But underground coal mining had a history of women laborers.
More than one long-time resident remembered women who had worked in 
European mines, and at least one valley woman worked in an underground mine in 
the early part of the century.
Clement Audin, early-Somerset coal miner and founder of Western Slope 
Carbon's Hawks Nest Mine west o f Somerset, began his mining career in a Belgian 
coal mine at the age of eleven. In a 1952 interview, Audin recalled working seven-
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hour-days, six days a week at the mine, watching "women lift chunks of coal into 
mine cars underground." When the cars contained half a ton, men wearing leather 
harnesses pulled the loaded cars to the surface "like a horse." It would appear that 
Belgian women had it easier than their earlier counterparts in Great Britain whose 
job included pulling loaded mine cars under similar "harnessed" conditions.39 
Although women were legally prohibited from working in British mines in 1842, 
women on the European continent continued to work underground into the 20th 
century.
Anna Baviere became a coal miner to support her family after her husband 
immigrated to the United States in 1914. Louis Baviere, like many male 
immigrants, left his family behind in Europe because he lacked the funds to bring 
them to the United States. Like many women, Anna Baviere supported her young 
family until enough wages could be saved to join her husband in America. Louis 
left Europe at the outbreak of World War I and as hostilities intensified, Anna and 
her four children were forced to leave Belgium for France. She was able to find a 
job in a coal mine outside of Paris pushing loaded coal cars out o f the mine from 
four in the morning until eight at night. She eventually joined her husband in the 
North Fork Valley in 1920 and ironically, lived with the Clement Audin family for 
a year until they could afford a place of their own.40
The women who later worked at the Orchard Valley Mine probably never 
heard of Anna Baviere nor is it likely that the Belgian woman would have felt a 
particular sisterhood with these women. Baviere's early employment may have
39Gordon H. Kester with Fred B. Hynes. "Rocky Mountain Miner: The story of a 
Du Pont dynamite customer whose 60 years underground have taught him what 
freedom means," DuPont Magazine, (August-September 1952): 14.
40Clock, Cabin and a Clothesline, 326.
97
been a subject she disliked talking about during an era dedicated to traditional 
female roles. But those traditional roles would not have ruled out the idea of 
work. Women of mining families have always worked, usually under difficult 
conditions yet at the same time have valued their roles as mothers and 
homemakers.
Somerset women labored under conditions similar to those in most 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century coal towns. Not only did their husbands 
work in a dirty environment, creating mountains of coal blackened clothes, coal 
dust blanketed the air, water, and houses. Homemaking was a full-time, physically 
demanding job. There is no reason to believe that Somerset was as dirty as larger 
coal towns, but women encountered similar conditions. Before Somerset houses 
were connected to a clean water source, women rushed to complete the laundry 
before their water supply became muddy from rains. Throughout most of the early 
period, water came directly from the river and the only source of clean water was 
the railroad engine. But women experienced hardships in most places in the 
United States during these years, especially on the frontier. There is no evidence 
that they considered themselves oppressed. They knew their husbands labored in 
worse conditions underground.41
The reality of their husband's occupation instilled in mining women a sense 
of stoicism that made their own work seem desireable. They may have been 
grateful that they would never be forced to do their husband's work. They 
identified their own work as a partnership contribution and it would have mattered 
little to them if a future generation considered it merely traditional. During the 
depression, wives and daughters cleaned houses and did laundry for others at the
41 The Paonian, 11 August 1977.
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rate of twenty-five cents a day. To survive lean years, those miners unable to find
work in the orchards left the valley in search of mining jobs elsewhere while their
families stayed behind. They had established roots in the valley, and few made the
decision to leave permanently. Contributions by mining women were fundamental
to holding the community together. The cohesiveness of the coal town allowed
these women to create an extended family that provided comfort, aid, and caring
to those in need, and to establish the social bonds that inspired in them a positive
identification with the "mining way of life."42
The Moen report attempted to describe mining women in collective terms:
....miner wives often take jobs to help out during strikes or in bad times, and 
some hold regular part-time jobs, but there is a preference to be full-time 
homemakers. The mothers of school-age children are actively involved in the 
schools, and several are also very active in community affairs. One of them is 
the first woman on the Paonia City Council.42
Twentieth-century changes, at some point, reached the North Fork Valley and
mining women reflected that change. Lane Lasater's 1979 Phd. dissertation on
stress and coal mining studied families in the North Fork Valley and his categories
included wives of retired coal miners, wives of older coal miners who were still
working, and wives of younger coal miners. His conclusions relating to levels of
frustrations of basic human needs provide a glimpse of what twentieth-century
social changes meant to mining women. Lasater had the following to say about
North Fork Valley mining women.
Retired Women: ....appeared to be satisfied and proud of their roles and
contributions. They...described themselves as home and family oriented and 
felt themselves to be part of the tradition of coal mining....identified and felt a 
part of the lifestyles that existed there [in the valley]. They considered ....the 
coal mining community to be an important part of community life.
42Moen, Women and Energy Development, 83.
43Ibid„ 84.
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Older Women: ...did not feel a strong sense of being able to have an impact on 
developments in the community and local environment. These women did 
value their roles as wives and mothers, but appeared to desire more options.
Older women were discontented with changes in the valley. [They]....took pride 
in their roles as wives and mothers. They were moderately satisfied with their 
involvement with deep coal mining, but had some awareness that this was not 
always respected in the community.
Younger Women:...indicated that concern about their husbands' safety was a 
constant preoccupation. Younger women considered the absence of career 
opportunities for women to be a big problem in the area, and felt that roles for 
women were generally somewhat limited....many younger women wanted to 
have more opportunity to pursue their own careers or education, and they did 
not estimate that family roles would be completely satisfying.44
In the 1970s and 1980s women coal miners should have been able to draw 
on this group of women for support but evidence suggests that it was not always 
forthcoming and in many cases, not always desired. The solidarity of a coal 
community of mining women appeared to have some serious gaps. The Moen 
report would probably attribute this to a generational or demographic variable. 
Speaking of mining families who arrived after 1970, the study concluded that 
newcomers:
....do not identify’ with mining as a way of life....They may be the men who rely 
most heavily on drugs and alcohol to help them endure an unpleasant job.
Their wives do not especially enjoy Paonia and few belong to clubs....and there 
is no support network of longtime mining familes operating for them. And 
they might reject such outreach if  it were offered....4'’
The report's conclusion about younger mining women confirms evidence from 
interviews of women coal miners that women miners might have also rejected 
support from the mining community. But then few of the women miners had
44Lane Lassiter, "Stress and Health in a Colorado Coal Mining Community," 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado at Boulder, 1979), 107-108, 110-111, 114- 
115.
45Moen, Women and Energy Development, 84.
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connections to mining prior to their work at the OVM. Most came from urban 
and agricultural roots and local farming and ranching women and their networks 
existed as an additional source of support in the valley. Like their mining 
counterparts, agricultural women reflected a history of nontraditional roles.
The early settlement population included women who came alone to stake 
out their claims in the valley or in partnerships with their husbands. Like most 
pioneer women, few could expect their chores and tasks to remain embedded in 
the female sphere of the home. Farm women considered themselves homemakers 
but farm and orchard work often dominated their time. During the years when 
farmers sought work in the mines, wives and children were expected to keep the 
family farm or orchard operating smoothly. The Moen study found that farm 
women were proud of these traditions but researchers were somewhat troubled 
that many contemporary farm women refused to identify themselves as farmers, 
"preferring the title 'farm wife.'" The report's authors were puzzled by the 
overwhelming denial by Paonia women of their own capabilities and importance to 
the community and their often stated resistance to feminism, failing to recognize 
that perhaps Paonia women measured themselves in different terms. Instead, their 
attitude merely confirmed the characterization of Paonia's "small town 
conservatism."46
One of the elements of Paonia's conservative character was the belief in 
self-help. When individuals have needed assistance, women's networks have 
stepped in to offer community support. Women have historically done the yeoman 
work in the North Fork Valley associations and churches. The network not only 
allowed women to bond but to help create a self-sustaining community. From the
46Ibid., 45-46.
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turn of the century, Paonia contained a significantly large number of women's 
organizations. Each mesa overlooking the town had its own club and although 
they were social organizations, these clubs played an historic role in assisting at 
times of neighborhood emergencies and assimilating newcomers into the 
community. The Cowbelles and Homemaker's Extension Clubs allowed 
agricultural women to become involved in the community at several levels. 
Sororities and Auxiliaries, many dating back to the 1880s and 1890s, provided 
opportunities for women’s participation. Even more startling is the number of 
churches that have existed in Paonia since the earliest years. Women formed the 
backbone of most of those churches. The club networks in the North Fork Valley 
testify to the involvement of local women, and many used their association 
experience to effectivly participate in the debate over what direction Paonia would 
take in the 1970s.
Women had always played a substantial role in the valley's social and 
economic development. When the boom began in the 1970s, their participation 
extended beyond the political and social processes that attempted to smooth the 
transition from a faltering economy to what experts predicted as a period of 
unrestrainable growth and prosperity. They participated in a significant experiment 
that was unprecedented in historical memory. Women broke a tradition that 
extended back 130 years by going to work in the mines. Ironically, the women 
who would take advantage of the mining opportunity were newcomers. But by 
choosing to work in the mines, they joined the sustained tradition that North Fork 
Valley women had carved out of nontraditional roles for more than a century.
The conflict between newcomers and oldtimers never erupted into open 
hostility, except after the initial influx of hippies, though it always simmered 
beneath the surface. When major coal companies discovered the valley's potential
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to help solve the nation's energy shortage in the 1970s, the tension between the
two groups threatened Paonia's chance to revive its depressed economy.
Oldtimers saw an opportunity to halt the hemorrhage of young people out of the
valley and solve the growing unemployment problem. Newcomers feared that if
big corporations came to the valley, their newly discovered refuge might turn into
the nightmare they sought to escape.
In the early 1970s, several large corporations expressed interest in
acquiring mining leases on the federally owned land surrounding Paonia. North
Fork Valley coal properties had become desirable as the search for an energy
substitute for oil began to point to low-sulphur coal in the West. Federal and state
governments, anticipating newcomer's concern about environmental impact and
community strains caused by unregulated growth, sought ways to involve towns
like Paonia in planning for increased development o f their natural resources. In
1974, the Colorado Office o f the U.S. Bureau of Land Management made it clear
that their objective for Colorado was:
....to cany out a coal-leasing program which will provide for the orderly and 
timely development of the resource and at the same time protect or enhance the 
environment....we will continue to involve the State, municipalities, the public 
and private enterprise in a joint effort to achieve a well planned program for 
continued development of Colorado's coal reserve.47
Paonia residents welcomed the idea of new jobs and economic growth 
promised by the new development but they were not willing to embrace plans 
made by outsiders that failed to include community participation. Large 
corporations like Westmoreland Coal Company and Atlantic Richfield understood 
that to successfully negotiate federal coal leases, they would have to satisfy the 
concerns and priorities of North Fork Valley residents.
The North Fork Valley, 72.
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Westmoreland came to Paonia with a plan to develop the Orchard Valley 
Mine with a non-union workforce that included a significant percentage of women 
miners. Corporate executives believed that they could gain community support for 
this plan even though all mines in the area were under union contract. They also 
believed that the community would support their effort to acquire the federal 
leases that would justify their capital investment. Westmoreland ultimately 
prevailed but not without a struggle. Union miners and their families were 
outraged, and environmental activists attempted to delay the process at each step 
of negotiation. Even so, public officials and private citizens of Paonia generally 
supported Westmoreland's efforts.
In December of 1976 miners began digging coal at the Orchard Valley 
Mine. Ed Marston announced in the The North Fork Times that:
Early Monday morning, 16 miners entered Orchard Valley Mine's 
brand new portal....The crew of 16 miners--half of whom are experienced--are 
backed up by 12 support and supervisory personnel. Nine of the 28 people are 
women.
The opening of the mine represented not only a boost to the valley's economy but a 
significant breach in the carefully-constructed tradition of excluding women from 
underground mining. Ironically, Westmoreland felt confident enough in their plan 
to include a large percentage of women in its initial hiring. It is unclear why a 
conservative town like Paonia might embrace such a plan. Perhaps its history of 
economic innovation and independent women who were willing to take on non­
traditional roles helped pave the way to this new, even strange, phenomenon of 
women coal miners.
48 77»e North Fork Times, 15 December 1976.
CHAPTER 5
THE ROAD TO THE ORCHARD VALLEY MINE
The Westmoreland Coal Company made it clear in its first public meeting 
how it planned to open and operate a new mine in the North Fork Valley. They 
intended to hire and train a non-union, gender-integrated workforce at a mine site 
directly above Paonia. Because of strict coal-leasing guidelines in the West and a 
growing conflict in Paonia over the issue of growth associated with the energy 
boom, Westmoreland understood that opening a new mine in the North Fork 
Valley required careful strategy. Company officials knew their proposed operation 
would be viewed as unorthodox by residents, but they believed that portraying a 
different type of operation would gain them the community support needed to 
open the mine and obtain a federal coal lease. They would have to sell the idea.1
North Fork Valley mines had been traditionally off limits to women, and 
since 1933, none had operated without a union contract. Of perhaps equal 
importance, the town had never lived with the everyday physical presence of a 
large-scale mining operation. Westmoreland believed its unconventional 
employment proposal would convince local residents that the operation would 
benefit the valley. Although they initially considered employing women miners an 
effective public relations tool, company officials remained committed to the idea 
after the mine opened. Until the mid-1980s, Westmoreland's Paonia mine
1 Pemberton Hutchinson, interview by author, tape recording, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, 2 November 1993.
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continued to employ more women miners as a percentage of the workforce than 
any mine in the United States.
The road to opening the Orchard Valley Mine proved rocky even before 
Westmoreland announced its intention to come to the valley. Prior to beginning 
full production, Westmoreland Coal had to purchase a mine site, satisfy state and 
federal regulations, win community support, resist a union organizing effort, and 
attract, hire, and train an inexperienced workforce that included women. In 1975, 
Pemberton Hutchinson, vice president in charge of the Westmoreland's western 
operations, identified the most promising site in the Stevens Gulch area that 
overlooked the town of Paonia. When fully developed, the mine would loom over 
the town and create a presence that affected every aspect of community life.2
Prior to 1975, Stevens Gulch remained marginal to North Fork Valley 
development. Its history mirrored the economic diversity of the valley although it 
had been sitting atop some of the richest, low-sulphur coal reserves in the West. 
Early homesteaders, disappointed by the shrinking availability of agricultural claims 
in the valley, searched for suitable land in the marginal areas above Paonia. 
Although unsuitable for fruit growing, the narrow parks along Stevens Gulch 
proved at least adaptable to subsistance settlement. Most of the homestead 
activity occurred after 1910. The Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909 and the 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 provided for increased acreage that made 
the marginal land in Stevens Gulch seem a more worthwhile goal to homesteaders. 
Many of these homesteaders "proved-up" on their claims then sold their holdings, 
making the area attractive to a few ranchers who were able to accumulate large 
tracts of lands.3
2Ibid.
3 Steven G. Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey fo r  the Orchard Valley Mine,
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Evidence indicates that from roughly 1915 to 1925, the typical homestead 
contained a small cabin, privy, a root cellar or spring house, and usually a small 
shed. Most Stevens Gulch residents improved upon and resided on the lands 
during the warmer months and retreated to Paonia for the winter. The seasonally 
subsistence operations allowed the homesteaders to work small vegetable gardens 
and milk a few dairy cows. Many sold their surplus cream to Paonia residents as 
their only cash commodity. During the early years, a number of Stevens Gulch 
families formed a local community, gathering regularly in an outdoor meeting place 
for picnics, horseshoe pitching, and ball games. On these occasions people pooled 
their cream into one wagon load for the trip into town. In this way many of the 
homesteaders were able to hang on to their land until proven up, gain title to the 
land, and then sell it for financial profit. By the early 1970s, the area was 
dominated by a few successful ranches, and only the archaeological traces of 
earlier homesteads and cowcamps remained.4
Early settlers found other ways to exploit the marginal lands above Paonia. 
The valley's booming fruit industry created the need for small scale logging 
operations and saw mills. During the first decades of the twentieth century, a 
number of saw mills appeared in the Stevens Gulch area to supply lumber for 
housing construction and railroad ties, but also for the manufacture of fruit boxes 
needed for the handling and shipping of fruit. Few traces of this industry survived 
until the 1970s, but the operations are linked to the intensive exploitation of the
Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., Paonia, Delta County, Colorado: An 
Historical/Archaeological Transect in the North Fork Drainage o f the Gunnison 
River, Prepared for: Thome Ecological Institute, Boulder, CO (Montrose, CO: 
Centuries Research, Inc., 1977), 39-40.
4Ibid., 41-47. Additional information on Stevens Gulch was provided by long-time 
Paonia resident Merle Fisk. Merle Fisk, interview by Mary Drake, Paonia, CO, 2 
October 1995.
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North Fork Valley at the turn of the century. The physical evidence of Stevens 
Gulch economic and social activities remained virtually invisible to townspeople 
and today the area itself represents the recreational environment that has drawn 
people to the valley throughout the 20th century. Even the small coal mines that 
dotted the bluffs above town remained hidden.
The renewed interest in coal during the early 1970s brought a number of 
large corporations to the North Fork Valley in hopes of developing its vast 
reserves of clean-burning, low sulphur coal. Some of the properties identified by 
these corporations were located in the hills above Paonia, specifically in the 
Stevens Gulch region. Three of these properties contained existing mines with 
histories as far back as the early settlement period. Although these mines were 
important economically to the town, they operated on a limited basis and remained 
out of sight to the valley residents.
The Farmer's Mine, above Garvin Mesa just east of Stevens Gulch, had 
been in operation since the early 1900s, producing an average of 3,000 tons per 
year during the early period, and increasing production to 4,600 tons by 1940. 
Hardly a significant producer compared to Somerset's Utah Fuel and Iron 
Company standards, but larger than the "wagon mine" category. The mine was 
cooperatively owned by a group of Paonians and operated until the 1950s. Gulf 
Oil Company secured options to buy the mine in the early 1970s but failed to 
develop the property. Their initial interest signaled the beginning of the coal 
industry's intent to exploit North Fork Valley coal reserves during the 1970 energy 
boom.5
5The Colorado System-Based Curriculum Project, The North Fork Valley: A 
Community Social Profile Appendix (1976, mimeographed), 21-23.
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The Cowan and Converse mines were situated on the bluffs overlooking 
Paonia and the North Fork Valley. Frank Converse had patented the tract near 
Stevens Gulch in 1906 and later leased part of the property to Charles Cowan. 
Converse failed to develop his mine to any significant extent, working it as a family 
mine until World War I. The mine was active only occasionally after the War.
The Cowan mine showed a more sizeable investment as the owner intended to tap 
the commercial market outside the valley. Cowan invested in an elaborate trestle 
spanning a 200-yard, seventy-foot-high gulch as part of a gravity tramway built to 
speed the delivery of coal from the mine to the railhead at Paonia — an impressive 
engineering accomplishment for the early 1900s. Shortly after its completion, 
Cowan attempted to the ride the string of empty mine-cars across the trestle and 
was thrown to his death when the car he was riding jumped the track. The Cowan 
mine closed following the accident and remained idle until Colorado Consolidated 
Coal Company (CCCC) leased the property in 1974.6
By the early 1970s, properties in many parts of the Rocky Mountain West 
attracted oil and mining companies eager to develop the mineral-rich region 
containing valuable low-sulphur coal. Historical forces breathed new life into an 
industry that many believed had seen its last boom-bust cycle. On the one hand 
new mining regulations served to constrain coal development but on the other, the 
Arab embargo that shut off oil supplies to the United States in 1973, stimulated a 
frenzied search for alternative energy sources in the United States. If coal 
companies could weave their way through a confusing myriad o f mining laws,
6Baker, A Cultural Resource Survey, 29-36. "Charlie Cowan-Fremont Pioneer," 
Pueblo Star-Journal and Sunday Chieftain, Pueblo, CO, 11 May 1969; 
"Consolidated Coal Official asks for a Chance," Delta County Independent, 26 
December 1974.
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moratoriums, and bureaucracies, they stood to make a considerable profit in the 
boom that many considered imminent.
Dealing with newly enacted mining regulations in most cases proved 
difficult. The movement to regulate the industry travelled along three tracks: 
safety and health, lease management, and environmental. Mine health and safety 
proved the less tractible issue and caused few problems to the large coal 
companies attempting to open large-scale mining operations in the west during the 
1970s. The safety of miners was not less important than leasing and environmental 
concerns, but the history of safety regulations and technological innovations 
evolved in such a way that by the 1970s, coal companies, unions, and miners had 
reached an awareness of the human and material costs of unsafe mining practices. 
This was especially significant to the Colorado coal fields since conditions in 
western underground mines had long been considered the most dangrous in the 
United States.
For decades, fatalities rates in Colorado mines were higher than anywhere 
in the nation. Much of the blame for this record has been placed at the feet of 
greedy coal operators, but deeper inquiry reveals a more complicated explanation. 
Most early legislation responded to mining disasters, usually an explosion, that 
killed scores of miners at once but failed to recognize that most coal mine fatalities 
occurred one at a time as a result of rock falls, coal haulage, and electrical 
accidents. Because fatality reporting methods changed at the middle o f the 
century, it is difficult to compare twentieth-century statistics, but the figures from 
1934 to 1969 reveal that the largest number of fatalities occurred as a result of 
falling rock or coal.7
7James Whiteside, Regulating Danger: The Struggle fo r  Mine Safety in the Rocky 
Mountain Coal Industry (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), xii, 162,
no
Early regulations failed to significantly decrease the number of fatalities 
because they did not alter the physical, technical, and human conditions under 
which miners worked. Early mining laws failed to alter the basic relations of work 
in the mines. As long as the room and pillar, contract method continued, miners 
were forced to make choices between safety and production. Changes in the 
process of mining and full mechanization changed that relationship to the benefit of 
the individual miner. Until mid-century, the contract miner was responsible for 
setting timber and securing the face area.8 The time spent ensuring his own safety 
decreased his production time and ultimately his wages. Full mechanization and 
subsequent changes in the mining process transformed the contract miner into a 
wage laborer whose pay did not depend on the tonnage he produced. But the need 
to maintain production at the expense of safety also weighed heavily on 
management. Pressure on superintendents to mine more coal despite human 
consequences added to the danger of the workplace environment. This was a 
problem that would have to be addressed within the industry prior to federal 
regulation.9
The idea that the miner was responsible for his own injury or death, 
referred to as "assumed risk," hung on until the 1930s. In 1915, the Colorado 
legislature attempted to put the idea of assumed risk in the dustbin through the 
principles embodied in the newly created Colorado Industrial Peace Act. The act 
sought to prevent strikes and violence in the coal fields, prompting opposition 
from organized labor. It also created an Industrial Commission responsible for 
administering the new worker's compensation program. Some operators
194.
8See glossary of mining terms, Appendix I.
9Whiteside, Regulating Danger, 96.
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supported the program, but the idea of assumed risk died hard. Even though 
officials noted improvement because of the program, federal intervention was 
required to bring about effective change of consiousness regarding accident 
culpability. Federal Workman's Compensation Insurance forced most operators to 
begin accepting responsibility for the cost of accidents. It provided further 
incentive to alter corporate safety conscience.10
Coal operators favored local control of mine safety during the early years 
of mining in the West. Through the 1920s, operators maintained control over the 
everyday lives of miners in company towns, and they held significant political 
power at the the state and local level. Although state laws were enacted to address 
the issue of safety in the mines, most legislation failed to provide for an effective 
enforcement mechanism. Coal mine regulation authority remained in the hands of 
state authorities until enactment o f the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act in 
1969. The act addressed many o f the failures of previous legislation and applied to 
all mines. It not only gave the federal government authority to close mines in the 
event o f violations, Secretary o f the Interior Walter Hickel recognized that 
accidents killed miners "by ones, twos, and threes" and conditions causing this type 
of occurrance had to be addressed. Fatality rates improved following 
implementation of the act. In Colorado, coal-mine fatalities totaled 154 for a rate 
o f 4.16 during 1941 -1945, but during the 1970s the fatality rate dropped to 1.23.11
As the burden o f coal mine inspections fell increasingly under federal 
jurisdiction, state agencies shifted their attention to education and training 
programs. Beginning in the 1970s, Colorado's high school and vocational 
education systems began implementing such programs as they faced increased coal
10Ibid„ 126-129.
n Ibid„ 170, 198.
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mining activities . By emphasizing the training of miners to help the state combat 
the carelessness and negligence that caused most worker injuries, state officials 
continued to place the burden of mine accidents on the miners. Coal mine safety 
required that industry assume their share of maintaining adequate training and 
safety measures, and more importantly, operators needed to be pro-active in 
creating an attitude of safety-consciousness. But in the early process of lease 
negotiation of North Fork Valley properties, prospective developers found safety 
and health regulations less cumbersome than the maize of environmental and 
leasing requirements. Future safety records of companies who advanced far 
enough in the process to actually mine could eventually prove their committment 
to safety. Safety consciousness meant little if operators could not obtain the 
necessary federal lease to mine the coal.12
The federal government originally allocated coal deposits by means of total 
disposal. Land including mineral rights could be purchased from the government 
for one dollar and twenty-five cents. Land and mineral rights were cheap because 
the government wanted the West populated. By 1863 this philosophy began to 
change when a special mining act limited the acquisition of tracts containing coal. 
The General Mining Act of 1872 provided that mineral rights to a parcel of land 
could be claimed by anyone who filed a surveyed claim, recorded it, and worked 
and improved it over a five year period. Congress attempted to assert control over 
the West's vast coal reserves. In 1906, all federal coal reserves were withdrawn 
from entry after millions of acres of public land were closed to homesteading. The 
government acquired even more lands during the depression when land holders 
defaulted on federally subsidized loans. The government was sitting on a valuable
12Ibid„ 200-201.
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resource even though the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act had made coal, oil, gas, oil 
shale, and other minerals "leaseable." Under this act, coal developers could obtain 
permits to prospect, pay annual rents, and obtain leases to extract coal from public 
lands.13
The policy had resulted in developers applying for leases following initial 
exploration, placing hundreds of thousands of acres under lease yet in many cases 
failing to produce coal. As demand for coal declined after World War I, federal 
coal reserves in the West became less attractive. Thousands of acres of western 
coal reserves remained unavailable to competitive development. In 1971, a Bureau 
of Land Management Study revealed that 91 percent of all acreage land under 
lease for coal development was not in mineral production. This led Secretary of 
the Interior C. B. Rogers Morton to place an immediate moratorium on all leasing. 
Leasing could only occur under Prior Right Lease Applications (PRLA) based on 
existing operation. Although the moratorium failed to stir much controversy as 
long as demand for coal remained low, by 1973 it became an obstruction of 
national importance.14
The moratorium was intended as a stop-gap measure until a long-term 
solution could be reached. In 1973, an interim solution emerged in the form of a 
program by which industry would nominate tracts for potential development and 
then bidding would occur. The program, called EMARS, was eventually 
incorporated into the 1975 programwide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
to assess impact on federal coal reserves.15 The initial moratorium lasted only
13Frederic J. Atheam, "Black Diamonds: A History of Federal Coal Policy in the 
Western United States, 1862-1981," Journal o f  the West 21, no. 4 (October 
1982): 45.
14Ibid„ 48.
15Under the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act, Congress directed all
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until the Interior Department devised the interim solution in 1973 yet almost 
immediately environmental groups became involved in the process of bringing 
federal coal lands under the control of the federal government. The move toward 
significant environmental regulation of the coal industry had evolved on a parallel 
track with health/safety and federal management of coal reserves since the late 
1950s. But by the early 1970s environmental issues produced the most intractable 
barrier to coal development in the North Fork Valley. Environmental awareness 
developed later than the other two yet concern about impact became the overriding 
issue during the 1970 coal boom.16
Historically, the coal industry responded to complaints about destructive 
coal operations by claiming that alternative methods would cost more and that the 
country needed coal. In many cases the environment was sacrificed in the name of 
patriotism. The industry became less able to sell that point as new strip-mining 
operations began in the Appalachian region, and to a lesser degree, in the West. 
Open pit mining created visible environmental damage impossible to ignore. Less 
attention was paid to underground mining until it became clear that underground 
operations caused significant stream pollution. Pollution affected agricultural land 
and irrigation water. Soil erosion threatened to spoil sources of drinking water 
and to degrade the aesthetic qualities of streams and rivers.17
agencies of the federal government to prepare an EIS on any action that 
significantly affected the environment. The EIS provision of the NEPA was not 
without problems, and by 1984, over 1,000 court cases had challenged the 
language in the section that spelled it out. Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies 
Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy o f Administrative Reform 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 34.
16Atheam, "Black Diamonds," 48.
17DuaneA. Smith, Mining in America: The Industry and the Environment, 1800- 
1980 (University Press of Kansas, 1987), 112-113.
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Concern with the environmental impact of coal mining dovetailed with the 
growth of tourism and recreation in the West, and coal operators began to realize 
that prior justification for wasteful and destructive practices would no longer 
satisfy critics. By the 1940s the industry tried to head off the growing threat of 
government regulations by calling for local solutions instead, but critics claimed 
that they were inadequate. In the 1960s time ran out for the industry to come up 
with its own solutions. Environmental awareness, growing slowly during the 
1950s, exploded during the next decade. The all-out assault on the industry 
proved disastrous to coal operators. The message even made its way into school 
books. Mine owners were portrayed to school children as destroyers of the future. 
Mining historian Duane Smith discovered that "Raper, polluter, and exploiter were 
some of the more polite terms used to describe this fiend." Some coal companies 
had gotten the message, but the unenlightened ones continued to use the old ways 
of justifying their practices. As the 1960s drew to a close, it was clear that mining, 
once a favored, even pampered institution, had slipped into public disfavor; and the 
momentum swung to its opponents.18
During the 1960s an array of legislation advanced, culminating in the 1970 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and its creation the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). By the 1970s moderates within the industry moved 
coal operators toward accommodation. New regulations impacted every aspect of 
the coal industry. Smith argued that "some regulations helped, some hindered and 
some only confused." Most of the small operators were hurt and many simple 
closed their operations. Larger operators could absorb the costs. Despite the
18Smith, Mining in America, 131,141.
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cost, federal action became necessary to force the industry to become stewards of 
the land.19
In 1973 the Arab oil embargo brought a new sense of urgency to the search 
for alternative energy sources. The nation, fearing a future without an inexpensive 
oil supply, turned to the vast coal reserves of the West to ease the crisis. Since the 
country once again needed coal, the industry believed that they could proceed with 
new projects like the ones available in the North Fork Valley. The 1973 interim 
solutions on federal leasing of coal inspired confidence that development could 
move ahead but environmental groups challenged the recently completed EIS. In 
1977 the court found the EIS inadequate and halted leasing until a new one could 
be done. The court allowed three exceptions to the new moratorium: by-pass, 
production maintenance and hardship cases. Many of the coal companies seeking 
leases in the west struggled to fit into these guidelines. But to those who could 
not, the court decision created a formidable barrier to coal development in places 
like the North Fork Valley.20
With its purchase of the Converse property, Colorado Consolidated Coal 
Company positioned itself as a textbook case o f how not to gain approval for 
development in the 1970 North-Fork-Valley coal boom. Gulf Oil, ARCO, Coors 
Beer Company,and Westmoreland all stood to gain from its mistakes. CCCC 
originally intended to supply coal to a glass manufacturer but later secured a 
sizable contract with the Northern Indiana Power & Service Co. to provide fuel to 
produce electricity. The size of the contract required CCCC to access federal coal 
lying beyond the limits of private coal on the Converse property. Local, state,
19Ibid., 152. Richard H.K. Vietor, Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 156.
20Smith, Mining in America, 153; Atheam, "Black Diamonds," 47-48.
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federal, and industry officials understood that plans for coal development operated 
under a certain logic by which expectant developers undertake exploratory drilling, 
obtain permits, satisfy haulage requirements, arrange contracts, and then prepare 
the mine site. CCCC attempted to circumvent accepted procedures.21
Colorado Consolidated leased the 120-acre Converse tract in 1974 and 
immediately began site preparation. Thousands of tons of rock and coal were 
stripped away to make room for a new portal and surface facilities and work began 
immediately to prepare an access road across two and one half miles o f BLM land 
to connect the mine entrance to Stevens Gulch Road. CCCC encountered its first 
setback before even filing for a federal coal lease, by not acquiring a permit to 
build the access road. The BLM filed a cease and desist order and road 
construction was delayed until a tramroad permit could be issued. The permit was 
issued in Mayl975, and until then, rock and coal from site preparation could not 
be hauled away and was dumped over a near-by bank. The delay also raised 
suspicions concerning CCCC's lease application. 22
Company officials recognized the limits the 120-acre tract of private coal 
imposed on their long range production plans. Their projected rate of extraction at 
2,200 tons per day meant they would be out of coal in two or three years, and that 
a lease to mine coal on adjacent federal land was necessary to long-term 
production. Company officials arrived in Washington to lobby members of 
Congress who received the lease application in December 1974. The application 
reflected CCCC's attempt to fit its operation into existing guidelines which allowed 
special consideration to Prior Right Lease Applications (PRLA) based on existing 
production but CCCC hoped to gain approval by claiming the activity of site
21 Delta County Independent, 26 December 1974.
^D elta  County Independent, 19 May 1975.
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preparation as prior work. A new mine would be forced to wait in line with other 
lease applicants, but an operating mine would receive special consideration.23
Colorado Consolidated Coal failed to consult with local officials prior to 
this point, nearly dooming the entire project. County Commissioners 
recommended the lease be denied until the company met "normal" requirments and 
until a social impact study was completed. Even the town mayors of Paonia and 
Hotchkiss were reluctant to support the lease. Local officials became alarmed that 
other prospective developers waiting in the wings would follow CCCC's example 
and disregard local concerns. Locals had been warned of "fast-buck artists" 
poised to descend on the valley in the event of a boom. The company aroused 
additional concern by its plan to use non-union labor. Company officials 
equivocated on the non-union point saying that it would be up to the future 
workforce to chose whether they wanted to be organized by the UMWA. Locals 
also believed the rumors of a Colorado Consolidated secret intent to develop the 
site then sell it to another company at a considerable profit. A local axiom that 
said "anything done too fast can't be any good" fueled the bulk of community 
suspicions.24
Rumors were laid to rest in January1976, when CCCC announced the sale 
of its Converse lease and "one-million-dollar assests" to Westmoreland Coal. 
Colorado Consolidated president Jack LaFollette stated that "hassles" associated 
with the tramroad permit delays and local objections to lease acquisition "stopped 
the company cold." Westmoreland Vice President Pemberton Hutchinson told the 
North Fork Times in December of 1975 that he had entered an option agreement 
to buy the property after drilling and geologic evaluations had been completed.
23Ibid.
^D elta  County Independent, 26 December 1974.
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Hutchinson also promised that if the sale went through, Westmoreland would 
begin by doing an Environmental Empact Statement. The Times had previously 
quoted CCCC's Lafollette as declaring that "Environmental impact is an outgrowth 
of the hippie age." Obviously Westmoreland would benefit from not only CCCC's 
expensive spadework at the minesite but by their experience in public relations 
with the local community.25
As an historical actor, the local community did not passively wait for social 
forces to act upon it, yet some of the impact studies cast Paonia in this light.
Even Ed Marston, who negatively critiqued the Boulder study, worried that 
Paonia's lack of sophistication would make it easy prey to the new breed of 
corporate manipulators. Years later, Marston suggested that his objections to the 
Boulder study might have been based on an unrecognized suspicion that as a 
trained observor he should have undertaken the type of analysis inherent in the 
study. He recalled his fascination with Paonia. After moving from New York, "it 
seemed almost like a toy town." Marston arrived in Paonia when residents were 
only beginning to struggle with the implications o f major coal development. As 
the new publisher of one of four area newspapers, he vowed to cover the public 
meetings often ignored by local reporters. He commented on one town meeting in 
early 1976:
What 1 took away from it was that the people that lived here were not going to 
stand up to this company or any other company. This company was going to 
have its way...they had money, they had expertise, they had smoothness....they 
were the new generation. But we urban people...to us these guys were just
our..you know...our fathers and we weren't intimidated by [them] Most of us
were fleeing what we saw Westmoreland and the other companies bring....so
25 The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 4 January 1976, and The North Fork 
Times, 31 December 1975.
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there was this immediate effect. .."Oh my God. 1 just moved here to this perfect 
little place and " It might not sound fair, but that was the chemistry. 6
Although Paonia's vulnerability concerned observers like Marston, local 
officials had taken confident steps to prepare for the anticipated boom that most 
welcomed and feared at the same time. Marston was not alone in wanting to 
protect this "perfect little place." One of the first steps was to commission a study 
by the Foundation for Urban and Neighborhood Development (FUND). Sponsers 
of the FUND study included Adolph Coors Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Denver 
Rio Grande Western Railroad, the BLM, Delta County Commissioners, the Forest 
Service, and the mayor of Paonia.27 Residents and officials hoped to mitigate 
population-growth impact through careful planning for infrastructure 
improvements. The school board drew up elaborate plans to expand Delta 
County's school system and voters enthusiastically agreed to funding four new high 
schools. The Paonia Town Council worked throughout 1975 to obtain additional 
supplies of domestic water. County Commissioners enacted new mobile home 
regulations to prevent the proliferation of unsightly mobile home parks that tended 
to accompany rapid population growth in similar boom areas.28
Paonia residents responded positively to official initiatives except for an 
attempt at new zoning regulations. A County Commissioner groused that the 
recent defeat of the zoning measure indicated that people were voting for sprawl. 
Another commissioner responded that "people would rather have the evil of sprawl
26Ed Marston, interview by author, tape recording, Paonia, Colorado, 2 August 
1994.
27Colorado Consolidate Coal's refusal to become involved in the FUND study 
contributed to local condemnation of the company. CCCC claimed they had 
already retained a planning firm to do their own study. Sheryl Robinson, "Official 
Asks for a Chance," Delta County Independent, 26 December 1974.
28 The North Fork Times, 31 December 1975.
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than the evil of control." There seemed to be limits to what North Fork Valley
residents would tolerate. Long-time Paonians generally expressed confidence in
the town's ability to manage coal development impact and would most likely have
been amused by Marston's evaluation. But Paonia's mayor, Don Chapman was at
least aware of the town's vulnerability to larger forces and expressed his concern in
a 1975 interview:
....people here haven't dealt with big industry, big government and rapid 
population growth. I think there is a communication gap about these things 
and how they will affect our future. We all have a lot of learning to do.29
Pern Hutchinson hoped that Westmoreland's participation in the local 
process would help lessen local fears and win over the more sophisticated critics 
like Marston. In a recent interview, Hutchinson spoke about the company's reason 
for coming to the valley and its priorities once a deal was made. A search for 
western properties to balance Westmoreland's eastern operations brought 
Hutchinson to the North Fork Valley in 1975. Following a six-year stint 
overseeing development o f a strip mine in Montana, he turned his attention to the 
high-quality steam coal abundantly available in the Paonia and Somerset area. 
Hutchinson identified Colorado Consolidated's Converse mine as favorable to 
those conditions and immediately began negotiations. CCCC possessed a small 
lease, a solid contract with NIPSCO, and a skeleton operation—Westmoreland 
would provide the rest.30
Westmoreland established a western office in Colorado Springs, Colorado 
in March of 1976, and incorporated Colorado Westmoreland, Inc. (CWI) of
29The North Fork Valley, Appendix, 169. The North Fork Times, 31 December 
1975; 28 January 1976.
30Hutchinson, interview.
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Paonia as a wholly-owned subsidiary. CWI took a six month lease on Paonia 
office space. Following the completion of the purchase agreement, CWI began 
work on the access road that would allow it to truck coal to a proposed railroad 
siding in Bowie.31 Westmoreland announced that the private coal on the 
Converse property would last for seven to ten years, making the need for a large 
federal lease less pressing, but Hutchinson expressed CWI's intention of applying 
for one anyway. Plans called for the mining of the twenty-seven-foot-thick D 
seam, and Hutchinson predicted production would begin by late 1976 or early 
1977.32
Despite optimistic predictions concerning the supply of private coal,
Hutchinson admitted in 1993 that a federal coal lease was mandatory if CWI was
going to have an ongoing, secure and viable property. Company officials
understood that acquiring a federal lease meant an enormous amount of public
involvement. Hutchinson recalled that:
Westmoreland came with an attitude of being willing to listen. We hired local 
people and said this is going to be a union-free operation. This will be an 
operation of high productivity and we are gong to hire according to the 
demography of the area.33
He believed these steps would help relieve local apprehension about CWI's 
development. He expressed appreciation for how people felt about their area.
They wanted to enjoy the peace and quiet of the land and even though young 
people lacked employment opportunities many locals still resisted coal
3 Eventually CWI constructed a large train load-out facility on Highway 133 
closer to the entrance to Stevens Gulch Road.
32The Converse mine D seam was located above C seam and B seam, both 
measuring 25 feet thick. The North Fork Times, 1 January 1976; 18 February 
1976; 3 March 1976.
33Hutchinson, interview.
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development. He believed that environmental concerns and the "fracases and 
trouble between employers and employees" in a union setting, troubled many of 
them. It is hard to know whether Westmoreland truly represented the new, 
enlightened developer. It took steps to give that impression by offering to do an 
EIS and then hired a Philadelphia environmental lawyer to head the management 
team. Official position on the union issue was more straightforward.
CWI philosophy accepted the premise that union is not the choice of 
management. If employees elected union representation it meant that management 
had failed. So, according to Hutchinson, "we made up our minds that we thought 
a union free workplace, properly motivated, paid and treated fairly with an open 
door policy, would win the day." Within that framework they viewed women as 
an asset because "women are not known to jump on band wagons like that...they're 
freer thinkers, particularly when going into something new." So not only did CWI 
believe that hiring women would help them gain community support it would also 
serve to blunt any union organization effort that might arise once the mine began 
production. Hiring women seemed like a wise decision. Hutchinson recalled that 
the company planned to hire according to the area's demography and, "...if there 
were 40% women in the area....we would try and have no barriers [to women]." 
CWI, clearly, did not intend to maintain a workforce slot reserved for 40% 
women, but it was serious about introducing the woman miner to the North Fork 
Valley in a significant way.34
When asked if he or other company officials were apprehensive 
themselves, about hiring women, Hutchinson admitted they were. But there was 
never a doubt that women could do the job. He believed that it was a matter of
34Ibid.
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"changing the culture." Westmoreland had hired women in its eastern operations
and was satisfied with their performance. In the West, Westmoreland attempted a
similar cultural change when it confronted a Native American workforce at its
Montana mine. Hutchinson learned that the inexperienced Indians, when properly
motivated and trained, became good workers. He believed that Indians had a
different concept of time that caused them to be consistently late to work.
According to Hutchinson:
We had to teach them about coming in on time in the morning. I learned from 
that experience that it wasn't like an art where some people can do it and some 
people can't....it was leamable. I also learned that females were very willing 
and that the strength factor was not a big issue at all.33
Experience with Native American workers convinced Hutchinson that cultural
differences would not exclude women from working underground. He assumed
that the biggest problem, if there was going to be one, lay in getting men to
recognize that women could do the job and that men would be forced to give up
their "macho mode." During early development CWI hired a psychological
consultant to work with the newly-hired miners in order to create a truly integrated
workforce. Hutchinson insisted that CWI was ahead of EEOC requirements to
hire women in the coal industry. Employing women, he said:
was not something that just hit us. We knew we were going to do it and we 
thought it was A) the right thing to do, and B) it was the law, but it was the 
right thing to do. It would help us, and it turned out to be true, in winning 
acceptance amongst the total community.3^
Evidence of community resistance to CWI's intent to hire women miners does not 
appear in the record. Residents were determined to bring employment to the
35Ibid.
36Ibid„ 6.
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depressed North Fork Valley and the issue of women miners failed to emerge as a 
problem. Hiring women fit CWI's corporate strategy and it seemed to be working.
Management had vowed to meet with the public and keep them informed 
of company plans and decisions, but in May 1976, CWI negotiations to move the 
proposed train load-out facility to a recently-optioned parcel of land closer to town 
caught the attention of The North Fork Times. Ed Marston publicly announced 
the secret negotiations and reminded Hutchinson of his promise that Westmoreland 
would be open with the community. He described Westmoreland's attempt at 
public notification as clumsy and embarrasing. The incident portended a series of 
roadblocks that CWI faced once they began mining. Even after mining 
commenced, the problem of the federal lease remained.37
The Orchard Valley Mine opened in December 1976. A mining crew of 
eight women and eight men began extracting coal from the private holdings that 
Hutchinson had announced would last for seven to ten years. Company officials 
later revised that estimate one and one half years. But conditions inside the mine 
threatened to cause a total mine shutdown within one year of the beginning of 
mining. Miners confronted a burned area which weakened the roof of the only 
section being mined. As production pushed eastward into the bum area, a 
significant cave-in occurred, blocking access to most of the remaining coal in the 
East section. Officials decided to retreat, pulling the handful of remaining pillars 
and sealing the section, then hoping that the federal lease would come through. 
Arm-chair observers second-guessed CWI's decision, reasoning that they should 
open a west section and continue extracting coal. Once CWI understood the
37 The North Fork Times, 5 May 1976.
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danger of mining under those conditions, it became clear that the lease was their 
only hope of continuing production.38
Lease negotiations proceeded slowly through 1977. Local and state 
environmental groups immediately opposed CWI's lease proposal. A BLM public 
hearing in July 1977 produced more vocal opposition than support. Negotiations 
centered on a short-term lease that required only an Environmental Assessment 
Report (EAR). The BLM had already completed the EAR, and if acceptable, then 
the lease could go ahead. The Delta County League of Women Voters, the 
Colorado Division of Wildlife, and numerous environmental groups opposed the 
EAR and demanded a more extensive, site-specific Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) be done. They also demanded that the new, revised Programwide 
EIS be completed and approved before CWIs lease application was acted upon.39
Also at stake was the 1.25-million ton per year, twenty-year approval 
requested by the company. They believed the 1.25 million-ton-lease would allow 
them to mine on more than the year-to-year basis under the smaller 700,000-ton 
lease. On the basis o f a federal judge's decision to suspend leasing until a new EIS 
was completed, Westmoreland's application was approved at the smaller, 700,000 
ton level in late December 1977. The BLM had recommended the 1.25-million ton 
lease but the Environmental Protection Agency threatened a lawsuit if more than 
the 700,000 tons were allowed before completion of the revised programmatic 
EIS. The company publicly announced that the smaller lease limited the future 
workforce to 175 people rather than the 250 the operation was designed to 
support, and it also prevented investment in an overland conveyor system designed
380 n  pulling pillars, see glossary of mining terms, Appendix I. The North Fork 
Times, 15 December 1977.
39 The Paonian, 14 July 1977.
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to eliminate the need to truck coal to the railhead. The smaller lease also meant 
that CWI would be forced to operate on a year-to-year basis as new lease 
applications became necessary. Company officials believed the larger lease would 
allow long-term planning. Delta County Commissioners condemned the ruling, 
saying that the smaller lease meant the county would be saddled with unsteady 
development that would make planning more difficult.40
In the midst o f conflict and uncertainty, CWI still managed to hold onto 
critical support from employees, town residents, and local officials. Ironically, the 
timing o f the OVM's lease problems coincided with the first real test o f its non­
union policy. On December 6, 1977, UMWA miners went out on nationwide 
strike and local pickets immediately appeared at the Stevens Gulch Road entrance 
to Highway 133 and outside the guard shack located at the BLM access road 
leading to the Orchard Valley Mine. Using the slogan "Remember! You Have 
Because we Are UMWA!" picketers tried hard to gain the support of CWI non­
union miners by distributing UMWA brochures claiming that Westmoreland mines 
posted the highest rate of disabling injuries among reporting coal operators.
Striking miners asked local businesses to display "We Support the UMWA" signs 
in their windows. Generally, local businesses supported miners as members of the 
community, but few were willing to display the signs in support of the union.
Many business owners believed that well-paid miners drove to Montrose and 
Grand Junction to shop, and miners felt that local business took advantage of them
4077/e North Fork Times, 8 December 1977; "Government approves CWI lease 
application," The (North Fork) Times, 22 December 1977; "Paonia miners facing 
layoffs," The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 5 January 1978.
128
by charging high prices. In the best of times, the relationship between the two 
groups lacked support and trust.41
CWI general manager Tim Hartley, attempted to minimize the impact of 
union activity by reminding locals that union animosity should be directed at other 
companies. Targeting CWI employees would only serve to alienate them from the 
union. He noted that higher wages and benefits CWI miners enjoyed resulted not 
from a union index but "as a result o f pegging the salaries to the heavy industry 
index." In light of other problems confronting CWI, Hartley emphasized that 
greater anxiety was embedded within the lease process than a threat from the 
union. Although union activity failed to arouse local passions against the non­
union mine, some OVM employees found reason to doubt Hartley's optimistic 
assessment of their non-union benefits. Problems surfaced during a 1978 National 
Labor Relations Board labor-trial against CWI. The local UMWA organizer 
brought the case to the attention of the NLRB on behalf of three former CWI 
employers. Women miners were at the center of the conflict with the company and 
so was the union. The legal action made CWI operations, once again, a front-page 
news story.42
Prior to the lawsuit, women of the OVM had received the lion's share of 
local press attention to CWIs operation. Despite historical formal and informal 
barriers to women working in underground mines, some cracked those barriers 
individually, without the power of organized groups like the Coal Employment 
Project behind them. A full two years prior to CEP's federal contract compliance
4177/e Times, 8 December 1977; 15 December 1977; 22 December 1977. The 
Paonian, 15 December 1977.
42 77/e Paonian, 10 February 1977; 10 March 1977; 23 June 1977; 15 December 
1977.
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lawsuit, Loretta Kraai of Paonia pushed her way into US Steel's Somerset mine. 
Having her application ignored, the thirty-eight-year-old, divorced mother of two 
teenagers made repeated trips to the mine office to re-apply and was finally hired 
in February 1976.43
Newspaper articles and local discussion about Kraai's brief career as a coal 
miner helped pave the way for women miners at the Orchard Valley Mine. Like 
Kraai, the women found themselves at the center of local and regional media 
attention. At the beginning the exposure made CWI look good. A September 
1977 article in The Paonian featured interviews with the recently hired women and 
without exception, they spoke positively about their experiences and about the 
company that hired them. Press coverage gave the impression that the women 
were doing well until Ed Marston uncovered evidence that trouble was brewing 
underground at the OVM.44
Marston's published interview with miner Yvonne Biggs threatened to strip 
the optimism from CWI's carefully crafted public relations campaign. Marston 
intended to provide the public's first insight into the reality of the Orchard Valley 
Mine. He believed Biggs' story illustrated some of the problems encountered by 
the "new breed o f coal miner" in "the brave new world of union-free, thick seam 
western coal." Biggs said that during her first few months of employment, she 
enthusiastically praised CWI's training and open-door policies, but disappointment 
with the company's response to a disabling hand injury led Biggs to alter her 
perception of managment policies. The mine had become, in her words, "a 
bureaucractic caste system" managed by the manipulative approach.45
43 "Woman Miner - A Valley First," The North Fork Times, 18 February 1976.
44"CWI's women enjoy mining." The Paonian. 15 September 1977.
45"Inside Westmoreland: one miner's critical view," The Times, 22 December
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Biggs told Marston that employees were led to believe that safety concerns 
led to management's decision not to mine the west section following the recent 
cave-in. She said the company lied and that they were using the safety issue to 
gain approval for the federal lease. Biggs was not alone in her growing distrust of 
the company. She and a small core o f Orchard Valley miners attempted to 
organize a miner's group that would be able to negotiate with management. Biggs' 
disillusionment stemmed mostly from her injury, not specific problems associated 
with her gender. But her romantic involvment with the CWI Safety Director and 
her role in organizing a miner's group put her on a collision course with 
management.46
In February 1978, Biggs was fired for excessive tardiness, absence, and 
incompetence. The termination led her and fellow miners Tim and Mary Walsh to 
ask UMWA organizer Joe "Moose" Martinez to intercede on their behalf. The 
Walshes had also been involved in the effort to form a worker's organization.
They quit their jobs in January 1978 after being told they could no longer work on 
the same shift. They claimed that their organizing efforts prompted the change in 
policy concerning spouses. Martinez welcomed the opportunity to demonstrate to 
non-union miners what the power of the UMWA could do for them.47
Testimony at the NLRB trial began on August 24, 1978 and after four 
days, the judge postponed procedings until September 25. Before testimony 
resumed, CWI and the UMWA settled the suit out o f court. Although not 
admitting guilt, CWI agreed to reinstate Yvonne Biggs, Mary Walsh, and Tim 
Walsh to their former jobs and to compensate the three for any loss of pay or
1977.
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
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benefits they may have suffered. CWI also agreed to post notices explaining the 
organizing rights enjoyed by its employees under the National Labor Relations 
Act. Of the three, Mary Walsh was the only one to return to her job. The miners 
were grateful for the union's help but it turned out to be a hollow victory for 
Martinez.48
The 1978 events were the first and last attempt by Orchard Valley miners 
to organize. They also prompted a shift in management philosophy at CWI. By 
September 1, 1978, the Director of Administration and Personnel, and the Mine 
Manager had resigned under pressure from the Philadelphia office. By the time the 
transformation was complete, CWI had asumed the style and philosophy o f the 
three men who would direct the mine until its sale in 1988, President Christopher 
Seglem, Mine Manager Ron Stucki, and Chief Engineer and Human Resources 
Director Matthew Sakurada 49
Within their role as workers, women would certainly benefit by 
understanding their rights to organize or elect union representation. Of equal 
importance, CWI women needed to count on enlightened policies covering 
workplace interaction. The first group of women hired in 1976 demonstrated their 
ability to do the job, but barriers relating to gender issues required a pro-active 
management philosophy that CWI, or any mining company, remained ill-equipped 
to provide. Colorado Westmoreland did quite well in areas where they were better 
equipped to succeed. During the early years, CWI officials devoted their efforts to 
traditional pursuits of mining—developing a modem mine and producing coal.
The transformation of the hill over-looking Paonia was breathtaking. The 
mine site incorporated physical structures -- a mine office and bathhouse building,
4877j<? Times, 24 Autust 1978.
49Ibid.; The Times, 7 September 1978; 18 September 1978.
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crushing/screening and truck load-out towers, maintenance shop and warehouse, 
and a surface conveyor system — into the natural environment, producing an 
inoffensive setting that was visible in detail from the valley below. An 
environmental engineer remained on staff throughout CWI's ownership of the 
mine, maintaining vigilance over possible mining impact on the area surrounding 
the mine. Scores of bright lights lined the access road, from the portal area to the 
guard-shack at the Steven Gulch entrance, reminding Paonians that even while 
most of them were sleeping, men and women were mining coal. During the 
daylight hours, and in unusual circumstances, at night, a consistent stream of coal 
trucks carried their cargo of coal down the newly-paved Stevens Gulch Road to 
the train load-out, then hurriedly returned to the mine to receive another load. 
During shift change, miners' cars going to and from work confirmed the fact that 
the road to the Orchard Valley Mine had been permanently transformed from a 
gravel road, maintained by the Division of Wildlife to access recreation areas, into 
a major paved thoroughfare.
Local residents seemed to accept the transformation into the rhythm of life 
of the valley, but vocal criticism emerged from time to time. The lights along the 
access road and the increased truck traffic prompted the bulk of citizen comment. 
Individuals and families whose lives improved because the mine had come to the 
valley easily adjusted to the change. CWI miners and their families were somewhat 
comforted by the knowledge that they could glance up on the hill and envision the 
activity of co-workers or family members as they went about their work 
underground. During the winter months, as clouds settled closer to the valley, the 
eerie yellow glow on the hillside was actually quite beautiful. But it could also be 
frightening. In June 1986, Paonia residents woke to the sight of black smoke 
pouring from the return air shaft at the mine. To CWI miners, it was doubly
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alarming. Some knew they would have to face what was obviously a serious mine 
fire, and others knew that a mine fire meant either a shut-down or a lay-off. The 
1986 mine-fire demonstrated the sense of conflicting realities that emerged once 
the Orchard Valley Mine became an immediate, physical presence to the 
community.
Some considered the mine a spectacle, an offensive reminder of industry’s 
encroachment on a "perfect, little place." To others it represented a responsible 
effort to bring much-needed industry to the depressed valley. CWI was partially 
successful in its quest to convince residents of its environmental consciousness. Its 
safety and production record throughout its decade-long operation was equally 
successful. The Orchard Valley Mine received numerous safety awards under 
CWI management, and its miners consistently kept pace with less labor-intensive 
strip mines when compared on a tons/per-man-hour basis. Few doubt CWIs 
dedication to safety under the direction of Safety Director Link Derrick. His 
department initiated programs that recognized corporate and individual 
responsibility to safety and training.
During the early 1980s, Matthew Sakurada attempted to use the 
philosophy behind these safety efforts to develop a program to successfully 
integrate women into the culture of mining. Pemberton Hutchinson's 
pronouncements about changing the culture in retrospect sound idealistically 
optimistic, but not shallow or dishonest. There is every reason to believe that at 
the beginning, full gender-integration seemed possible and officials continued to 
pursue what may have been an illusive concept in the best of environments. Within 
the underground-mining culture, it took more than sheer force of the will of 
Hutchinson, Sakurada, Stucki, or Seglem. The dynamics of human interaction 
within the underground environment mitigated against full integration within the
lifetime of the Orchard Valley Mine and only the experiences of the women who 
worked there can offer explanations for its failure. Barriers built over the course 
of one and one half centuries significantly interfered with women's attempt to 
successfully integrate the underground coal industry.
CHAPTER 6
DIFFERENCE IN A MASCULINE ENVIRONMENT
After breaking employment barriers in coal mines throughout the United 
States, women found that simply working hard and gaining new skills would not 
automatically ensure their success at integrating the traditionally male mining 
workforce. For some this was not a goal. It was enough to learn the job and 
receive the substantial wages and benefits the occupation offered. But even those 
who sought only the financial rewards of coal mining would have welcomed a 
more gender-integrated workforce. Difficulty in integrating the occupation lay in 
the process of mining and the underground culture constructed over time to cope 
with the physical environment of the mine.
The process of extracting coal from an underground mine demanded hard 
physical labor, and the work culture constructed to meet those demands rewarded 
masculine characteristics and behavior. For more than a century men had been the 
sole shapers o f that culture. Breaking employment barriers, constructed on the 
basis of difference, brought a special "pioneer" status to women coal miners, but 
once hired they faced the reality that they were different from traditional coal 
miners. Difference mattered in the masculine work culture, and it threw up 
barriers that few women expected to confront. The mine environment, work 
process, and unique culture made jobs more difficult for both men and women, but 
they were more constraining for women.
135
136
Sex and gender difference erected both external and internal barriers to job 
success and satisfaction of women coal miners. Difference between males and 
females rests on the twin foundations of sex and gender. Sex differentiation 
between male and female is biological and essential and is rooted in the fact that 
women can become pregnant (reproduction) and men, on average are bigger and 
stronger (strength/size). Gender differentiation is the social process by which 
characteristics are coded as feminine or masculine. Gender is not essential, it is 
socially constructed. The mine and its culture imposed sex and gender barriers, 
but women also struggled to adjust internal, sex-role expectations and perceptions 
to an environment in which feminine characteristics were of questionable utility.1
The relationship between women and the underground environment, 
carefully constructed over time as masculine, affected women's social interactions 
as they attempted to mediate gendered role expectations on the one hand and learn 
a difficult and dangerous job on the other. In the absence of human activity the 
mine is a natural environment. It is enclosed, unpredictable, unstable, powerful, 
and alive. It shifts, bounces, and adjusts its barometric pressure to outsides forces 
as it adapts harmoniously to the rest of nature. Human geographer Derek Gregory 
detailed how humans have historically interacted with the landscape in an attempt 
to "make over" nature into the image of man. He cites "masculine sexual 
metaphors of penetrating closed dark spaces,” suggesting the process by which a 
natural cave becomes a masculine mine.2
Sandra Bern, "Probing the Promise of Androgyny," Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes: 
Readings Toward a Psychology o f Androgyny, ed. Alexandra Kaplan and Joan 
Bean (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 52.
2Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 131.
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The process of extraction has continually sought to control the natural 
forces that made the mine a dangerous place and although it is less dangerous 
today, the mine remains unpredictable and miners continue to respect its power. 
Humans are the vulnerable intruder into it and have constructed strategies for 
coping with the dangerous conditions, based on interactions among men. Women 
could adapt to the natural environment of the mine, but the masculine culture 
became a handicap to many who simply wanted to do their work and be respected.
The work culture o f the mine was constructed to cope with the physical 
properties and work process of the underground mine. Miners worked in a 
confined, dark, dirty, and dangerous environment. Generations of miners 
developed language, practices, and behaviors as unique strategies for coping with 
that environment. The language coal miners use underground is irreverent and 
sexually explicit. Miners frequently engage in practical jokes, sometimes to relieve 
the boredom but often to relieve anxiety and fear. One of the most bizarre 
practices that occurred frequently underground was the ritual of horseplay. In its 
most physical form, the ritual included miners wrestling each other to the ground, 
biting the nose, greasing the genital area, squeezing the testicles, and pinching the 
nipples. The practice allowed crew members to demonstrate affection and 
solidarity, but it could also be used to demonstrate to a crew member that he did 
not fit in with the crew and that he should ask for a transfer.3
Although practices and rituals could occur whenever more than two miners 
were working together, they were observed more frequently in the production 
section. The production section is the set o f rooms in which coal extraction takes
3Kristen R. Yount, "Women and Men Coal Miners: Coping with Gender 
Integration Underground," (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1986), 
238-251.
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place. At the Orchard Valley Mine the production crew usually consisted of a 
miner operator, miner helper, two roof-bolter operators, three or four teletram 
operators, one utility person, and a face boss. Crews also existed to service outby 
operations. In an underground mine, outby refers to any activity or location that 
exists away from the working face (the point of current coal extraction) toward the 
portal. The outby crews were responsible for maintaining all areas outside the 
production section.
The production section was considered a private and masculine place and 
in the hierarchical structure o f the underground mine, its crew members held the 
highest status. Outby operations were considered low-status, women's work since 
most of its tasks were concerned with cleaning, dusting (depositing rock dust on 
rib, roof, and floor to inhibit the spread of coal dust), and taking care of the mine. 
Some women preferred the intensity and excitement of production work, and some 
preferred the variety and autonomy of outby operations. But most men sought the 
high-status membership of the production crew. Production offered rewards and 
opportunities to women as well as men including status, and it was the most 
favorable path to advancement within the underground hierarchy.
Horseplay was but one of the practices and rituals that women maneuvered 
their way around, trying to make sense out of this strange world. Orchard Valley 
Mine women miners were constantly tested by the practice. Some viewed it as 
amusing, some were offended, some were appalled, and some responded with 
indifference. Most women found that setting boundaries played a significant role 
in avoiding problems associated with horseplay. Boundaries represented a clear 
statement to the men that they could go this far and no farther. Of all the women 
whom I interviewed, Annie Rocha had the clearest recollection of her particular 
moments of boundary-setting. The fact I had never heard these stories testifies to
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how effective boundaries can be, even between women. Rocha was put in a 
production section only two weeks after she went to work at the mine. Her 
accounts sounded like war stories. One of Rocha's experiences with mine 
practices was played out in the lunch-box ritual. Miners were particularly touchy 
about their lunch. The cultural assumption associated with the ritual was that if a 
man's wife prepared him a substantial, pleasing lunch, then other crew members 
knew that he was keeping her satisfied. I was always struck by the almost 
ceremonial practice of laying out of the lunch during the dinner break. Male crew 
members could always tell when a man had been forced to pack his own lunch 
bucket. A playful way to subvert this ritual practice was to "mess" with the crew's 
lunch. Of course it made little sense to mess with a woman's lunch because the 
assumptions of the ritual did not apply to her. Everyone knew that women packed 
their own lunch.4
From the time Rocha joined the crew, her co-workers began "messing" 
with her lunch. She complained to the foreman, but the activity continued. Rocha 
finally retaliated by dumping everyone's lunch bucket into the feeder that breaks up 
the coal before it dumps onto the conveyor belt. All the lunches and buckets were 
destroyed. "It seemed like I had to just get to be a ffiggin bitch...for the guys to 
finally knock it off," she said. Rocha always seemed to even things out—balancing 
her sense of disgust at being in what she considered an offensive environment. 
Although the crew stopped messing with her lunch, she continued to be drawn into 
the fringes of the horseplay traditions. One of her crew members was particularly 
offensive, and her description of his actions was filled with references to body 
parts and bodily functions.
4Anna Rocha, interview by author, tape recording, Montrose, CO, 6 August 1994.
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...he crawled up in my tellie seat [coal haulage equipment] and shit in it. He 
peed in my radiator and I had to smell warm urine all day. And he always had 
his damn peter out. You know wagging his-peter at me.5
On one occasion after he defecated in her equipment seat, she scooped up the pile 
and put it in his lunch box. The memory of his lunch-bucket ritual at dinner time 
that day became one of Rocha's small victories. Oddly, that same crew member 
became her ticket into group membership. Following one particularly offensive 
incident, Rocha picked up a shovel and hit him, busting his hardhat and light. "I 
meant to killed him....I could have killed him I was that damn mad. Then they 
started letting me sit at the lunch table." Rocha's understanding of the incident was 
that she had set a definite boundary, once and for all, but her crew considered it a 
membership ritual, and she had passed.6
On some occasions women initiated their boundary setting in the 
management offices. At these times women wanted other women to accompany 
them, or had wished later that they had taken a "witness." All upper managment 
positions were occupied by men and the office atmosphere could be as intimidating 
as it was in the mine. Although CWI policy explicitly forbad discriminatory or 
harassing behavior, mine management often appeared unsure o f how to address 
human relations problems of a gender-integrated workforce. Some members of 
middle managment did not believe that women belonged in mining, and from the 
beginning of operations women could not always count on a fair hearing when they 
approached management with specific problems.
Rocha took her battles to management, usually accompanied by Pam 
Brezonick. She wanted to get things changed, "to stop the crap that was going
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
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on...[but]what changed was me." She complained to the mine superintendent 
about the offensive practices of her crew, but he thought that her charges sounded 
a little bizarre. He told her that if things were that bad, other women would have 
also complained. I am struck by what must have been a very lonely struggle for 
Rocha. Why did other women fail to complain? Did other women experience 
what Rocha experienced or did she simply have a particularly offensive crew?7
Other women did complain o f offensive behavior at the mine and 
occasionally management responded. Elisa Greco experienced an incident similar 
to Rocha's. Although the incident was of a serious, potentially explosive nature, it 
contained moments of humor. After several years of working underground, Elisa 
Greco bid for a surface job in the parts warehouse. One day a male coworker 
exited the bathroom with his penis hanging out of his unzippered pants, stood and 
looked at Greco then walked away. Clearly shaken, she recognized the man was 
purposefully exposing himself and reported the incident to the mine 
superintendent. The superintendent talked to the co-worker who defended himself 
by saying that he had forgotten to zip his pants and his penis simply fell out of his 
pants. According to Greco, the mine superintendent went home and spent the 
evening testing the hypothesis that a limp penis could fall out of unzippered pants. 
He returned the next day, satisfied that it could not happen, and asked Greco what 
she wanted done about the offender. She felt vindicated and pleased that they 
allowed her to set the terms of discipline. But she said to me later that "in 
retrospect, I should have asked for more." Greco did not specify the terms of his 
discipline, but he continued to work at the warehouse after the incident. Greco
7Ibid.
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later believed that she should have insisted that the man be fired or at least made to 
undergo therapy.8
Some women chose less overt strategies of maintaining a sense of power in
their work lives. But in most cases the strategies for dealing with the masculine
environment were aimed at protecting themselves from the worst excesses of
mine-culture behavior in order to become competent and skillfull at their jobs.
Their persistence in these strategies usually paid off, in most cases, with a belief in
their own competence and the respect of co-workers and managment.
Some women seemed unaware that they had achieved competence and
respect. Maryanne Love spoke to me frankly about how her expectations of
herself and of others affected her work.
....the men always felt like us girls could not do what the men did...and I never 
did ever feel confident in myself underground. I always felt intimidated by the 
men. I was raised on a farm and did all those things as a kid, but I always 
knew that I never did as good as my brothers. And that carried over to 
underground. I always felt like 1 would step on their toes if I did anything that 
got in their way.
Love, an outby miner, told me that after one particularly difficult shift of work, her 
foreman told her, "Maryanne, nobody ever said it was going to be easy." She said 
that those words stuck with her and made her tougher.9
Listening to how women mediated roles, erected boundaries, and sought to 
gain competence and respect, made it clear that women understood the 
consequences of gender discrimination and harassment and a clear perception of 
where the primary power existed. At the same time they recognized the power 
they held has actors to transform their new work environment. To miners like 
Love power arrangements in the mine mirrored those throughout society, and it
8Elisa Greco, interview by author, tape recording, Hotchkiss, CO, 16 July 1994.
9Maryanne Love, interview by author, tape recording, Delta, CO, 14 June 1994.
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often made sense not question them. Love was content to defer to her crew
members like she had deferred to her brothers. Miners Pam Brezonick and
Kathleen McCallister chose different strategies.
Brezonick felt like she had to "prove" herself all the time, a feeling shared
by all the women.10 Brezonick seemed to know what she wanted and how to
achieve it. She had done her share of boundary construction, and the men
respected her. She always appeared confident in her abilities, and she was a skilled
miner. Brezonick, eager for the opportunity offered by the production section,
after two years was assigned to a production crew. She became proficient driving
a teletram and roof-bolting—both high status jobs. But she continued to feel like
she had to prove herself, and she continued to set boundaries:
I felt like I was being sized up, not just physically, but sexually, too. I'd worked 
around ranchers and cowboys and they never treated me like that....! felt 
defensive about the male energy ....and about the way they talked around me. I 
think it took me years to get it across to them that I had a good set of morals 
and limitations. Once I laid out the ground work then I was more comfortable 
with redefining my limits when 1 needed to.11
Brezonick not only felt satisfied that she finally constructed protective 
boundaries, but was equally satisfied that she had the power to redefine them. 
McCallister's experiences illustrate similar success at achieving competence and 
setting boundaries. Brezonick and McCallister exemplified that type of success. 
They shared other things as well. Neither seemed to be aware that others 
perceived them as competent and respected. McCallister was furloughed from the 
Orchard Valley Mine in 1988 and went to work in an underground mine in
1 inexperienced male miners had to "prove" themselves until they were accepted 
into the culture, but few women ever exprienced that acceptance.
1 Pamela Brezonick, interview by author, tape recording, Grand Junction, CO, 23 
July 1994.
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Steamboat Springs, Colorado. Of all the women at the OVM, she has lasted the
longest in mining. She spent most of her years underground on a production crew,
and her former supervisor described her in terms of respect. "Kathy knew what
she always knew....she could do everything," he said. His words illustrate the
respect that McCallister commanded. But she revealed to me, "I was just in my
own little world...through the whole thing...it was just to survive."
McCallister's expriences, like Rocha's and Greco’s, are punctuated with wry
humor. On one of her first trips underground at the mine in Steamboat, a crew
member put his hand on her leg. "I picked up his hands, and told him... very
calmly, very MargaretThatcher-like...'knock it off or you'll be dragging one o f your
testicles out of your nostrils.' And I see all these little smiles, and it was just
wonderful after that." McCalister had worked eleven years in a mine and knew by
this time how to protect herself--and how to do it with a language that left no
doubt that she commanded respect. Her competence would be easy to prove, as
she had done before.12
Women understood the oppression of the mine culture in ways that men
could not, and they developed strategies to negotiate within it. I am not suggesting
they enjoyed a position of privilege but neither were they powerless victims. Most
of them extracted something concrete from the experience of working
underground. Former miner Pamela Easterday captured the experience quite
eloquently, but simply:
We were there for the money....it wasn't a career move or most of us 
would still be there. Women do not identify with their labor the way 
men do. They don't run around saying "I'm a coal miner." I prefer 
people don't know that I was. I'm just Pam, I grew up in Missouri and 
I live in Colorado. Working underground was the only time
12Kathleen McCallister, interview by author, tape recording, Hayden, CO, 7 
October 1994.
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when...when women, at least in an institutional environment, were 
given the opportunity to operate heavy equipment The equipment 
doesn't care what gender you are. 1 would encourage girls to take a job 
like that at least once in their lives. I think it gives women a lot of 
confidence.13
The social relations of the mine were constructed to meet the human 
requirements for working within its unique environment...by men. The natural 
environment of the mine became a blank page on which the masculine will-to- 
power was written, and the work process became naturally suited to the size and 
strength of man for what appeared to be rational reasons. But those women who 
perservered forged a competent and respected identity despite the barriers inherent 
in its highly masculinezed environment.14
As troubling as dealing with the masculine practices and rituals was to 
women, adapting to the mine environment proved less onerous for women than 
confronting issues associated with sex and gender difference. The following 
description of the ideal, successfully integrated woman coal miner illustrates just 
how difficult those issues would become for the women of the Orchard Valley 
Mine:
Women who have lasted in mining and who enjoy what they are doing are 
those who have maintained a sense of self-esteem, not allowed themselves to 
respond emotionally to harassment, have been able to hold their ground firmly 
when challenged, and have basically shown the men that they are there simply 
because they want and need the work....There is no doubt that these women 
have to be emotionally very tough.
The Women’s Bureau Publication containing this description of what it would take 
for women to "last" in mining was published in 1985 as a guide for women who 
chose to enter nontraditional industries. That women miners commanded the 
attention of the federal government illustrates the notoriety that surrounded
13Pamela Easterday, interview by author, Grand Junction, CO, 24 June 1994.
14Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, 129-130.
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"pioneer" women in non-traditional occupations. The description implies the 
challenges faced by women miners and the struggle that followed their much 
publicized entry into the occupation. It illustrates the reality that women at the 
Orchard Valley Mine faced regarding their difference within the male culture of 
mining. Their struggle with that reality took a toll on their mental and emotional 
health, but the physical barriers of sex difference may have taken a greater toll.15
Sex difference played a significant role in women's exit from coal mining. 
The exit strategy that many women miners ultimately chose may have been in 
response to internal and external barriers to success, constructed on the twin 
foundations of sex and gender differentiation. Gender differentiation is the social 
process by which characteristics are coded as feminine or masculine.
Characteristics considered appropriate to succeed in occupations such as mining 
have been traditionally associated with the male sex role. Women working in male 
jobs often experienced sex-role incongruence between doing work historically 
identified with the male sex role, and their own traditional female role. Women 
miners struggled constantly to mediate sex-role strain, and although many 
succeeded at overcoming this internal barrier, the struggle took a toll on their 
mental and emotional well-being. These gender differences between men and 
women mattered in the underground environment, but the physical barriers of sex 
difference may have mattered more.
The most powerful biological differences are reproduction and 
size/strength disparity. Psychologist Sandra Bern's characterization of biological 
difference considers the search for fundamental biological difference misguided
15United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau. The Coal Employment 
Project: How Women Can Make Breakthroughs into Nontraditional Industries 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department o f Labor Women’s Bureau, 1985), 22.
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because interpretations of sex difference are usually transformed into female 
disadvantage. Bern believes that social change can radically transform the context 
of human lives enough to free them from what has historically been considered 
essential biological limitations.16 Women seeking jobs in the mining industry in the 
1970s probably believed that social changes freed them from these biological 
limitations, but in the extreme environment of the mine, essential sex difference 
remained a limitation to most of them. Those physical limitations may have 
contributed to the resegregation of underground coal mining, and this raises the 
question of whether some occupations are appropriately sex-segregated. The 
search for the meaning of biological differences between men and women may be 
misguided, as Bern suggests, but within the context of underground mining, 
potent, biological differences between the sexes took on substantial meaning.
Most often, women coal miners searched for ways to adapt to the most 
limiting componants o f difference—reproduction and size/strengh. It is not entirely 
clear which componant impacted women coal miners more but experiences o f the 
Orchard Valley women indicate that the former was certainly the most dramatic. 
Managing the reproductive processes primarily meant confronting pregnancy in a 
hostile, masculine, and dirty underground environment. CWI company records 
remain restricted so it is impossible to document pregnancy statistics. My first 
interaction with a pregnant coal miner involved Gwen Goff, a member of my crew. 
Goff became pregnant and insisted on continuing her duties underground for as 
long as she remained physically able. I had expected Goff to request light duty and 
spend most of her pregnancy in the comfort of the mine office, but as long as her
16Sandra Bern. "In a Male-Centered World, Female Differences are Transformed 
into Female Disadvantages," The Chronicle o f  Higher Education (17 August 
1994)81.
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doctor agreed, Goff could remain underground. As her foreman, I spent the next 
seven months in a state of anxiety, planning what I would do if Goff went into 
labor underground. I respected her wishes and admired her determination, but the 
idea of her giving birth in a coal mine seemed too bizarre. I lost many night's sleep 
preparing for my role as an underground mid-wife. Goff worked underground into 
her ninth month of pregnancy and gave birth in the hospital to a healthy baby.17
The story illustrates that even though the "all women are potential 
mothers/then all men are potential fathers" argument against the idea that 
difference matters, may be true—and it is a rational argument—women's experience 
with reproduction in the coal mine was essentially and dramatically different from 
men's. Goffs experience with pregnancy was unique, but then most pregnant 
miners used different strategies in managing their pregnancies. CWI had a liberal 
pregnancy policy that in many ways allowed women and their doctors to set the 
conditions of pregnancy and child birth leaves. Women miners nationwide could 
not expect this type of treatment. Policies throughout the industry varied, 
prompting the Coal Employment Project to initiate a program to offer support, 
advice, and ultimately public policy aimed at the special needs of the pregnant coal 
miner.
Since 1978 women workers had been protected by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act which ensured that:
....women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to work.1**
17Dona Gearhart, journals and personal recollection of the author.
18Mary E. Becker, "Can Employers Exclude Women to Protect Children?" 
Journal o f the American Medical Association 26, no. 16 (October 1990): 2115.
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The wording reflects the fear of saddling women with protective legislation that 
might encourage inequality in the workplace. So pregnancy became like an illness 
or a disability, essentially putting it on the same footing with men's non- 
reproductive conditions. The CEP recognized that the anti-discrimination law was 
important but of little help to women who didn't have enough seniority to have 
sick leave. They also recognized, by the number of calls and letters they had begun 
receiving, that pregnancy and mining had become a significant concern to many 
women miners.19
Pregnant miners wanted to know how long they could safely work. Their 
doctors lacked experience treating women doing this type of work and could only 
offer superficial advice. The CEP designed an exhaustive study of the thirty-three 
women known to have experienced pregnancy and child birth while working 
underground, and in 1982 released the results in Pregnant and Mining: A 
Handbook for Pregnant Miners. Their research, though limited by a small sample, 
revealed that some women stopped working in the first three months of pregnancy 
while others continued working until their due date. The women reported varying 
degrees of strenuous work, and some reported having the option of light duty. 
Length of leave time following childbirth differed as well. Although the handbook 
made no definitive recommendations for managing pregnancy underground, it 
supplied needed affirmation to women mines that other women shared their unique 
condition.20
19"Pregnancy Documentation Proposal," undated memorandum, page 8, CEP 
Records.
20Brenda Bell and June Rostan eds. Pregnant and Mining: A Handbook for  
Pregnant Miners, CEP Records.
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Pregnancy and childbirth experiences of OVM women varied along the 
same dimensions as those found in the CEP study. Goff eventually gave birth to 
three healthy babies during her thirteen-year career as a coal miner. Yet few of her 
cohorts chose her pregnancy strategy. Annie Rocha was pregnant twice during her 
seven years at the OVM. She suffered a miscarriage early in her first pregnancy, 
and assumed it was because she continued to work underground. When she 
became pregnant again in 1982, her doctor restricted her work activities to prevent 
another miscarriage and the company attempted to lay her off. "I felt like they 
were trying to fire me," she told me, "and I said...'ok guys, I will get a lawyer and I 
will keep my job."' They put her on compensated leave at 60% of her salary and 
she remained on leave for seven months. Managment policy became more flexible 
over time as more women experienced pregnancy. But the type of inconsistent 
determination that provoked Rocha's threat of legal action convinced the CEP to 
seek a solution to the problems of pregnant miners—one that would provide better 
protection than the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.21
In December of 1982 the CEP hired a parental leave coordinator to 
formulate a policy that addressed the needs of pregnant miners in a comprehensive 
and consistent way. Since virtually all miners in the eastern United States were 
covered by UMWA contract, the CEP initially sought to make parental leave 
policy a bargaining issue in the 1984 negotiations between the UMWA and the 
Bituminous Coal Operators Association [BCOA], The campaign to convince the 
union to place the issue on the bargaining table included a well crafted argument 
that the policy would benefit not just women miners but all miners. The policy 
failed to make it into the new contract but the UMWA and the BCOA established
21Rocha, interview.
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a committee to study the issue. Perhaps as important, the campaign gained solid 
support from the union and catapulted the CEP into the movement for a federally- 
mandated Parental Leave Act.22
At the grassroots level, women at the Orchard Valley Mine continued to 
negotiate reproductive issues individually within the guidelines of the CWI policy. 
But pregnancy was not the only reproductive issue confronting women miners. 
Having a menstrual period underground was a significant event to most of these 
women. This normal female function could become problematic on two levels— 
personal hygiene and menstrual cramps. First, there were no private facilities 
underground, and changing a tampon or pad in a dark and dirty isolated area of the 
mine was unsanitary and a potential source of embarrassment. Being unprepared 
for a period could be even worse.
When miners went underground for a shift, they were allowed to go back 
outside only in an emergency, and few women would risk asking a male foreman's 
permission to go outside to get sanitary protection. But miner Kathy McCallister 
trusted her foreman enough to make such a request, "...he was always clean-cut 
and I knew he had some education and I always felt like I could expect more from 
him," she told me, "I had horrible cramps and I needed something and I didn't have 
anything with me." She asked him for permission to go outside and felt safe in 
telling him why. On returning underground, she discovered that he had told the 
crew about her dilemma. "And then the son of a bitch had the nerve to call me up 
and ask me out," she recalled, "and he couldn't understand why I turned him
22CEP internal memoranda, correspondence between CEP and the UMWA, press 
releases, and testimony before the US House of Representatives sub-committee, 
CEP Records.
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down." Some women eventually kept a tampax in their lunch buckets at all times 
to avoid such experiences. 23
On a second level, managing the pain of menstrual cramps became a 
challenge to women miners. Underground duties involved heavy lifting, 
shovelling, or operating heavy equipment over uneven surfaces at high rates of 
speed, but the process of work continued despite menstrual discomfort. I recall 
from my own experience being in tears from the pain of cramping, knowing that 
tears rolling down a coal-blackened face is an experience a woman miner wants to 
avoid at all costs. The problem of managing a period underground began to 
seriously interfere with my work, and I eventually decided that the most realistic 
solution was a hysterectomy. I found a reputable gynecologist willing to perform 
the operation, and to this day, I consider my choice an excellent strategy for 
managing a period underground. Few women would have made the same decision 
but I had three grown children, generous medical benefits, a healthy body, and a 
superfluous uterus. The reproduction process was, to me, a barrier to a competent 
work identity and I was able to negotiate around it.
Sex difference vis a vis reproduction held an essential meaning to women 
miners. To attempt to minimize the potency of biological sex difference ignores 
many of the very real barriers that it erected to women who chose to mine coal. 
When women became miners, many had unrealistic expectations that their sex 
would not be a barrier. The initial optimism faded quickly once they were 
confronted with the most mundane biological functions underground. Women 
adapted to the work environment, as most workers do, but it proved indifferent to 
their physical needs.
23McCallister, interview.
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The environment was clearly not gender neutral to miners who needed to 
urinate underground. Male miners could, and did, urinate wherever they happened 
to be working, but a woman had to search for an isolated location, remove her 
hard hat, her tool belt, and any outer clothing. If she wore coveralls the process 
became even more complicated. A woman could never be sure if someone would 
inadvertently, or on purpose, approach her isolated spot. Some women refused to 
go to the bathroom underground. Elisa Greco would not drink anything prior to 
or during her eight-hour shift underground in order to avoid the discomfort o f the 
process. Greco believes that the kidney and bladder problems she later 
experienced were related to her refusal to urinate underground. Few women 
carried their distaste for the underground urinating process to this extreme, but 
most remember it as an uncomfortable experience.24
Evidence exists that the CEP attempted to deal with this problem during 
their personal-protective-equipment campaign. They urged work-clothing 
manufacturers to design coveralls with knee-to-knee zippers that would facilitate 
urinating underground. As recently as 1994, a much scaled-down CEP attempted 
to revive the effort to address the sensitive problem. The group, now headed by 
former miner Cosby Totten, sought to improve the situation through a letter- 
writing campaign to the U.S. Labor Department. Totten spoke of the problem in 
the language of someone who understands. "I don't care if you're a man or a 
woman, when you have to go, you have to go and you don't want to sit down in 
front of everybody to do your business.25
The CEP effectively addressed some of the barriers related to reproductive 
difference, and although the Parental Leave Act met rigid resistance throughout
24Greco, interview.
25Las Vegas Review Journal, 19 September 1994.
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the 1980s, their work influenced change on an institutional level. Most of the 
problems of sex difference related to reproductive health can be structurally 
remedied. Had the coal industry remained economically healthy, women miners 
could have benefited from those remedies. Sex difference related to size and 
strength presented a more complicated challenge to women and industry. The 
environment in which mining occurs made the size/strength differential harder to 
remedy. Unless the process o f mining is fundamentally altered it is impervious to 
attempts to alleviate differences in size and strength.
Technological advances in mining throughout the twentieth century 
resulted in a mechanized process far removed from the pick, shovel, and blasting 
powder of earlier practices. Nineteenth-century mining has been depicted as a 
brutalizing, dehumanizing occupation, but until the 1840s women worked in 
underground mines alongside fathers and brothers. These women described their 
work in various ways depending on whether they valued it our sought escape from 
it. Women were not allowed to do face work because extracting coal was a high- 
status job and only young boys were chosen to apprentice at the face. Most 
women were used to pull the coal-laden wagons, and were eventually replaced by 
horses. We have little information by which to assess mining's longterm, physical 
impact on them. It is difficult for women miners in mechanized mines of the late 
twentieth century to imagine the physical demand on their nineteenth-century 
sisters, but the environment and the work remained a challenge to women in the 
1970s and 1980s.26
Machines absorbed much of the human labor of the mining process over 
the course of the twentieth century, but miners were still expected to perform hard,
26 Angela V. John, By the Sweat o f  Their Brow: Women Workers at Victorian Coal 
Mines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983),19-35.
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physical work in a dark, dangerous, unpleasant environment. Everyday tasks 
included building walls of solid concrete blocks across entries to regulate the flow 
of air, hanging ventilation tube from the exhaust fans to ventilate the face, and 
laying heavy iron water pipe. Miners shovelled coal that spilled from the conveyor 
system. They extended the conveyor belt as mining progressed, and one of the 
most physically demanding jobs in the mine involved handling heavy, cumbersome 
belt structure. The mine roof was supported by wooden timbers from four to 
twelve feet tall, depending on the distance from the floor to the roof, and miners 
lifted, carried, and set them. This is only a partial description of the work process 
but enough to illustrate the physical demands of mining even in a fully mechanized 
mine. The demands were greater for women than for men because women were 
less physically equipped to handle them.
Studies assessing how work affects men and women differently are only 
now becoming available to scholars. The relative new field of ergonomics—the 
science of fitting job requirements with people's abilities to do tasks—has only 
recently begun to provide data necessary to these studies, but a few assumptions 
have emerged. The average women is only 85% the size of an average man, and 
the strength of adult women is about 80% of that of men. Studies show that 
women's upper extremity strength averages 56% of men's, lower extremity 
strength is 71%, and trunk strength only 64%. Moreover, a stronger person works 
at 50% of maximum strength, and the less strong person works at 83% of 
maximum strength—meaning that the less strong person will become fatigued 
sooner and more often.27
27Andrew S. Jackson, "Preemployment Isometric Strength Testing Methods: 
Medical and Ergometric Values and Issues," A technical report prepared for 
Lafayette Instrument Co. (June 1990), 17; Per-Olof Astrand, and Kaare Rodhl,
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These findings confirm what most women miners often suspected. They
were working twice as hard as male co-workers to accomplish the same task.
Former miner Pam Brezonick illustrates the pragmatic work strategies that women
adopted if they intended to "last" in this occupation. During the early months of
Brezonick's employment she experienced a situation that would eventually
confront most of the women. If a woman was doing a difficult, manly task, a male
crew member would often step in to take over. Brezonick was removing a cinder
block stopping [wall] with a sledge hammer when a male co-worker intervened.
Thinking she would have been offended by the interference, I was surprised at her
reaction to the incident.
At first I was a little defensive about it...just because I was a woman doesn't 
mean that 1 can't do it. But after watching him swing that sledge hammer, 1 
thought "go for it...my body's working twice as hard as your body to get the 
same thing done." So I didn't care.28
Brezonick knew that in order to "prove" herself, she would have to demonstrate 
that she could "do the job" but it was often tempting for women, and men, to 
accept help from a stronger miner. Other women adjusted for the strength 
disadvantage by working smarter. Women miners discovered ways to use the 
machinery to lighten the burden of physical work. Women, and men, would often 
use a piece of equipment to maneuver a piece of ventilation tube into place instead 
of lifting it and placing it manually. Men also recognized the value of the 
machinery but few would risk losing his manly reputation by relying on the easier 
way. In many situations there simply was not time to allow a piece of equipment
eds. Textbook o f Work Physiology: Physiological Bases o f  Exercise 2nd ed. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1978), 123.
28Brezonick, interview.
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to do the work. If a roof was about to fall, the timber had to be cut, carried, and 
set in a hurry—by hand.
Some of the disadvantage of size and strength disparity in the work place 
can be ameliorated, and this is precisely the role of the ergonomist. Tools and 
work stations can be adjusted to fit the requirements of a woman's smaller size.
But the sudden inflow of women into traditionally-male occupations in the 1970s 
caught them off guard and they have since been attempting to catch up. Much of 
the current ergonomic work has been done by women. Women scientists 
recognized that the bulk of research in the field of ergonomics and occupational 
health was based on the male-as-normative model. A recent feminist model of 
analyzing the impact of physical work on women has argued that research on 
women's work conditions should emphasize the experiences described by women 
themselves, and questioned the use of standards appropriate to the strength and 
size of the average man to construct work practices and environments. Feminist 
ergonomists believe that man can no longer be used as a norm for designing tools, 
equipment, and work stations for a diverse labor pool, and that using a sex-neutral 
norm would collapse many of the consequences of size/strength difference.29
Anticipating the changes in how scientists look at ergonomics and 
occupational health, the Coal Employment Project began seeking solutions to such 
issues in the late 1970s. CEP was alerted to the problems faced by women miners 
when the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) informed 
them that no standards existed for women's safety shoes. Upon further 
investigation, the CEP staff discovered that women were suffering foot injuries due 
to inadequate women's safety shoes. Unwilling to wait for government action,
29Nicole Vezina and Julie Courville, "Integration o f Women into Traditionally 
Masculine Jobs," Women and Health 18, no. 3 (1992): 97-118.
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they generated an extensive survey of women miners in order to document the 
problem of inadequate protective equipment. The CEP found that as a public 
interest group they lacked influence over safety-equipment manufacturers or 
organizations which set the coal industry standards, so they enlisted the help of the 
influential coal industry itself, in a way it could not refuse. CEP made the survey a 
condition of a sex discrimination settlement under negotiation with Consolidation 
Coal Company. CEP director, Betty Jean Hall recognized that the power and 
influence of the industry leader would enhance their campaign for the health and 
safety o f women miners.30
Women at the Orchard Valley Mine experienced problems with ill-fitting 
equipment, and even though they were not included in the CEP survey, they 
sought their own solutions. Many of these concerns were addressed by CWI's 
Accident Prevention Ideas Team [APIT], The APIT, organized by the OVM 
safety deparment involved a rotating membership of all miners. APIT meeting 
notes reveal that women aggressively challenged the company to address safety 
issues in general and women's safety issues in particular. Suggestions included the 
modification of equipment to facilitate operation by smaller persons, the use of two 
people to work on tasks usually assigned to only one person, and smaller gloves 
and hard-hat liners to fit women.31
Although women often complained about ill-fitting safety shoes, the issue 
apparently was not addressed during APIT meetings. Maryanne Love's 1984 
accident brought the issue to everyone's attention in a painfully dramatic way. A
30Coal Mining Women's Support Team News 1, no. 4 (November-December 
1979); and Draft proposed letter by Betty Jean Hall dated March 1981, CEP 
Records.
3 Occident Prevention Ideas Team Meeting Notes dated 1983 and 1984. CWI 
company documents in possession of author.
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heavy, steel, electrical nip fell on Love's foot, crushing the two outer toe bones. 
Love recalled later that "the nip got just behind the steel toe in that boot and 
crushed my foot." Love was wearing the smallest size of a man's boot, and the 
steel toe failed to cover her entire foot. Later, the Accident Prevention Committee 
discussed whether all miners should be required to wear new "metatarsal boots" 
that provided protection almost to the ankle. The need for smaller women's sizes 
was not discussed but many miners eventually began wearing the metatarsal boots. 
It was clear that even in a small-man size, they would have protected Love's 
foot.32
The CEP campaign and the individual efforts of the OVM women could 
not eliminate women miner's physical disadvantages in the work environment, nor 
would it have been reasonable to expect that they could. Nevertheless, steps had 
been taken to level the working field with the campaign for adequately-sized 
personal protective clothing and the modification of mining machinery, but the 
underground coal mine challenges the concept of redesigning work stations and 
environments. Work practices cannot be redesigned without changing the process 
of mining. Although women agitated for necessary structural change, the 
environment of the mine remained impervious to most of their needs.
Barriers constructed by physical difference in male-defined occupations are 
difficult to dismantle especially in uncomfortable, hostile environments. Women 
miners at the OVM suggested remedies to their physical limitations. Some 
believed that two miners should be assigned to tasks that were generally performed 
by one person. Others suggested that each miner be assigned to the level at which 
they could physically perform. Still others advocated the use of equipment to
32Love, inteview; Accident Prevention Committee Meeting Minutes, 16 October 
1984, CWI documents.
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perform tasks generally done by humans. Often management conceded that these 
suggestions contained merit, yet such changes could not always be implemented 
because of productivity requirements. Uncertain environmental conditions meant 
there was not always sufficient time to rely on machinery. The uniform wage 
structure meant that all miners were expected to perform similar work. This last 
issue lies at the heart of physical difference and work.
If woman coal miners expected the same wage as men within the 
underground environment, they were expected to perform the same job. If, 
because of physical limitations, they were allowed to perform at a lower 
productive level, those jobs would most likely be valued less. More demanding 
jobs and jobs entailing more risk would have more value. At the Orchard Vailey 
Mine, all underground miners received the same wage and allowing some to 
perform at a lower level o f competence would not have been permitted by 
management or miners. Changes in the work process of underground mining have 
historically lightened the burden of the miner, but it is unclear if the industry would 
be motivated to make significant work process or policy change in order to 
ameliorate the strength and size limitations of women miners. It is clear though, 
that policy changes within the coal industry might have a significant effect on 
barriers associated with gender differences faced by women miners. Many coal 
operators in fact instituted gender-related policies tailored to integrate women into 
the underground workforce. Gender differences appeared to be a less tractible 
problem.
The social process of gender differentiation is related to, but not dependent 
on, biological differences between the sexes and remains a powerful variable in 
creating barriers to women's success in nontraditional occupations like 
underground mining. Characteristics traditionally sex-typed as masculine include
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agressiveness, independence, autonomy, strength, risk-taking, dominance, 
competetiveness, and self-reliance. Those coded as feminine are compassion, 
gentleness, loyalty, understanding, does not use harsh language, yielding, and 
shyness. Few of these feminine characteristics would have been of much use in the 
work process of the underground environment, except, perhaps, loyalty and 
understanding. Women miners did not possess only the feminine and none of the 
male characteristics, but the sex-role socialization of females from an early age 
meant that their gender identity, even in the workplace, depended in part on 
expectations derived from traditional feminine traits. Gender stereotypes 
penetrated all aspects of the woman miner's work experience, from interaction with 
male co-workers to the policies and procedures established by the individual coal 
operators.33
Most of the women of the OVM knew before they began work 
underground that being a coal miner would challenge their perceptions of 
traditional gender identity, but few understood how antithetical coal mining was to 
their embedded gender-role expectations. CWI anticipated problems related to 
gender stereotyping but they also failed to adequately prepare for a gender- 
integrated workforce. Since Colorado Westmoreland began operations with a 
twenty percent female workforce, they attempted to formulate policies and 
procedures that were gender neutral. Task assignments depended on prior mining 
experience in the early stages of the operation, but women were quickly integrated 
into all phases of underground work. All underground miners were paid at the 
same rate. Gender-neutral policies and procedures were designed to ensure that
33Sandra Bern, "Probing the Promise of Androgyny," Beyond Sex-Role 
Stereotypes: Readings Toward a  Psychology o f  Androgyny, Alexandra Kaplan and 
Joan Bean eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), 52.
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no structural barriers to women’s success existed at the Orchard Valley Mine. But 
barriers did exist. OVM management was dominated by men, from the highest 
company official to the lower, management level of spell foreman. Each man in 
position of authority interacted with and evaluated women miners through the lens 
of gendered expectations based on socially-constructed stereotypes. Women's 
need to be seen primarily as a worker depended on gender-neutral evaluations
Most OVM women sought competence and respect during their years 
underground, hardly a unique concept among workers. Scholars of women and 
work have argued that women commit to their work in similar ways and for similar 
reasons as do men, and the same set of mechanisms o f the commitment process 
operates for men and women. But women's commitment to work in the coal mine 
often differed in gender specific ways. Many of the OVM women failed to assume 
the specific work identity of "coal miner" as did male coal miners. Pamela 
Easterday made this point when she said that women did not identify with their 
labor the way men do. Women coal miners did not view their work as a central 
life interest as did male coal miners, but they enjoyed the rewards of the job and 
were committed to their work role.34
The gendered role expectations of self and expectations that others had of 
them made achievement of competence and respect an incessant struggle for 
women miners. Scholars whose work examines women and labor have identified 
characteristics that are valued in highly masculinized and physically challenging
34Denise Bielby and William Bielby, "Women's and Men's Commitment to Paid 
Work and Family: Theories, Models, and Hypotheses," Women and Work: an 
Annual Review, Barbara Gutek, Ann Stromberg and Laurie Larwood eds. 
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1988), 259. Judith Hammond and Constance 
Mahoney, "Reward-Cost Balancing Among Women Coalminers," Sex Roles 9 no. 
1 (January 1983): 20.
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environments. Traits mentioned most frequently were competitiveness,
aggressiveness, assertiveness, confidence, and independence. Interviews with
OVM women and my own journal notes confirm that these were the most valued
characteristics in underground mine work. Some women possessed them prior to
coming to work at the OVM, some adopted self-presentations that mirrored them,
and some women rejected them as not suitable for themselves but adapted their
work identity to accommodate them in others. All three groups represent the
mediation work done by women in nontraditional occupations.
The small sample of women I chose to interview turned out to be limited to
women who successfully mediated the role-strain inherent in nontraditional jobs,
but many of the women at the OVM were not so successful. Many quit after a
short time and some were terminated. My sample in many ways represents the
"cream of the crop." Their success at sex-role negotiation does not mean that they
were masculine women, only that they possessed or pragmatically utilized the
characteristics that were valued in the masculine environment of the mine. They
also maintained the feminine characteristics they valued most:
McCallister: It was very important for me to maintain personal hygiene...I hate 
to just say the femininity, but a lot of my identity as feminine was a safeguard.
I don't want to act like a guy. I don't want to grab my crotch. I think 
consciously that I had confidence in my work, but if 1 acted cocky, then that 
kept them at bay.35
McCallister is still employed as underground miner but is currently recovering 
from surgery and is considering long-term disability leave. Pam Brezonick 
survived the 1984 lay-ff at the OVM but took long-term disability leave in 1987. 
She described how she came to terms with competing roles.
35McCallister, interview.
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I think that it was an incredibly monotonous job. Once I mastered the 
equipment, it was boring. The men would never acknowledge the fact that 1 
could walk in and run all of that equipment....I could keep up though, and 1 
think that was the only thing that saved me But I let them intimidate me and 1 
let myself accept the pressure....I had to really perform..and be good. But I 
worked hard to maintain my femininity. 1 did develop foul language and it was 
after 1 had been away from the mine for a year or so that 1 could really see what 
my mouth had become. But I drew a line with them. You could tease with me. 
but don't touch me.3^
Glenda Childs and Mary Reilly were older than most o f the women at the
mine. Both were over forty when they began work as miners, and their
experiences reflect the different styles and strategies used by the women. Reilly,
an Irish immigrant, worked construction for many years before coming to the
Orchard Valley Mine. Reilly survived the 1984 furlough and worked as a surface
employee until the mine closed in October of 1994.
At first they put me on the LHD [heavy diesel equipment] and I told the boss,
'ya know I don't mind the pick and shovel so ya don't have ta put me on that.'
But I got pretty comfortable on that piece of machinery women have the
touch, ya know. They're not as rough on machinery. And ya know, the idea is 
a woman likes ta be clean all the time, ta look nice, ta have their hair fixed 
nice, and there ya are blacker than hell, and havin' dirty fingernails.37
Glenda Childs was forty years old when she held her first wage job. She 
worked at the mine four years and was laid off in 1984. Childs resumed her 
education and earned a degree before coming back to Paonia in 1992. She 
returned to the Orchard Valley Mine as a surface worker and remained there 
through 1995. She has told me that, given the opportunity, she would go back to 
work underground. Her description of work illustrates what it meant to be a 
woman laborer in a job designated as masculine.
36Brezonick, interview
37Mary Reilly, interview by author, tape recording, Hotchkiss, CO, 9 November 
1993.
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A lot of times I felt like I wasn't earning my share especially when we built 
stoppings with solid blocks...because one of them was all I could carry. I did 
get to where I could carry three hollow blocks..but the men could always carry 
more than that. So I tried to move twice as fast. When you're a woman you 
have to work harder because of your physical size..and when the environment is 
not friendly, you work harder. That may not be something that's imposed from 
the outside either, that can come from inside.38
In a workplace with a highly-skewed ratio between men and women, 
gender roles associated with the majority sex become embedded in the work roles. 
Sociologists of work have discovered that women in nontraditional occupations 
often experience conflict between masculine work roles and their sex-role 
orientation as female. This sex-role spillover into the workplace can create an 
internal barrier to success. Rosemary Agonito has referred to this internal barrier 
as "the enemy within."39
Mediating sex-role incongruence became, like everything else in the 
underground environment, an incessant struggle. Even though the mediation work 
by OVM women resulted in a self-described competent work identity, it took its 
toll. Most of the women, except Reilly, Childs, and Love, spoke of being 
depressed during much of their time underground. Many admitted they hated the 
job during their years o f employment but most missed the mine once they had been 
away from it. My own experience falls within this ambivalent description.
I viewed my career at the OVM as successful. I considered myself a 
competent, skilled employee and was promoted to foreman in 1983. But by 1987 I 
was seeking a way out o f the mine. Remembering those final years is painful, but I 
still consider my mine-work identity as successful and competent. The ambiguity
38Glenda Childs, interview by author, tape recording, Paonia, CO, 20 July 1993.
39Rosemary Agonito, No More "Nice Girl:" Power, Sexuality, and Success in the 
Workplace (Holbrook, Mass.: Bob Adams, Inc. Publishers, 1993), 18.
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is probably related to my status as foreman. I raise the issue to illustrate an 
important dimension to women's work in nontraditional occupations—women and 
leadership. My experience as foreman is the only one on which I am able to draw.
I was the OVM's token female foreman even though others had completed the 
necessary requirments for foreman certification.
Problems encountered by women who seek positions of authority are 
exaggerated in a highly masculinized occupation. Some scholars have suggested 
that perceptions of women managers in nontraditional jobs may be more damaging 
than they are for professional women. The notion that women lack drive and 
ability contributes to these perceptions.40
Studies on leadership generally focus on personality, style, and sense of 
power. They show that personality characteristis most often associated with 
leadership are masculine aggressiveness and competitiveness, yet scholars disagree 
on how this affects women. Differences between leadership characteristics of men 
and women may only exist in style because males and females who occupy 
positions of leadership tend to possess the personality traits that allow them to 
cope well in their capacity as leaders. Even though men and women may function 
similarly regarding style, women may be more concerned with interpersonal 
relationships while men are concerned with tasks. This particular difference in 
style became the basis of my own ongoing conflicts with management during my 
years as foreman 41
I painfully discovered that my status of foreman also caused problems with 
other women. Women miners spoke often of feeling isolated in the work setting
40Veronica Nieva and Barbara Gutek, Women and Work: A Psychological 
Perspective (Praeger, 1981), 102.
41Ibid., 85-86.
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because of their small representation in the mines. Being part of an informal 
support group helped mitigate some of this isolation. As a miner, I was often 
comforted by the support of the other women. Even though OVM women did not 
form close relationships based on gender solidarity, they tended to support one 
another. I sensed a change when I became foreman. It seemed that when I made 
that change I was no longer a part of the group. Although I know I truly felt this 
additional isolation, I have had to accept responsibility for my role in the changed 
realtionships. The women may not have know how to support me in my new 
position and the pressure of the job may have caused me to turn my back on 
them.42
A growing body of research has developed around the dynamic of the 
relationship between women in nontraditional jobs, and several theories have 
emerged to account for the depiction o f women in positions o f power as 
problematic. There are two possible explanations. One holds that women 
managers are individualistic, tend to deny sexual discrimination, do not offer other 
women support, and contribute to the derogation of women. These women have 
been labeled "queen bees," an explanation that casts women leaders in the role of 
traitors to their sex. Another interpretation posits that women managers are self­
actualized, have a high degree of ego integration, and because they are secure in 
relationships they have no need to gain at the expense of other women. These 
women find it difficult to understand the animosity they engender in other women. 
In one study of coal mine women, Judith Hammond and Constance Mahoney 
suggested that "the desire to preserve one's unique status as a pioneer in a male 
domain may lead to the development of negative stereotypes about other women."
42Dona Gearhart, interview by Gail McClure, tape recording, Breckinridge, CO, 7 
July 1994.
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The issue of women and leadership raises an additional variable in the complicated 
question of why women failed to "last" as underground miners.43
The experiences of the OVM women suggest that because of gender 
difference, barriers to success constrained women in a way that did not effect men. 
Women experienced subtle, informal barriers to success on both a structural and 
individual level. Change needs to occur at both levels before gender difference 
loses its power to constrain women. Several approaches to change at the 
structural level focus on how work organizations impact people in them and how 
their behavior reflects the norms and values embedded in those organizations. 
Women workers are viewed through the gendered lens of those who control the 
operations o f work. In the mining industry, men held the overwhelming majority 
of these positions.44
Although OVM policies and procedures were developed to accommodate a 
male/female workforce, attitudes and behavior of mine managment did not always 
reflect this egalitarian ideal. Anna Rocha's experience with her foreman and the 
mine superintendent illustrates the incongruence between behavior and ideal.
OVM policy was gender neutral and should have immediately addressed horseplay 
and offensive behavior. Ironically, on rare occasions men complained of similar 
practices. During the years I spent on a production crew, two men requested to be 
put on another crew after becoming victims of horseplay. Their complaints had 
also been dismissed due to the embeddedness of the time-honored, masculine 
rituals of the underground mine culture. Their complaints also revealed that some
43Virginia O'Leary, "Women's Relationships with Women in the Workplace," 
Women and Work: cm Annual Review, 190-191. Hammond, "Reward Cost 
Balancing," 26-27.
44CWI records.
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men were offended by the language and behavior embedded in the male culture of 
mining.
Models o f structural change imply that the disparity between the egalitarian
ideals of the organization, and the values and behaviors of its individual members
can be mitigated. Management can increase an individual's anxiety level by forcing
awareness of the individual's unwitting complicity in discriminatory behavior.
Policies used to elevate an individual's anxiety can vary. Eventually CWI policy
was used in this way. The OVM management came to regard such policies as
necessary to truly integrate women into the workforce. Human Resource director
Matthew Sakurada's pro-active policies provided the anxiety-elevating tool needed
to initiate change at the OVM. Two events illustrate its usefulness.45
In 1983 Shift Supervisor Bud Love was terminated for yelling at a woman
miner. The woman was having difficulty maneuvering a piece of equipment when
Love became frustrated, yelling at her to get her "red ass" out of the machine and
let him move it. She complained to managment and the supervisor was fired. He
was later reinstated as a laborer at a considerable loss of salary and status. I
interviewed Love in 1993 and he spoke candidly about the incident.
I didn't talk to her any different than 1 would to a man. 1 blew up at her. The 
only reason 1 used "red ass" was because of her red hair. It was just a blow up.
I had a production crew to get back down there and she was in my way...and 
she jacked around and she made me mad. I think she wanted to get even with 
me for being the way 1 was....this blowin up at people. She didn't like that.
Well nobody liked that46
45William Kahn and Faye Crosby, "Discriminating Between Attitudes and 
Discriminatory Behaviors: Change and Stasis," Women and Work: an Annual 
Review, 232-233. Matthew Sakurada, interview by author, tape recording, 
Charlottesville, VA, 8 October 1994.
46Buddie Love, interview by author, tape recording, Austin, CO, July 1994.
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Love's experience cost him more than mere anxiety and must have affected the 
consciousness of other employees.
In 1984 Sakurada established the Active Integration Program at the OVM. 
The program identified problems that existed for women underground and focused 
on hiring practices, foreman training, management awareness, and additional 
training for women. The establishment of the program and Love's demotion could 
have played significant roles in changing fundamental attitudes and behavior at the 
mine had economic forces not intervened. In 1984, OVM was forced to furlough 
two-thirds of its workforce, including a significant number of management 
personnel. The program lost its impetus as the remaining workforce struggled to 
maintain production. Most of the women I interviewed believed that management 
had begun to deal more effectively with the problem of gender integration, though, 
making it appear that a structural model of change can be effective.
Models of individual change often fall within a framework that suggest the 
shifting of the traditional sex-role equilibrium, constructed and supported over 
time by society's institutions, and that the change in women's treatment in the labor 
force reflects society's search for a new equilibirum. Once realization of injustice 
occurs, individual and group behavior will change. The anxiety inducing model for 
change noted above suggests that systemic change is accelerated when individual 
anxiety is aroused by evidence against traditional sex-role ideology conflicting with 
their own discriminatory behavior. These predominately psychological models 
suggest to me a reverse process by which sex-roles were originally constructed. 
Individuals, male or female, who benefit from the traditional sex-role ideology are
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slow to change their attitudes and behavior despite potential anxiety produced by 
organization and societal pressures.47
The OVM women perceived some change within themselves and on the 
part of the men. Barriers created by sex-role expectations did not prevent them 
from achieving skills and job satisfaction. In most cases though, the emotional and 
physical costs overpowered the rewards. Perhaps their experience mirrors that of 
other "pioneer" women in highly masculine occupations. Although women miners 
appeared to reject coal mining as a central life interest, there were rewards 
attached to their pioneer status—media attention, high wages, token gestures on 
the part of management. In a sense, they were in a class by themselves and this 
may have added to their self-esteem. But their identity was invested in the more 
concrete reality of earning a living and supporting a family. OVM women 
balanced the rewards of status-as-coal miner, income, and pioneer "specialness" 
with the costs of internal sex-role negotiation, male hostility, physically demanding 
labor, and an unpleasant environment. Most decided that the costs outweighed the 
benefit and rationally chose to leave the occupation 48
Sex difference mattered to the women of the Orchard Valley Mine and 
their voices provide compelling evidence that once they confronted the reality of 
these differences, most decided that the costs were too high. Difference mattered 
yet to them it was not a question of who was better—men or women. By the time 
the women left mining they had established competent work identities, they had 
effected some changes to facilitate their integration into the mine workforce, and 
many male coal miners had begun to perceive them differently because of 
interactions within the mine. But underground mining is an extreme case among
47Kahn, "Discriminating Between Attitudes," 231.
48Hammond, "Reward Cost Balancing," 27.
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nontraditional occupations. Sex-related difference matters more there because of 
mining's unique historical and environmental context.
Although it appeared as though the pattern of sex-segregation in the mining 
industry had been fundamentally altered when women beame underground miners 
in the 1970s, the industry today remains essentially male. Analyses of failure to 
integrate this and other male defined occupations generally concentrate on issues 
related to socially-constructed, gender differences. Policies and programs—some 
imposed by regulatory agencies, some internally initiated within the work 
organization, and some emanating from female employees themselves—have 
facilitated women's progress in several fields. Management and employees at the 
Orchard Valley Mine attempted such policies and programs beginning in the early 
1980s, and there was evidence of progress toward reducing existing informal 
discrimination at the OVM and throughout the industry. Since then the coal 
industry has been absorbed by the realities o f down-sizing and a depressed coal 
market.
The re-segregation o f the Orchard Valley Mine is a complex phenomenon 
that began with a major furlough of its employees in 1984, but it continued 
essentially because women made a choice to find an ocupation that better suited 
their needs as workers. Social policy cannot micromanage industry to restructure 
opportunity in all cases, especially the extreme ones. Reasonable explanations can 
account for re-segregation of the coal industry, and those who would look at its 
employment statistics and see only discrimination should consider the experiences 
of OVM women miners and their exit from underground mining.
CHAPTER 7
EXIT
Mine closures and industry-wide lay-offs beginning in the early 1980s 
signalled the decline in the number of women coal miners working in American 
underground mines. Other factors motivated women's exit from the occupation 
but soft markets in the coal industry accounted for the hightest percentage of 
women who left mining before 1985. When women chose underground coal 
mining as an occupation, most were unaware that they would be at the mercy of 
the boom and bust cycles historically associated with the industry. When the 
shadow of a bust cycle descended in the early 1980s they received a lesson that 
generations of coal miners learned before them. By 1980, demand for coal 
plummeted and the energy boom was over. Energy conservation, falling oil prices, 
and changes in clean-air laws forced coal companies to lower production, close 
mines, and furlough employees.1
Many women lost their jobs as a result o f mine closures and workforce 
reductions. Roughly half of the nation's 4,000 female underground coal miners
Donald Stucki, interview by author, taperecording, Colorado Springs, CO, 
January 1996. Denver Post, 19 March 1985. The number of women miners as a 
percentage of the total underground workforce is difficult to document. CEP 
documents frequently use the eight percent figure as the highest percentage 
achieved. A more precise statistic origninating with the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) reveals that in 1979, 11.4% of all entry 
level miners hired as underground coal miners were women. The number declined 
following 1979. CEP Records.
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lost their jobs through industry furloughs between 1980 and 1985. In a heavily 
unionized industry, lay-offs disproportionately affected those with the least 
seniority, and the majority of women had only recently entered the occupation. 
Non-union mines like the Orchard Valley in Paonia, used more flexible furlough- 
selection procedures that allowed them to retain a higher female percentage in their 
reduced workforce.2
In the early 1970s North Fork Valley residents discussed only optimistic 
predictions concerning the anticipated energy boom. Longtimers and newcomers 
alike knew of the possibility of a boom/bust cycle, but no one wanted to inject 
pessimism when optimism was what the community needed. By 1980, Paonia's 
economy was good and unemployment was down. The train whistle, heard several 
times a day instead of only once or twice weekly, gave people a sense of well­
being. Coal trucks traveled Stevens Gulch road day and night. Cars carried 
miners to and from work at the Orchard Valley Mine and up the valley to the Blue 
Ribbon, Hawk's Nest, the Bear Mine, U.S. Steel at Somerset, and over the 
mountain to the Mid-Continent Mine at Redstone. Employed at all the mines 
except the Bear Mine and Mid-Continent, women had become a vital part of this 
economic activity.
The Orchard Valley Mine continued to employ the largest number of 
females relative to its overall mining workforce. By the end of 1983, fifteen 
percent of the OVM underground miners were women, including one foreman.. 
Although problems existed, CWI management and the women themselves believed 
that women were becoming a part o f the culture of the mine. To those who would 
insist that the overwhelming male culture would somehow have to be changed to
2 Wall Street Journal, 6 March 1985.
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accommodate them, women of the OVM would have responded that adapting to it
in the short-term made their job less onerous. They believed that their presence
would eventually effect changes in the long-run.3
Colorado Westmoreland management attempted throughout this period to
facilitate full integration of the women. In October 1982, General Manager Ron
Stucki issued an official policy statement concerning sexual harassment. Stucki
defined sexual harassment as:
....unwelcome sexual advances; requests for sexual favors and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature ....when (l)submission of such conduct is 
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's 
employment, (2)submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is 
used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)such 
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
working environment.4
The policy promised that complaints would be "thoroughly and confidentially 
investigated" and if found to be valid, could result in discharge. Interviews, 
company documents, and my own personal knowledge suggest that the company's 
record of dealing with sexual harassment charges was mixed. Management 
immediately responded to Elisa Greco's complaint, and she was given the 
opportunity to participate in deciding appropriate punishment. Annie Rocha's 
difficulties appear not to have been taken seriously by managment, but Shift 
Supervisor Bud Love was "busted" to laborer following complaints of harassment 
by miner Vickie Bergstrom.5 Even so, women themselves inconsistently 
construed actions or events as sexual harassment, even when they fit within the
3 Shift list dated 21 November 1983, CWI documents in the possession of the 
author.
4Official memo dated 1 October 1982, CWI documents.
5Greco, Rocha, and Love, interviews.
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broad guidelines of the policy. Many women viewed actions that occurred within 
the mine culture differently than if they had occurred outside the mine in a more 
traditional work environment. Whether right or wrong, this distinction was quite 
often a part of negotiating work relations within the mine. In these cases it 
appeared a rational choice to these women.
Matt Sakurada eventually brought consistency to the gender policies once 
he became Director of Human Resources. Colorado Westmoreland's Affirmative 
Action policy is among the company documents that remain unavailable, but 
Sakurada spoke from memory about its intent and implementation. The program 
was designed to actively bring in "minorities, females, and the handicapped" to 
match the diversity of the surrounding area. Sakurada remembered that the 
company attitude was that they could not simply "sit by and hope it happened in a 
passive way," but that they would act affirmatively to promote and hire minorities. 
The critical goals set in the early 1980s concentrated more on promotion than 
hiring.
....on the minority side....[we promoted] Mike Vigueria and I guess in some 
ways it is easier for me to understand [that] because I'm a minority....and that 
was when you became foreman. I fought really hard to get both of those 
promotions because promotions didn't come by very often. There wasn't that 
much opportunity to place a woman like you or a minority like Mike in those 
foremen's jobs.^
Mike Vigueria and I were promoted to foreman at the same time, and 
Sakurada was probably correct in remembering the dearth of positions that opened 
in 1983. There seemed to be a sense of things becoming tighter. Many men had 
gone through mine-foreman classes and had become certified during the time that I 
received mine-foreman papers. Many had the opportunity to act as spell
6Sakurada, interview.
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(replacement) foreman to complete the training requirment during the same period 
that I acted as spell-foreman. Most of these men had more underground mining 
experience. The promotion of a woman caused bitter feelings. In November 1983 
I received a notice of appointment to utility foreman and a letter of congratulations 
from company officials expressing "how delighted and proud we are of your 
accomplishment." I realized at the time that all promotions warranted this personal 
touch from managment, yet I kept the letter as a visible justification of the 
challenging work and sacrifice my job had come to represent. I suspect that even 
at that time my mind flirted with the possibility that I was a token, the symbol that 
disturbed Shirley Boone. I never regretted becoming a boss, but the promotion 
added additional stress to a job that had become more challenging than I had 
anticipated.
Sakurada admitted that achieving the company's critical goals of promoting 
a minority and a woman might have eclipsed the goal of hiring more women. He 
recalled that it was "tough to find women who wanted to do the work and were 
qualified to do the work." Even after the initial promotion of a woman to foreman, 
CWI managment encouraged women to seek advancement, but not as actively as 
Sakurada desired. The response from the General Manager and the Manager of 
Operations seemed to be that none of the women exhibited an interest. Their 
assessment corresponds to what I discovered in interviews with women miners. 
Pamela Brezonick and Elisa Greco passed the mine-foreman examination and 
received fire boss7 certification but expressed reservations about taking on the 
responsibility that accompanied the position of foreman.8
7See glossary of mining terms, Apendix I.
8Brezonick, Greco, interviews.
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Sakurada approached the issue of sexual harassment more aggressively
than affirmative action. Ironically, the harassment that first caught his attention
concerned the harassment of males. In addition to his human resource
responsibilities, Sakurada directed the department of engineering whose duties
included mine survey and planning. Surveyors under Sakurada's direction made
scheduled trips underground to perform technical functions. These men, distinct
outsiders to the underground culture, often became the object of the physical
horseplay ritual. Sakurada considered horseplay demeaning and believed it would
result in physical harm to employees. On learning of the threat to his surveyors,
Sakurada went to Stucki and threatened to fire the men responsible for such
activities. He said:
....if I hear about this I'm going to fire those people and I don't care who it 
is...it can be your best miner or your worse one. And actually [Stucki] ...and I 
have to give him credit, he didn't know what I was talking about and he didn't 
believe that kind of stuff was happening...but he looked at Art [operations 
managerjand said "you get it stopped."9
The experience with his surveyors made Sakurada more aware of how the 
underground culture might embrace a different relationship between workers, and 
shortly after the incident he began to formulate a policy geared towards integrating 
women into the underground workforce using radical guidelines. As had the Coal 
Employment Project, Sakurada realized that integration meant invasive action 
against the underground culture itself.10
In April 1984 Sakurada initiated CWI's Active Integration Program. In a 
memo to Ron Stucki, Sakurada sought to identify problems concerning women 
miners at the OVM. The list included hiring practices, foreman training,
9Sakurada, interview.
10Ibid.
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management awareness, additional training for women mirroring those areas 
indentified in the CEP training program, and male female relationships 
underground. Male/female confrontation during "rap sessions" would identify 
additional problem areas. Sessions would be held on a regular basis and even 
though males and females might not come to a total agreement on improving 
relations within the mine environment, Sakurada hoped perspectives might 
change.11
The program was structured along the lines of CWI's Accident Prevention 
Program, which had proved successful in reducing accidents in the mine. The 
Active Integration Program (AIP) would instead be used to evaluate and attempt 
to solve the "human relations problem." Although a standard problem solving 
structure could be set up by management, the primary objective became identifying 
the nature of the problems experienced by men and women alike in an integrating 
work environment. The program initially emphasized the positive reinforcement 
philosophy that proved successful in preventing accidents. CWI had been able to 
reduce the number of accidents at the mine by rewarding miners with cash bonuses 
for avoiding lost-time injuries. The AIP could not offer tangible rewards such as 
Safety Bonus payments and for that reason, discipline would be used to punish 
individuals who violated AIP and anti-sexual harassment policies, but only as a last 
resort.12
The "rap sessions" proved instructive. Meeting notes included such 
comments as "women need to be the ones who change." Men considered verbal
11 Inter-office Correspondence from Matt Sakurada to Ron Stucki, dated 28 June 
1984, CWI documents.
12"Active Integration Program" by Matt Sakurada and Dona Gearhart, dated 10 
April 1984, CWI documents.
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and physical abuse to be an historical condition of the underground environment,
and women needed to be made aware of this prior to coming to work in a mine.
Women were perceived to isolate themselves from the men in order to discuss
problems. Women commented that:
no real changes have been made in attitudes within male foremen or male 
employees. Men were brought up a certain way and it is slow for them to 
change. Most of the male workers do accept women, but they don't like them.
Men are threatened by women in the mine because of possibly taking male 
jobs.13
Although the discussion centered around relationships between men and women, 
the "rap sessions" highlighted complaints about managment performance. Miners 
perceived that problems arose because of management inattention to or middle- 
managment sanction of inappropriate behavior. Miners voiced concern that if the 
AIP was based on the Accident Prevention Program then it was doomed to fail. 
Miners felt that improved safety was a direct result of hiring additional miners to 
take the pressure off the existing workforce. Some believed the accident 
prevention approach implied that the employees were careless or stupid. Everyone 
agreed that congeniality on a specific shift resulted from the respect and decency 
exhibited by the shift supervisor, reinforcing their top-down explanatory 
approach.14 Although many employees viewed the process unenthusiastically, it 
seemed clear that the program might have been useful to the process of integrating 
women into the workforce in a meaningful way.
Despite the Affirmative Action, Active Integration, and anti-sexual 
harassment programs, Colorado Westmoreland and company officials could not 
innoculate themselves against sex-related litigation. The company and selected
13Active Integration Program Meeting Notes. CWI documents.
14Ibid.
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officials were named as defendents in a sexual harassment suit filed in August 
1986. Plaintiff Vicki Bergstrom alleged in a civil action, filed in Denver District 
Court, that defendents Stucki, Garcia, Bennett, Wallace, Davis and Gearhart 
". ..intentionally induced the corporate Defendent-Employer to terminate its 
employment contract with the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff was fired on or about 
October 10, 1984." Bergstrom's claim was based on intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship, but also charged that the defendents discriminated against 
her because of her sex and that she was harassed. The complaint asked for 
damages in the amount of nine million dollars. What made the legal action 
significant was the fact that as Bergstrom's immediate supervisor at the time of her 
termination, I was named as a co-defendent. Her complaint of sex discrimination 
and harassment made it clear that crafting well-meaning affirmative policies did not 
guarantee immunity from costly litigation.15
By the time the Active Integration Program was in place and beginning to 
show results, external forces had begun to exert pressure on the valley's economic 
optimism. Some residents began to suspect that the area might experience yet 
another economic bust. Studies done in the late 1970s created unreasonable 
expectations concerning the energy boom. Atlantic Richfield's West Elk Study 
projected that by 1984 they would employ 200 miners, but by the end of 1983 
West Elk employed only 111 and had adjusted their 1984 goal to 162. US Steel's 
Somerset planned for a workforce o f280 by 1984, but employed only 235 in July 
of that year. Colorado Westmoreland's OVM employed 232 in 1984 but had 
projected 280. No one could have predicted that oil prices would fall and the coal
15Amended Complaint, Vicki D. Bergstrom vs. Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., et 
al., filed in District Court, City and County of Denver, State of Colorado. Civil 
Action No. 86CV15293.
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market would slump, but then no one would have wanted to hear that kind of 
prediction. The closure of the Hawk's Nest Mine shortly before Christmas, 1982 
signalled the beginning of the local industry's downward trend, and cost 200 
miners their jobs. Many of the other mines began stockpiling coal as demands fell 
off in hopes of riding out slump. As the surplus coal dwindled, the mines 
cautiously resumed optimistic projections. Having resorted to a part-time schedule 
at the beginning of the downturn, US Steel switched back to full time production 
by 1983. West Elk and CWI began hiring a few miners at a time. The spurt of 
encouragment was brief.16
To add to the sense of uneasiness, word reached Paonia of a mining 
disaster at the Wilburg Mine in Utah that claimed the lives o f twenty-six men and 
one woman. The local newspaper suggested that the disaster raised numerous 
questions "that haunt coal miners and others involved in a profession shadowed 
daily by danger." The article raised the possibility that a similar disaster might 
occur in the North Fork Valley. Because o f the movement of miners between 
Utah and Western Colorado, some local miners knew most of the victims. The 
tragedy held special meaning to women. Few Paonia women had been aware of 
the McCusker fatality in the eastern coal fields, but they knew about the woman in 
Utah. The Wilburg disaster in December 1984 portended future events in the 
North Fork Valley. Within the span of two brief years, the community, and 
especially the Orchard Valley Mine, would suffer a series of crushing events.17
Colorado Westmoreland management attempted to publicly reassure the 
community and employees in the light o f growing lay-off rumors. Even so, CWI
16"01d Studies on Coal Viewed In Restrospect," North Fork Times, 26 July 1984.
17"Utah tragedy shakes coal-mining communities," Delta County Independent, 27 
December 1984.
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miners were told that hard times had arrived. In December 1984, General 
Manager Ron Stucki asked CWI employees to help defray the costs of the up­
coming Christmas party. He told the miners that because of the soft coal market 
and lower prices for coal, CWI must begin "tightening its belt" but only "things 
that are nice but not essential" would be affected. He vowed that the payroll 
would be the last item to be cut. The company had already announced they would 
not be hiring new employees and that departing workers would not be replaced. 
Publicly, CWI continued denying rumors of an impending layoff. In February 
1985, company spokeswoman Kathy Geddes told the local press that CWI had 
never experienced a layoff and "we are planning no layoffs now."18
Privately, Ronald Stucki and Christopher Seglem searched for new 
markets for Orchard Valley Mine coal, but by March they were forced to confirm 
the rumors. On March 18, 1985, Colorado Westmoreland furloughed 155 of its 
220 employees. The mine closed temporarily, and was to reopen one week later 
with only thirty percent o f its workforce. CWI's treasured customer, North 
Indiana Power and Service Co. had drastically reduced the amount of coal it 
purchased from the OVM. In fact, clean, low-sulphur western coal was becoming 
less attractive because of new and stricter clean-air laws. This affected not only 
the Orchard Valley Mine but mines throughout the West. High transportation 
costs o f western coal, the discovery of large reserves o f low-sulphur coal in the 
east, and increased use of scrubbers [technology that allowed utilities to "scrub" 
sulphur from coal to improve the quality of emissions] made western coal
I8"cw i employees to have 'different' Christmas party," The North Fork Times, 13 
December 1984 and "Layoff rumors fly: but major mines deny specific reports," 
Delta County Independent, 7 February 1985.
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essentially equal to "scrubbed" eastern coal, and utility customers like NIPSCO 
responded by dramatically reducing its demand.19
The local press expressed betrayal over CWI's reluctance to confirm the 
speculation earlier. Since the debate over energy development impact on the 
North Fork Valley the local press had come to expect full disclosure of coal 
company activities. Headlines and news accounts reflected the press's growing 
distrust of CWI's veracity. The company, whose very existence had depended on 
the good will of the community in the late 1970s, found itself in the position of 
fighting public relations battles for the second time. City and county officials 
scolded the company for failing to adequately warn of the layoff in time to adjust 
public operating budgets. The loss o f200 mining jobs ffom the Hawk’s Nest 
closure in 1982 had already produced a noticeable impact on local government 
services. CWI raised local suspicions by their method of rehire selection.20
A local reporter obtained a list of the rehired miners ffom "other sources" 
and discovered that less than half the remaining employees at the Orchard Valley 
Mine were miners. Of the sixty-five recalled, twenty-three were supervisory 
personnel, four office staff, three engineers, one safety worker, and two janitors. 
Only forty-two miners would be recalled according to the account. As a result of 
what the reporter termed unfair hiring practices, some laid-off CWI employees 
contacted the UMWA to obtain labor relations advice. This must have seemed 
bitterly ironic to UMWA orgainzer Martinez who had attempted to organize CWI
19"Paonia coal mine cuts 70% of workers," Denver Post, 19 March 1985. "Federal 
officials discuss Paonia's problems," The North Fork Times, 22 August 1985. 
Stucki, interview.
20"CWI shuts mine: 220 miners idle," The North Fork Times, 21 March 1985; 
"CWI idles mine; 155 will lose jobs," Delta County Independent, 21 March 1985, 
"Miners minority of CWI rehires," Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
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workers in 1976. The disgruntled miners were disappointed to discover that 
without a contract, Colorado law offered little protection in an "employment at 
will" situation. One miner called it a "raw deal....but it's nothing new."21
After informing miners of the temporary closure on Monday, CWI officials 
announced that a list of rehires would be posted at the guard shack the following 
Friday. During those five days, company officials went through the painful process 
of deciding who would stay and who would be without a job. An internal CWI 
document spelled out the process of selection. First, employees needed to know 
what caused the furlough. Briefly, the answer lay in marketing. The coal market 
by 1984 was "very soft—both in price and amount," and "NIPSCO had lowered 
their take." To fill the demand, only sixty-five employees were needed. The 
memo stated that "selection would be made on skill, and only if skill was equal 
would seniority play a part." Next, the memo listed the skills needed to 
accomplish diminished production goals. For example, production required bolter 
operators, miner operators, teletram [haulage equipment] operators, mechanical or 
electrical skills, and outby equipment operators. Maintenance requirements 
included master electricians, diesel engine specialists, hydraulic specialits, welders, 
and lubrication specialists. The process was refined further. A bolter operator 
should be able to put 100 bolts in the roof in an eight-hour production shift.
He/she should know the laws and safety requirements to prevent accidents, and 
should know the machine well enough to do preventive maintenance.
Clearly, the greater the experience the individual had with all aspects of the 
mining process, the greater his/her chances of being retained. Women were 
actually in a good position to do well in this process. Women lacked only one of
^  Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
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the required production skills—continuous miner operator. Few women actively 
sought the position. The job meant neither a promotion nor a higher rate of pay, 
but it was a high-prestige job in the underground culture, and men aspired to 
operate the miner for that reason alone. Virtually no women considered the 
challenge. Traditionally, the requisite step to miner operator involved serving as a 
miner helper, one of the most physically challenging and dangerous jobs in an 
underground mine. The miner helper's job proved difficult in a developing section, 
but during pillar extraction, he/she became the most vulnerable miner on the 
section.22
Demonstrating what might well be a bonafide gender preference, women 
generally did not consider the increased physical challenge and safety risk worth 
whatever prestige that operating a miner would provide. Miner operator 
experience would have added points to a woman's overall evaluation in the 
furlough, yet her sex might have offset that deficiency. Gender points are not 
referred to in the memo but during the selection process, women were accorded 
additional points because they were women. When the process was completed, 
five women, a full eleven percent, retained their jobs as underground miners. My 
name appeared on the list as one of the three underground foreman recalled.23
The future looked grim for the furloughed miners and the community as a 
whole. Company officials explained that it would be three years before the OVM 
could resume its 1984 production level o f 1.3 million tons. Until then the reduced 
workforce was expected to produce coal at a yearly rate of 300,000 tons. Idled 
miners received four weeks severance pay and medical insurance for one year.
They would also be eligible for twenty-six weeks of unemployment benefits at
22See glossary of mining terms, Apendix I.
23CWI documents.
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$206 per week. Federal funding would extend benefits an additional 26 weeks. 
Officials proposed retraining programs in Paonia and Delta, and many expected 
CWI to either "migrate" the furloughed miners to other areas or create jobs in the 
North Fork Valley.24
Another blow fell in January 1986 when US Steel announced plans to close 
its Somerset mine, putting an additional 220 employees out of work. The mine 
had been idle since December and negotiations had been under way to sell the 
property. Unable to find a buyer, company officials continued to pursue marketing 
opportunities, but admitted that it would be three to five years before those 
markets would materialize. US Steel miners echoed the sentiments expressed by 
those furloughed ffom CWI earlier in the year. "Its a bitter pill," said one miner,
".. .it seems like the American dream is going [and]...you can't make it just by being 
a hard worker anymore. "25
Historically, Paonia's economic diversity had been able to offset downturns 
in one industry through strength in another, and by the 1980s, tourism joined 
mining and agriculture as the third leg of the valley's economic base. The western 
slope had finally been connected to the tourist-rich eastern slope with the 
completion of the McClure Pass highway. Not only did tourists find it easier to 
reach the North Fork Valley via the paved highway, local miners could efficiently 
commute the thirty-five miles to the Mid-Continent Mine at Redstone, Colorado.
In 1986 economic diversity suffered a congruence of events that attacked each 
each leg of the base supporting the valley's economy. Late winter and early spring 
brought a freeze that produced a major fruit crop loss, and a massive mudslide
24North Fork Times, 28 March 1985; Delta County Independent, 1 April 1985.
25 The Daily Sentinel, Grand Junction, CO, 1 January 1986, Delta County 
Independent, 2 January 1986.
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temporarily closed the McClure Pass highway. Coupled with the mine closings 
and lay-offs, the late freeze and the mudslide tested the resilience of valley 
residents and many wondered if it could survive economically.26
Paonia's struggle with economic viability had dominated its attention, yet 
the community's social base appeared to be unaffected. Churches and local social 
organizations continued to thrive, and families seemed to remain intact. The valley 
sustained one economic disaster after another, and residents found themselves 
bracing for more. In 1986 fires consumed the local fruit packing shed and the 
historic opera house that served the community's senior citizens. But no one was 
prepared for what happened in next. On April 26, eighteen-year-old Christy 
Kistler and her friend sixteen-year-old Shane Cox decided to go to Glenwood 
Springs for pizza. The wet spring had not yet caused the mudslide on the McClure 
Pass road, and the weather looked good. Gathering five others, including Cox's 
brother and Kistler's sister, they headed over the mountain. Somewhere along the 
Crystal River heading into Glenwood Springs, Cox lost control of the car and it 
plunged into the icy river. Five of the seven teenagers were killed including 
Kistler, Cox, and Cox's younger brother. The tragedy represented an almost 
unbearable loss to the community. Of what use were all the economic plans and 
goals of the community if it could not protect its next generation? The finger- 
pointing and recriminations that followed emerged out of a sense that the 
community had somehow failed these young people.
After determining that alcohol had not played a major role in the crash, 
townspeople tried to attach its meaning to recent economic woes. The May 1 
Delta County Independent evoked how the community perceived the tragedy.
26 The Daily Sentinel, 3 June 1986.
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Front page headlines read "Teen Tragedy. Friends remember five crash victims, 
wish for 'something to do' in Paonia." and "Frost hits fruit again" and "Trooper 
tells of teenage drinking and driving peril." Teens themselves stressed the 
economic factors that led Kistler and Cox to head over the mountain. Some peers 
of the victims felt that many of Paonia's adults were concerned with economic 
matters to the exlusion of being interested in the "doings of their children." One 
commented that "all there is to do in this town is drink and cruise—we need 
something to do."
Years later, in 1994, Ed Marston linked the tragedy to Paonia's boom and 
subsequent bust. Faced with another boom in the 1990s, Marston recalled what 
the last one had brought.
The depths of Paonia's bust was reached when a car full of teen-agers dove into
a river, killing five. Some of the young people were on their own, living with
friends or relatives. Their parents had moved away in search of jobs, but the
children had staved to finish school, or at least the school vear. The accident
77occurred during a pizza run to a town 70 miles away.
I would not attempt to question the passion prompting the comments by 
the teens and Marston, but the emotional attributions of 1986 failed to grasp that 
the accident occurred under unexceptional circumstances. Cox lost control of his 
father's car when he turned his attention away from the road. There was much that 
could have been said about the irresponsible and careless actions of teenagers, but 
Paonia reacted instead out of the depths of its economic woes. News accounts of 
the tragedy typically contained references to recent mine closures and damaged 
fruit crops and how the hemorage of jobs from the valley left its young people at
27Ed Marston, "This boom will end like all the others—in a deep, deep bust," High 
Country News, 26 no. 16 ( 5 September 1994):22-23. Delta County Independent,
1 May 1986.
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risk. Paonia Elementary School Principle Willa Sorenson told a Grand Junction, 
Colorado reporter, "We let those kids down, the whole system did."28
Kistler and Cox had not been abandoned due to economic circumstances. 
Cox and his brother Scott lived with their father who enjoyed stable employment in 
the community. Kistler had moved out of her parents home two years earlier, and 
had been working two jobs to sustain herself and her sister. She would have 
graduated in less than a month, and had been awarded a college scholarship a few 
days before the accident. In fact, only one of the teenagers was living on her own 
because of Paonia's economic instability. Yet it seemed somehow important to 
assign guilt to a bad economy, so important that Ed Marston continued to make 
the connection eight years later. The accident devastated a community already on 
its knees, and the waves o f disaster that continued to wash over Paonia evoked a 
sense that an evil spell had been cast on the valley.
On Sunday morning, June 1, 1986, Paonians awakened to the remarkable 
sight of an expanding plume of smoke on the Orchard Valley mine site above the 
town. There was no doubt that the mine was on fire. The pillar where the fire 
originated had begun smouldering shortly after the last worker vacated the mine on 
Saturday afternoon. Fanned by the high volume of air being sucked through the 
portal to provide ventilation, the pillar ignited spontaneously producing the 
hideous black smoke pouring from the return air shaft. Company officials had 
been notified during the early morning hours when computerized monitors began 
showing high levels of carbon monoxide, a by-product of combustion.
Experienced miners attempted to extinguish the blaze but were driven out 
by the heavy smoke and accumulations of fire gasses. By daylight on Sunday, the
2*The Daily Sentinel, 1 May 1986; Delta County Independent, 1 May 1986; The 
Daily Sentinel, 15 May 1986.
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blaze was out of control and attempts to suffocate the fire by injecting foam failed. 
CWI, state, and federal officials decided the only way to starve the fire of its 
needed oxygen was to seal the mine. By late Monday afternoon, sealing neared 
completion, and the billowing black cloud of smoke had dwindled to a pale whisp. 
The fire broke out at the one time of the week that the mine was idle, preventing a 
human disaster. A Colorado Division of Mines inspector voiced what was on 
many minds, comparing the intensity of blaze to the the recent Wilburg disaster.29
Miners waited outside the guard shack hoping for word that the fire was 
extinguished and that they could return to work. They quickly returned to work 
but not underground. Once the mine was sealed, company officials organized 
surface duties at the site to keep seventy-one miners working. Experienced miners 
began doing unfamiliar work related to surface and equipment maintenance, and in 
some cases, miners accustomed to physical labor were assigned administrative 
duties. In August of 1986, a crew o f five miners equipped with breathing 
apparatus, entered the mine for the first time to assess the damage and confirm that 
the fire had been extinguished. Visual inspection of the crosscuts directly inside 
the portal revealed extensive damage. Information provided by the re-entry 
supplied the basis for a feasibility evaluation of rehabilitating the fire-damaged 
entries to 1] retrieve millions of dollars worth of mining equipment sitting at the 
bottom of the mine, and 2] consider possibility of reopening the mine to resume 
production. The rehabilitation estimates were staggering but even more cogent, 
the evaluation revealed an enormous amount of risk to the safety of rehabilitation 
crews. Mine officials had two choices at this point—rehabilitate the existing mine
29The Daily Sentinel, 3 June 1986; North Fork Times, 5 June 1986. J.Bob Davis, 
interview by author, Paonia, CO, 19 July 1994.
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at high cost and safety risk, or begin the permitting process to open a new mine 
close by.30
Once the decision was made to seal the mine, CWI officials faced the 
possibility of opening a new mine. Within days after the OVM was sealed, they 
began seeking alternative sites for a new portal. By August 18 they submitted a 
mine plan and reclamation application with the Office of Surface Mining and the 
Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Division. The August re-entry confirmed the 
need for an alternative portal. The new site, designated the Orchard Valley Mine 
West (OVMW), was located south and west of the original OVM but accessible to 
Stevens Gulch Road. Construction and permitting of the OVMW consumed a 
fraction of the time required for the original mine in the 1970s. CWI miners began 
mining coal on December 28, 1986, a short seven months from the morning that 
Paonia awakened to the sight of black smoke pouring into the sky. It was certainly 
an accomplishment of will—a boost the community sorely needed. The resumption 
of mining also marked my own separation from the Orchard Valley Mine.31
I submitted my resignation to CWI officials in mid-December 1986, two 
weeks prior to resumption of production at the new mine. Honesty would compel 
me to admit today that I simply could not face going back underground and doing 
the work I had once approached with enthusiasm. I am also unconvinced that 
circumstances leading to my resignation were influenced by gender but in 19861 
believed they were. The decision involved several considerations, but the 
apprehension of continuing underground work accounted for the timing. My 
resignation stated that ". . .my state of physical, mental and emotional health has 
deteriorated to the point that I have no choice but to make a change.
30CWI documents.
31Dan Jackson, "Like the Phoenix," Coal 25, no. 2 (September 1988): 60-62.
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The reference to "having no choice" seems ironic. It implies that resigning 
was beyond my control, yet I had spent hours assessing the positive and negative 
aspects of my employment in an attempt to decide what was in my best interest. 
The personal considerations listed in the document were: a desire to further my 
education, diminishing responsibilities at home due to the ages and needs of my 
children, and a desire to live in a community better suited to my needs and goals. 
But the decision to quit involved more fundamental concerns.32
Four important factors motivated my resignation ffom CWI. Three were 
marginally related to gender and the fourth involved the size/strength difference 
between women and men. The most materially relevant factor concerned my 
parental responsibility. My youngest son would soon graduate ffom high school 
in May 1987, enabling me to choose what I wanted to do, not what I had to do in 
order sustain the material needs of a family. A second consideration 
acknowledged the fact that bossing might not be worth the emotional costs. As a 
foreman, my decisions affected the safety of other human beings and that can be an 
overpowering responsibility. Being a foreman also meant increasing isolation ffom 
the other women and self-doubt concerning my ability to respond in emergency 
situations. Male foremen experienced similar feelings o f separation ffom their 
former work group following a promotion, and I discovered later that male 
foremen experienced similar uncertainty about emergency response. In 19861 
believed my circumstances of being a foreman were unique to my gender.
Adding to the normal stress of responsibility and isolation, I became 
increasingly at odds with the General Manager over what constituted appropriate 
managment style. A coal mine supervisor was expected to act tough and above all,
32Ibid.
produce results. I had no quarrel with those requirements but always tried to 
include employee concerns into the equation. On one occasion I allowed a crew 
member to take time off when his wife gave birth to twins. It seemed a reasonable 
decision, yet the General Manager saw it as a sign of weakness and I was 
reprimanded for doing it. I recognized that the philosophical gulf could not be 
breached when we differed over the fundamental issue of grief. He objected to my 
request for personal time off following the death of a beloved friend, saying that I 
would appear weak to members of my crew. When his brother died many years 
before, he told me, he was back to work the next day. He advised me that a 
foreman had a responsibility to exhibit strength in the face of personal tragedy. It 
seemed clear that because of this and other incidents, our philosophies would 
always be at odds and that I would be constantly pressured to accept his methods 
of managing people. Within an environment less challenging to my physical 
capabilities and gender-role expectations, conflict with a superior would have 
simply been a human relations problem that required resolution but in 1986 it 
assumed unreasonable proportions.
The third factor leading to my resignation concerned the matter of the 
Bergstrom litigation. Following a determined effort to fight the civil action, 
company officials decided in December 1986, to settle with Bergstrom out of 
court. After months of preperation and depositions, they recognized that a 
prolonged trial in Denver would draw needed personnel away ffom the mine at a 
time they could least afford to be away. As a co-defendent in the case, I was 
considered an agent of the company and thus bound by the settlement. Yet I felt 
betrayed by it. In the absense of testimony (and the opportunity to respond), 
Bergstrom's allegations would remain an uncontested document in the public 
record. A non-disclosure agreement included in the settlement bounded all
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defendents from releasing any information concerning the Bergstrom situation 
other than what appeared in public documents. Even though I understood the 
economic considerations underpinning the company's decision to settle the matter 
out of court, I was offended by the action.33
The fourth factor affecting my decision to resign was simply the emotional 
and physical effects on my body. Even though I had suffered no serious phsysical 
or psychological damage, I understood the toll that nine years of mining coal had 
extracted. I felt as though my body parts—joints and muscles, shoulders and knees, 
back and legs—were breaking down at an accelerating rate and I was confronted 
with a vision of myself as a sixty-year-old coal miner. It was not a pretty vision 
and when it was clear that I would be going underground again in December 1986, 
I knew it was time to quit.
The decision to exit the occupation constituted choice. As a social being, 
rational calculations to maximize my interests were culturally, physically, and 
psychologically constrained in a number of ways, but not exclusively by my 
gender. In a 1994 interview, former CWI supervisor J. Bob Davis described his 
decision to resign in 1989. He received a memo from Colorado Westmoreland 
saying that he could retire in 2008 and he recalled thinking, "...holy shit, I can't
33I had been informed by Matthew Sakurada in 1986 not to discuss the terms of 
the settlement but was not informed until November of 1995 that the restriction 
remained inclusive of all information except the dates o f Bergstrom's employment 
and her rate of pay at the time of termination. I was advised by the attorney 
representing the company in the litigation that "Although you did not sign the
agreement I believe it more likely than not that a court would view you as
bound by this language." I tend to agree with his assessment yet I find it 
unfortunate that cases such as these fail to reach the light o f scrutiny and analysis. 
Letter from Charles Newcom of Denver CO, date 16 November 1995. Memo 
from Matthew Sakurada, Paonia, CO, dated January 1987. Non-disclosure 
agreement paragraph II-N of Bergstrom settlement.
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keep working like this for that many years." Davis had also experienced 
management conflicts with the General Manager and before he quit mining the 
pressures of assuming responsibility for the safety of other miners began to affect 
his emotional health. Davis and I shared similar concerns and similar reasons for 
leaving the occupation. I learned ffom the interview that perhaps gender 
differences are often emphasized at the expense of similarities. As real as the 
constraints were, none of the factors leading to my decision to resign represented 
insurmountable challenges—challenges I once enthusiastically welcomed.
Operating within the context o f the interplay of ffee will, external and internal 
constraints, and opportunity to choose another occupation, I chose to leave.
When I left the mine on January 2, 1987, only three women remained 
underground: McCallister, Goff, and Brezonick.34
Production at the new mine represented a temporary reprieve to the 
Orchard Valley Mine and the community, but as impressive as the rebound 
appeared, hard times were not over. Throughout 1986, CWI officials continued to 
negotiate for new contracts. Seglem anticipated a schedule o f fifty to sixty trains 
per month and 1987 production was projected at 500,000 tons. But by December 
of 1987, CWI was forced to furlough the seventy-nine workers employed at the 
Orchard Valley West mine. Officials cited a reduction in anticipated sales, and 
employees, furlough veterans by this time, took the news with a sense of fatalism. 
One miner told the local reporter, "It's just a matter o f economics." Another 
commented: "It's just a rough go right now." Miner Pamela Brezonick had been 
on disability leave at the time of the furlough and when the company attempted to 
lay her off along with the others, she went to the labor board to force the
34Davis, interview.
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company to pay her long-term disability. "As soon as I involved the labor board," 
she recalled, "I got what I wanted. They didn't want to fight with the labor 
board."35
McCallister and Goff, furloughed along with the rest of the workforce, had 
their own choices to make. I have been unable to contact Goff for an interview 
but her friend Annie Rocha has kept in touch with her and through Rocha I have 
been able to piece together a sketch of Goffs activities. Following the furlough, 
Goff went to work at a union mine in Craig, Colorado. Sometime in 1993 or 
1994, Goff underwent back surgery and eventually received a substantial disability 
settlement. She eventually married and went to Montana to try and buy a ranch. 
Rocha reported in late 1995 that Goff continued to have problems with her back 
and appeared to be partially disabled. Goff was the youngest of the women who 
survived the first CWI furlough in 1985.36
Kathy McCallister, twelfth on the furlough rehire list, considered the 
possibility of not going back underground. "I didn't really want to go back... .after 
I was away." she recalled. "I really wanted to go back to school...but there's a 
selfish part of me." McCallister owned show dogs and often traveled to compete 
in dog shows. The dogs represented a significant investment and competition was 
an expensive hobby. But more important than the cost, she enjoyed the hobby and 
loved the dogs. So McCallister left the valley to work underground at the Twenty- 
Mile Mine in Steamboat Springs, Colorado. At the time of the interview, 
McCallister was recuperating ffom surgery on her shoulder and ankle and again 
considered leaving the mines. "I could go back but I would kill myself," she said.
35Brezonick, interview. Delta County Independent, 17 December 1986. The Daily 
Sentinel, 12 December 1987.
36Rocha, interview.
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"I'd be a cripple...I've always said that mine years were like dog years...and I 
thought that maybe I could make it another couple of years simply because my 
attitude is different." At the time of the interview she was making the type of 
mental calculations that would ultimately lead her to a rational choice.37
CWI eventually recalled most of the furloughed workers in 1988, but by 
then there were no women working at the Orchard Valley Mine. After limping 
along for another year, CWI finally called it quits and sold the Orchard Valley 
Mine to Cyprus Minerals in November of 1988. The Cyprus OVM joined an 
existing network of western coal mines in Steamboat Springs and Craig, Colorado, 
and Price, Utah. Ironically, Cyprus CEO and President Kenneth Barr 
optimistically announced that the investment was made because of "the improved 
climate for coal mining in Colorado." Barr said that the brighter future for 
Colorado coal mining was "tied directly to needs in Denver and other US markets 
for high energy, clean burning coal." Local residents had heard the same 
prediction of a brighter future repeated often in the recent past.38
Colorado Westmoreland's role in the history of the North Fork Valley and 
in the lives of women coal miners ended with the sale to Cyprus, but the Orchard 
Valley Mine... and the coal industry....remains a part of the community.
Newspaper stories covering the last few years suggests that little has changed since 
CWI and most of the women coal miners left the valley. Headlines announced that 
a new mining lease might boost the area's economy and that coal mining in the 
North Fork Valley was once again on the upswing. ARCO's West Elk Mine 
announced expansion plans. Pessimistic headlines soon replaced those heralding 
the new economic surge. Cyprus miners faced a bleak Christmas as company
37McCallister, interview.
^T he  Daily Sentinel, 14 November 1988.
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earnings dropped considerably in 1991. It appeared not much had changed in the 
North Fork Valley, but residents remained optimistic. In February 1995, Cyprus 
Minerals sold the Orchard Valley Mine to Bowie Resources, and the local paper 
announced that the mine was "back in production—with a new owner, a new name 
and new management."39
Loretta Felice, who I believed to be the only woman miner still working 
underground in the North Fork Valley, quit her job at ARCOs West Elk mine 
following the high school graduation of her youngest child in May 1995. Felice 
had worked underground for fifteen years in Utah and Colorado, and I always 
believed that if there was a female, career coal miner, it was Felice. She loved her 
job and was a treasured employee and co-worker at the West Elk Mine. She told 
me on many occasions that she would quit when her son graduated from high 
school. I had consistently doubted her resolve to quit but in May 1995,1 helped 
her celebrate her retirement and the beginning of a new life and new career in 
Durango, Colorado.
I believed that her exit marked the closing of a door in the history of 
women's involvement in North Fork Valley coal mining, not the window of 
opportunity because the opportunity still existed. During the summer of 1995,1 
learned of two women who worked underground at the recently re-opened 
Somerset mine confirming my belief that mining opportunity continued to exist for 
women. Apparently women still view it as a viable occupation choice. One of the 
women seemed to be realistic about how long she would be able to do the work. 
And the community seems to have adjusted to the idea. The hiring of the two
39Delta County Independent, Summer 1990; The North Fork Times, 5 February 
1992, 8 April 1992, 22 April 1992, and 22 February 1995; The Daily Sentinel, 25 
July 1992.
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women occurred without the publicity that accompanied the hiring o f the first
generation of women coal miners in 1976. The continued optimism of valley
residents and the mining careers of the second generation of women miners hints at
a resilience of communities and individuals in the Rocky Mountain West. But
observers like Ed Marston take another view. He has a different vision of the
western past and future. He wrote in 1994 that "....Western towns and small cities
that look so calm and bucolic are churning at a fierce rate, and are anything but
stable." In the midst of the 1990s boom, stimulated by an influx of Southern
California discontents, Marston sees another bust that will end with misery and
tragedy like the one in the mid-80s, but he sees an up-side. He writes:
But the aftermath of the bust and tragedy was wonderfiil-a stable period when 
communities and their surviving residents concentrated on living here rather 
than on making money. It was during this interim period that riverfronts were 
reclaimed from rusted cars, trails were built in the backcountry, land was put 
into conservation easements, and libraries were expanded.
Judging ffom the differing perceptions in the valley, the old-timer/newcomer 
tension still exists and perhaps accounts for the resilience and dynamics of the 
West.40
Throughout the United States, other coal mining communities experienced 
dislocations similar to those in Paonia, though perhaps not as painful. Other coal 
mines closed or reduced their workforce. Women elsewhere fell victim to 
furloughs and some women survived them. The oil embargo in the 1970s 
stimulated a boom that resonated thoughout the United States, and though much 
of the attention that accompanied the boom focused on the West, the correction 
that followed in the early 1980s affected the coal industry and its employees 
nationwide.
40Ed Marston, High Country News, 5 September 1994; 22-23.
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Steel consumption began to decline in the early 1980s, affecting 
metallurgical coal sales. Lower-priced oil and gas began to eat into the coal 
industry's utility and industrial markets that had become sluggish. Responding to 
the changes, utility customers pressured coal suppliers to renegotiate contracts at 
lower prices, often at lower volumes over longer periods of time. Forced to adapt 
to the changes in the industry, companies like Westmoreland Coal attempted to 
become more efficient. Increased efficiency more often than not resulted in lay­
offs. Underground mines suffered greater reductions in the mining workforce than 
surface mines. Department o f Labor statistics reveal that between 1979 to 1983 
the average number of employees at underground mines declined from 132,928 to 
89, 803. The number declined steadily, but not as dramatically into the 1990s.
The less dramatic decline in strip mine employees reflected the competitive edge of 
their lower production costs.41
The changes in the coal industry affected many lives in coal communities 
throughout the nation. Women's experiences in the eastern coal fields during the 
industry downturn mirrored those in the West despite the fact that coal miners in 
the East were more likely to be under union contract, and that eastern women 
were more likely to be touched in some way by the activities of the Coal 
Employment Project. Marat Moore's 1983 interviews of women miners in the 
eastern coal region evoke a range of emotional response evident in my interviews 
of Paonia women.
41James Cook. "Ill wind blows some good," Forbes, 138, 17 November 1986. 
U.S. Department of Labor. Document provided by Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, Denver, CO. Table 03. "Average Number of Employees at Coal 
Mines in the United States, by Primary Activity. 1978-1993."
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Elizabeth Laird of Alabama, the woman who entered the mines at the age
of fifty-four, was still working in 1983 but knew things might change. "If I’m laid
off," she said, "I could go ahead and retire, and then if I got called back, I could
freeze my retirement, go back to work and finish getting my two and a half years."
Laird was sixty-two when she spoke these words. Charlene Griggs also worried
about her employment in the mines in Alabama. She said, "If I was to get laid off,
my options would be to draw my unemployment as long as I could, and hunt me a
job." From her self-described list of limited options, she assumed she would
probably "be right back at the sewing plant again." But if she was forced to return
to factory work, she was determined to organize a union there. Griggs made her
attachment to the union clear. "I was brought up union, union, union Democrat,
never a Republican."42
Vira Rose's position as foreman in a West Virginia mine may have offered
some protection from furlough. Her plans included working through 1984, then
attending school full-time to become a mine inspector. The change in the industry
drew these comments from Rose.
After these layoffs, I think it will at least be another year before things pick up, 
and I think the women will be going back into the mines. The mines will come 
back strong again, but right now we haven't seen the bottom yet. I may get laid 
off, but if I do I'll draw a check for two years. I'm the only one Iwoman] that's 
left.43
But Shirley Boone's position as foreman in another West Virginia mine 
failed to protect her job. She believed that being forced to leave the union as a 
condition of her management status left her vulnerable to being furloughed. Boone 
was laid off in early 1980 while on leave due to a self-described emotional
42Laird, Griggs, interview.
43Rose, interview.
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"breakdown." She filed suit against Westmoreland Coal to get her job reinstated,
claiming the company eventually recalled male foremen with less seniority than she
had accumulated. Apparently the suit was pending at the time of the interview.
Boone believed the union could have saved her job.
if  I was union, I would still be working. I would still have my job. I wish I 
had. I'd have been on day shift. They wouldln’t let me go back in the union.
But I'll stay in the mines. I'd like to get on in a big mine. I don't care whether 
it's union or non-union. I just want a big mine because these penny-anty, two- 
bit punch hole mines can get you killed.
Even as industry furloughs chipped away at women's gains into 
underground mining, the Coal Employment Project continued to work on behalf of 
women coal miners—employed and unemployed alike. The CEP remained a source 
of support for many of the eastern coal-mining women even in the wake of the 
drastic cut-backs. But their advocacy agenda underwent fundamental changes 
after 1980 in response to the decline in the number of women entering the 
occupation. But as an interest-group lobby targeting a specific industry on behalf 
of women within that industry, the scope and success of CEP's advocacy remains 
impressive.
Following CEP's successful litigation against major U.S. coal producers in 
1978, they began a range of activities in response to problems women experienced 
in their new profession. From 1978 to 1980, CEP focused attention on developing 
and implementing a training program for women miners. Also during these years, 
and into the 1980s and 1990s, they attempted, through media publicity and support 
groups, to bring attention to the "widespread" sexual harassment suffered by
44Boone, interview.
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women coal miners. CEP officials relied on feedback ffom its associated support 
groups to keep them up to date on other problems the women experienced.45
The 1982 pregnancy study dovetailed into the parental leave project when 
it became apparent that anti-discrimination laws proved inadequate to protect the 
rights of pregnant miners. The CEP viewed parental leave as an issue for 
organizing in the 1980s. They sought union support to include parental leave 
provisions in the BCOA c ontract and in 1985 a joint UMWA/BCOA committee 
was created to study the concept. Not content to restrict its efforts to coal-mine 
labor, the CEP became one of the primary interest groups lobbying for the passage 
of Parental Leave legislation throughout the 1980s 46
The CEP focused attention on other issues during the 1980s. They sought 
to force manufacturers and coal producers to provide personal protective 
equipment appropriate for unique physical requirements of women miners, and 
continued to effect improvements in bath-house, sanitary conditions, and 
underground toilet facilities. A Leadership/Empowerment program was instituted 
to prepare women for advocacy within their occupational environment. The Coal 
Employment Project left no stone unturned in its efforts to facilitate women's
45CEP Records, Series VII, Box 81, Coal Mining Women's Support Team News, 2 
no. 1 (August 1979); "A Meeting of [women] Miners," Ms November 1979, 33; 
"Women in the Mines," Newsweek, 17 December 1979, 74; "Women Say No to 
Sexual Harassment," Coal Age 84 no. 8 (August 1979), 74-81; The New York 
Times, 11 November 1979, and 11 October 1982; New York Daily World, 8 July 
1982; Brenda Bell and June Rostan. Pregnant and Mining: A Handbook for  
Pregnant Miners, Coal Employment Project, Oak Ridge Tennessee, 1982.
46CEP Memo, "Parental Leave: An Issue for Organizing in the 1980s." CEP 
memo ffom June Rostan to Cosby Totten, dated March 1986. Memo to UMWA 
Pres. Trumka ffom Jim Weeks, dated November 1984. Letter ffom Patricia 
Schroeder to Betty Jean Hall, dated January 1988. "Women Miners Fight for 
Parental Leave," Labor Research Review, (date unknown, article included in CEP 
records), CEP Records.
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involvement in underground mining and it continued to hitch its star to the union 
wagon.47
Throughout its existence CEP sought to establish and maintain an intimate 
relationship with the United Mine Workers of America. But the UMWA had its 
own problems. Like other unions, it had watched its power and membership 
decline in the second half of the twentieth century. By 1979, UMWA's total share 
of U.S. coal production had dropped to 52%. Union officials recognized that 
because of the west's low-sulphur coal and its suitability for strip-mining, they 
needed to organize the West or the national union would face gradual extinction. 
Union efforts in the west yielded few victories despite the use of aggressive 
organizers like Moose Martinez. Organization efforts in the east resulted in union 
victory in virtually half the elections, but the union sustained a series of defeats in 
the West.48
There were a number of reasons for the UMWAs decline. It maintained 
much of its power by negotiating national contracts with the Bituminous Coal 
Operators Association (BCOA) but several large coal producers dropped out of 
the association in the 1970s marking an end to national bargaining. The union 
could not afford to negotiate separate contracts with producers. Internal problems 
also lead to a loss of faith in union leadership during the terms of W.A. [Tony] 
Boyle and Arnold Miller. In the West, many of the miners viewed the union as 
capricious and unruly, and besides, the rate of pay earned by the non-union miners 
in the West exceeded rates of most unionized underground miners. Most western
47CEP records,1982, Series VII, Box 73; 1985-1987, Series VII, Box 72. Report 
on Leadership/Empowerment Project, Series VII, 1979-1987, Box 61. "Coal 
miners at a oss when nature calls," Las Vegas Review Journal, 19 September 
1994.
4^Wall Street Journal, 8 October 1979.
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miners lacked the emotional attachment to the union felt by eastern miners whose 
family histories were embedded in union philosphy.49
In the midst of the UMWA's attempt to halt decline in its membership, it 
virtually ignored the new constituency of loyal, union women. The CEP 
developed a strategy to force a change of consciousness within the union. CEP 
strategy to align with the UMWA was evident from the beginning. The First 
Annual National Conference of Women Coal Miners, sponsored by the CEP, was 
held in June 1979. A statement of purpose contained in the registration brochure 
states that:
With the support of our brothers, sisters and union supporters, we hope that this 
conference will build a stronger UMWA and strengthen the role of women in 
the mining industry.
Workshop topics included: How to Use the UMWA Contract and Grievance
Procedure to Protect Your Rights; Constitution & History o f UMWA; and
Building the UMWA (Organizing the Unorganized). But assuming that a
relationship existed between the CEP and UMWA did not make it so.50
Initial CEP efforts to forge an alliance with the UMWA and to force the
union to acknowledge its new female constituency, proved less than successful.
CEP pressured union leadership to submit the following resolution to the
International Executive Board:
Therefore, Be It Resolved: That the United Mine Workers of America support 
the efforts of our sisters who are trying to achieve greater opportunities for 
women in the coal industry as it grows to meet the energy needs of our nation.
UMWA President Arnold Miller responded that although the objective sought by 
the CEP was a noble one, equal opportunity in the industries and employment
49Ibid.; 'The (North Fork) Times, 15 November 1979.
50Conference registration pamphlet, CEP Records.
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practices was one over which union leadership had no control. He also believed it
highly irregular to support a project or group about which he knew nothing.51
Betty Jean Hall was determined that Miller's intransigence would not stand
in the way of CEP's desire to form a bond with the powerful union. After all, her
organization had taken on the national coal industry and won jobs for thousands of
women through a class action lawsuit. Curiously, Hall did not want to use this
tool with the union. In a 1983 discussing CEP strategy, Hall wrote that, "We have
to realize that the UMWA, like any organization that is made up of lots of
individual people, is not immune ffom having problems of race and sex
discrimination..." Hall then went on to suggest ways to "help" the union deal with
these problems. Ultimately, she touched on the issue of litigation.
....CEP has always resisted filing any discrimination complaints against the 
UMWA, because the UMWA is too important to us and the women we work 
with. However, if  an internal grievance procedure is not developed, I'm afraid 
it's just a matter of time before formal complaints start being filed against the 
union, despite our best efforts to not have that happen.52
Documents reveal that the union strategy was becoming more sophisticated by the 
1980s. Hall sought to use the concept of "fair representation," developed by the 
courts to address the issue of minority status within a union. In a meeting with an 
attorney to discuss the feasibility of such an action, part of the discussion centered 
around identifying the weaknesses of UMWA leadership. The meeting notes 
reveal that UMWA Vice President Richard Trumka and President Sam Church 
might be vulnerable to CEP pressure. Trumka was noted as being conservative in 
terms of making moves but that he had an inherent disposition to do the right
5 be tte r ffom Bill Lamb to Arnold Miller dated July 1978 and Memo from Arnold 
Miller dated August 1978, CEP Records.
52Hall letter to Sandy Dorsey, dated October 3, CEP Records.
thing. He was also sensitive about what people thought about him and that was his 
weak point. Trumka's sensitivity meant that he "could be embarrassed by a threat 
to make him not look progressive in the press (not for women's rights)," whereas 
Church, "doesn't give a rat's ass about what anybody says about him." Richard 
Trumka became fourteenth International President of the United Mine Workers of 
America in December of 1982. Whatever strategy had been decided upon, it 
appears that Trumka became a solid ally of the CEP and women miners.53
Throughout most the 1980s UMWA leadership participated in CEP 
conferences, and the two organizations worked hand in hand to effect passage of 
the Parental Leave Act. Although the Coal Employment Project remains an active 
organization, it is now operated out of the home of its current director and its once 
active agenda has been considerably reduced, its ties to the UMWA remain solid. 
Some of the furloughed miners associated with the CEP, have gone to work for 
the union or participate in its auxiliary activities. Others transferred their skills to 
other industries. In 1985, former miner and parental leave activist Cosby Totten 
began promoting jobs for women in construction, trucking and computer repair.
She told the Wall Street Journal that "we didn't go underground to go back to 
minimum wage." Totten also assumed the directorship of the scaled-down CEP.
A 1993 CEP newsletter revealed that the CEP remained actively supportive of 
union and women's issues.54
The Coal Employment Project and United Mine Workers provided sources 
of support for women miners at a time when many felt they had nowhere else to
53Letter ffom Richard Bank to Nancy Burnett, dated August 30, 1982. UMWA 
Strategy File Memo regarding meeting with Rick Bank, dated October 15,1982, 
CEP records.
54"Layoffs Force Blue-Collar Women Back Into Low Paying Job Ghetto," Wall 
Street Journal, 6 March 1985. CEP News, October 1993.
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turn. Those raised on union philosophy would have turned nowhere else. The 
support remained long after the number of women entering the occupation began 
to decline. Belonging to the union or taking part in CEP activities was not an 
indicator of success in working underground, but to some it remained essential. 
Coal mining women, as might be expected, formed a diverse group. Each woman 
chose, independently, the politcal attachment that reflected her individual identity. 
For some, the union represented that identity, for others gender was the primary 
point of attachment, and the CEP offered political and associational support. Still 
others relied on cultural realities embedded in individualism or their familial role.
From the mid-1970s when women became empowered to make 
unorthodox choices, their expectations mirrored popular, cultural messages that 
proclaimed that whatever men could do, women could do. My own expectations, 
rationally considered but emotionally fired by these messages, led me to choose a 
career in underground coal mining. I do not regret the choice, and my research 
confirms that few women regretted similar choices. Underground coal mining 
represents an extreme example of occupations pried open to accept women in the 
1970s, and if women failed to fully integrate the occupation because of sex and 
gender difference then economic inequality did not automatically become a 
consequence. Most women miners gained economically, at least in the short run, 
and most benefitted on a personal level through the development of skills and self­
esteem. Although hundreds exited the occupation through lay-offs, those who 
remained often made the rational choice to exit for more promising opportunities. 
By the time women were laid off or chose to leave mining, the range of 
opportunities open to them had become virtually unlimited. Women—and men— 
who continue to mine coal reap significant benefits and rewards, but at significant
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cost. I admire them and respect their choice to remain in a proud, yet physically 
challenging and dangerous occupation.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Constraints against women working in underground mining were legally 
and socially constructed in the nineteenth century. Sex segregation in this industry 
was accomplished suddenly and purposefully by a consensus that reached across 
class and gender lines. Since men held a disproportionate share of power, they 
became the primary actors in the exclusion movement, but women also 
participated in its activities. Although evasion of the act was not widespread, 
some coal operators and pit lasses circumvented the law by continuing the practice 
of underground work for women, and the evasion was finally ended through 
efforts of male miners and their unions. Thus women were banished ffom 
underground mining in the nineteenth century, closing off the occupation as an 
opportunity for women for 130 years.
The legal, technical, and social transformations of the 1960s removed most 
of the constraints against women working underground, and the occupation 
opened once again as an opportunity for women. Technically, the industry became 
desegregated, but it remained virtually male-dominated as women failed to 
integrate the underground culture and environment in any meaningful way. 
Although women continue to work underground, their representation in the 
occupation remains tiny and may have reached its lowest level of 1978 when the 
CEP referred to the industry as the most blatantly discriminatory of all industries.
Despite women's presence, the occupation has been resegregated, leading
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to speculation of continued discrimination in the coal industry. Other factors 
appear to be driving women away ffom the occupation. Fewer women find 
underground mining a desirable option for work than do men. Regardless o f the 
high wages and liberal benefits, few women have developed a preference for 
underground mining. If at some point in their lives they chose to mine coal, the 
consequences of that choice, in many cases, eliminated it as a future option. 
Women's experience with underground mining constitutes an example of how 
gender affects preference formation. Because of their coal mining experience 
women assessed the job queues, a list of jobs ffom which to choose, and most 
found that underground mining no longer constituted a desirable option. Prior to 
1973 women would have probably made the same assessment. Few men 
considered the occupation desirable, but women possessed gender-specific reasons 
for rejecting it.1
Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos have examined how job queues and labor 
queues, a list o f available workers ffom which employers choose, become 
gendered. Much of their analysis concerns forces external to the women worker. 
They have argued that workers rank jobs on a variety of characteristics on whose 
importance women and men generally agree. Workers maximize income, social 
standing autonomy, job security, congenial working conditions, interesting work 
and the chance for advancement. The question of whether women's family roles 
lead them to choose different occupations than men was dismissed for lack of 
empirical evidence.2
Barbara F. Reskin and Patricia A. Roos, Job Queues, Gender Queues: 
Explaining Women's Inroads into Male Occupations (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1990), 39, 41.
2Ibid., 29-68.
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The idea of job queues is precisely what has been missing ffom the 
literature on the sex segmentation of labor. The reason for this, and for Reskin 
and Roos's de-emphasizing the job queues, lies in the almost visceral reaction to 
language that includes individual choice and difference. Yet this is precisely the 
language that should be used. Invoking choice based on difference rejects the 
image of victim and oppression as regards women and the idea that in a 
differentiated world essential differences between women and men, today, 
axiomatically translate into inequality. Marilyn Frye provides an eloquent example 
of how women have become disconnected ffom choice in economic matters. Frye 
describes oppression of women using the root word press. "The press of the 
crowd....Presses are used to mold things or flatten them or reduce them in bulk, 
sometimes to reduce them by squeezing out the gasses or liquids in 
them...something caught between or among forces and barriers which are so 
related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing's 
motion....Mold. Immobilize. Reduce." The world as experienced by the 
oppressed—how is that perceived by Frye? "...options are reduced to a very few 
and all of them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation." If women are 
perceived in this way then it makes sense to dismiss, eliminate, or de-emphasize 
the idea of women's choice or preference.3
The two most persistent ffameworks for labor segmentation might argue 
that since women are oppressed, they are forced into options by either patriarchal 
hegemonic forces, or capitalist hegemonic forces. The capitalist/patriarchal theory 
of job segregation is based on the belief that society became less egalitarian with 
capitalism. A patriarchal system had been established whereby men controlled the
3Marilyn Frye, The Politics o f  Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, 
NY: The Crossing Press, 1983), 2.
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labor of women and children. Proponents of the theory have argued that through 
this system men learned the mechanisms and techniques of hierarchical control and 
organization. Industrial capitalism threatened to bring women and children into 
the labor force thus ending men's control over them, and the only way to maintain 
that control was to maintain women's inferiority in the labor market. The theory 
has not been accepted uncritically, but it seems to persist. It rests on women's 
oppression at the hands of patriarchy and capitalism, virtually placing women 
outside any meaningful, self-directed action.4
The theory o f labor market segmentation proposed by Michael Reich,
David Gordon, and Richard Edwards, separates the labor market into primary and 
secondary sectors. The primary sector is characterized by higher wages, better 
working conditions, and greater promotional opportunities. This dual labor 
market favored white males who have held the overwhelming majority of primary 
sector jobs. The theory has also argued that political and economic forces within 
American capitalism gave rise to and perpetuated segmented labor markets. To 
meet the threat of what Reich, Gordon, and Edwards termed a homogenized and 
proletarianized work force, employers consciously constructed labor market 
segmentation that essentially divided the labor force according to race, class, and 
gender. The approach has been used to explain why certain groups seem to remain 
in poverty.5
Institutional economists have recently used gender as a category o f analysis 
within the dual labor theory to explain the persistence of the wage gap that exists
4Heidi Hartmann. "Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex," Signs 1, 
no. 3, Part II (Spring 1976): 137-169.
5Michael Reich, David M. Gordon, and Richard C. Edwards, "A Theory of Labor 
Market Segmentation," American Economic Review LXIII, no. 2 (May 1973).
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between men and women. Jeffrey Waddoups and Djeto Assane examined 
women's mobility within the dual labor market by using a tripartite model that 
separates the primary sectory into an independent and subordinate segment. Their 
research revealed that women experience rather unrestricted mobility ffom 
secondary jobs to subordinate primary jobs, but that there remains significant 
barriers to their movement into the more stable, higher wage jobs in the 
independent primary segment. Waddoups and Assane found that even after 
controlling for a number o f variables, including education, being female constituted 
a barrier to the higher status jobs in the independent primary segment.6
These findings and those of other analysts consistently conclude that the 
wage gap and women's continued failure to achieve parity with men must lie in 
discrimination. But throughout the literature, the variable of individual choice 
remains exogenous to the analysis. Reskin and Roos incorporated a model of job 
queueing yet seem to deny women's will to use it and to deny them the will to use 
it differently than men. Women surely try to maximize income, social standing, 
autonomy, job security, congenial working conditions, interesting work, and the 
chance for advancement. But congenial working conditions held a different 
meaning for women and men in an underground mine. Autonomy for a woman 
often meant the ability to move in and out o f the labor market according to her 
attachment to the family. When economists analyze data and control for 
education, do they consider the difference between what constitutes a desirable 
educational field for women and for men? Are there differences in wage and status 
between a BA degree in social work and a business degree? Researchers
6Jefffey Waddoups and Djeto Assane, "Mobility and Gender in a Segmented Labor 
Market: A Closer Look," The American Journal o f  Economics and Sociology 52, 
no. 4 (October 1993): 399-411.
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Katherine Post and Michael Lynch found that individual choices by men and 
women—in levels and choices of education fields, careers, and marriage—not 
discrimination is what statisticians measure when they find wage dispartity. They 
argued that when individual choices like educational focus and attainment, time in 
the workforce, and career and marriage are factored in as wage determinants, the 
wage gap virtually disappears.7
Women's failure to achieve parity with men, whether reflected in the wage 
gap or disparity in occupational representation, is usually attributed to 
discrimination, leaving choice or preference unexamined. Preferences need not be 
cast as external to the system, to the analysis. If scholars cannot inquire into how 
preferences are formed and exercised, then women will continue to be perceived as 
oppressed victims outside the historical process o f change. Aaron Wildavsky has 
argued that preferences are, in fact, endogenous to the process. According to his 
cultural theory, things that people prefer can be explained in terms of the 
consequences those preferences have for their social relationships. Choices people 
make come from their involvement with others. Women, then, would use their 
powers of reasoning to compare existing social arrangements with alternatives. If 
the consequences fail to live up to the expectations then, according to Wildavsky, 
"the discrepancy between the expectation and the result can dislodge individuals 
from their existing view of how the world out to be and thrust them into another."8
7Katherine Post and Michael Lynch, "Free Market, Free Choices: Women in the 
Workforce," A briefing from the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, San 
Francisco, CA, December 1995.
8Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural 
Theory of Preference Formation," American Political Science Review 81, no. 1 
(March 1987): 3-21. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural 
Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 22.
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There is no doubt that women's choices are constrained by gendered 
cultural assumptions. Few, if any, individuals operate without such constraints. In 
the absence of a consideration of choice, an explanation of why and how coal 
mining became resegregated might be that women were simply driven out of the 
occupation. Because of their small numbers women often felt isolated in their 
everyday work relations. Quite often they remained outsiders even in their 
communities. It would take a very special person to endure a physically 
demanding, dangerous job without networks of support. But if we were to accept 
the premise that they were driven out by patriarchal or capitalist hegemonic forces, 
the question then becomes, who would benefit?
Perhaps coal operators would benefit from a male-only workforce. It is 
clear that hiring women was not without cost, and no evidence exists that 
operators hired them to drive down wages. Sexual harassment litigation, programs 
to integrate women into the culture, enhanced training sessions required to bring 
women to an acceptable skill level, management problems associated with 
male/female sexual and romantic relationships—all produced costs that coal 
operators might have wished they did not have to confront under unstable coal 
market conditions. Women brought some benefits to the underground mine. Most 
proved to be stable employees, they learned quickly, and introduced a sense of 
normalcy into the environment—the gentle tamers of the underground. Most 
important, the costs of discriminating against women were certainly significant to 
coal operators.
Male coal miners would have recognized few benefits from the 
resegregation of the coal industry. Heidi Hartmann, proponant of the 
capitalist/patriarchal theory of labor segmentation, has said that it was the role of 
men—"ordinary men, men as men, men as workers"—to maintain women's
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inferiority in the labor market. This argument certainly made sense in the 
nineteenth-century exclusion act but evidence fails to support it in the 1980s. Men 
would have gained little except a re-masculinized underground culture. The 
masculine nature o f the environment was only minimally affected by women's 
presence, usually in a beneficial way. Women miners introduced the tradition of 
what were termed "smorgasbords" at the Orchard Valley Mine. Usually on a 
Friday night swing shift, crews would plan potluck dinners. Each crew member 
was assigned a different dish, and during the dinner break everyone sat down 
together for the meal. The practice developed because of the women crew 
members, and the men enjoyed the practice as much as the women. Many of the 
men liked working with women.
Women miners stood to gain the most by leaving underground work. Even 
though women benefitted from mine work in the short run through high wages and 
prestige, in the long run, benefits diminished in personal value as women's bodies 
began to wear down. Then the job became less desirable. Because they were 
women, the law of diminishing returns set in earlier for them than it did the men.
So if they were driven out, or coerced into leaving, by either the job itself or the 
work relationships with men they could at least be satisfied that they were the ones 
who benefitted. If women chose to leave the occupation, or were coerced into 
leaving, and the industry once again became male defined, does that necessitate 
legal or policy intervention as it did in 1978?
Public or corporate policy intervention would first mean changing the 
culture of mining. It is reasonable to assume that this could be done. Punitive 
measures could be instituted to change the earthy, often sexually explicit language 
of the coal miner, male and female. Many women miners felt comfortable with and 
often used the language of the underground culture Miners could be forced to
219
become more humane, more civil. Surely policy could remove the sexual 
implications of men and women working together in dark, closed, dangerous 
places. For many women a kinder, gentler underground work environment would 
have removed some of the stress of the job, as it would for many men. But for 
some women and men, the underground culture posed few problems.
Perhaps policy intervention could bring changes in the nature of the work 
itself. The work could be made less physically challenging to women. Although 
this approach remains a possibility, it seems improbable. Costs to accommodate 
women's physical limitations may be too high. Occupations similar to coal mining 
have struggled with the size/strength factor. Few occupations exist that physically 
challenge women to the same degree as underground mining, but military ground 
combat comes close. Until recently proponants of women's participation in ground 
combat have failed to find a way to accommodate women, but a newly developed 
training program promises to change that. Army scientists recently put forty-one 
women through a twenty-four-week strength training program. Four nationally 
certified trainers oversaw the women's "conditioning." The results of the closely- 
monitored study convinced the scientists that women are capable of being 
conditioned to perform most of the heavy military tasks associated with ground 
combat. The study prompted immediate response from critics including a strength 
and conditioning coordinator with the U.S. Olympic Committee. This is 
reminiscent o f the CEP's attempt to prepare women for coal mining. The program 
may work, but is it a long-term solution? Will women become damaged after a 
number of years?9
9Robin Estrin. "Army Research: Most women can lift as much as men," Las Vegas 
Review Journal, 30 January 1996.
The physical limitations that occupations like coal mining and ground 
combat pose for women expose the root of why difference can, and often does, 
make a difference. If policy and advocacy initiatives fail to ameliorate the 
consequences of those differences, why is choice or preference not a viable option. 
Nearly every program and policy sought by the Coal Employment Project 
eventually tackled some aspect of the difference disparity suffered by women 
underground, and yet women left the occupation. Should they have tried harder, 
or does the time come when women are accorded the privilege of preferring 
another job? The most obvious answer to that question lies in the belief that to 
recognize difference between men and women is to invite inequality.
The issue of difference-equating-inequality continues to confound feminist 
scholars. A sex-discrimination filed by the EEOC against Sears in 1978 became 
the center o f a debate in the 1980s illustrating how problematic the issue had 
become. The judge hearing the case found no evidence of discrimination by Sears 
and accepted the defense that the disparity in the numbers o f men and women 
working in commission-sales jobs was due to women’s presumed lack o f interest in 
the higher-wage jobs. The lack of interest, or preference, was rooted in 
fundamental differences which were the result of culture or long-standing patterns 
of socialization. Feminists were not only concerned about the judge's finding— 
EEOC suits on behalf of women generally resulted in favorable rulings for women 
during the late 1970s—ironically, the EEOC and Sears both used the testimony of 
feminist historians to argue their case. This made the ruling even more painful.
But difference became the primary issue around which the case was argued.
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Feminists argued that the judge's decision meant that difference was substituted for 
inequality.10
Joan Scott described the dilemma of difference in terms of its potential 
damage to women. "If one opts for equality," she argued, "one is forced to accept 
the notion that difference is antithetical to it. If one opts for difference one admits 
that equality is unattainable." Difference becomes a dilemma when it is posed as a 
polar opposite of equality and might disappear when paired instead with sameness. 
The solution rests on refusing to oppose equality to difference and recognizing 
choice as an expression of difference. It also rests on the perception of equality 
and its relationship to sameness. Those who accept the belief that equality of 
opportunity, not equality of results, underpins liberal democracy, might view the 
dilemma-of-difference debate as less problematic.11
The opportunity to work as an underground coal miner still exists for 
women and some continue to choose it. In the 1970s women seized the 
opportunity to become coal miners and most succeeded against formidable barriers 
related to sex-difference. Policies and programs ultimately failed to mitigate those 
barriers for women. All but a very few of the Orchard Valley Mine women 
understood that policy got them in the door, but it was up to them to stay. Once 
in, the union, a powerful and active advocacy group, and company policies might 
have influenced the women's choices to stay, but the extreme conditions of the 
underground mine influenced choice as well. Women looked at the consequences
10Ruth Milkman, "Women's History and the Sears Case," Feminist Studies, 12, no. 
2 (Summer 1986): 375-400.
11 Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics o f  History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), 172.
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of doing that kind of work, and in most cases, made the choice not to do it 
anymore.
APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF MINING TERMS
continuous miner. - A mining machine designed to cut or rip coal from the face 
and to load the coal into cars or conveyors without the use of cutting 
machines, drills, or explosives.
drill and shoot. - Making a circular hole in the coal face with a drill or cutting tool 
(hand auger, jackhammer or rotary drill powered by air or electricity), and 
inserting into the hole an explosive charge. The resulting blast breaks the coal 
away from the face and can then be loaded into haulage equipment. Prior to 
mechanization the miner undercut the coal face with a miner's pick before 
drilling.
face. - A working place from which the coal is extracted.
fire boss. - A mine official certified by the state to examine an area for gasses and 
other dangers before a shift comes into it, making a second examination during 
the shift.
hand loading - A mining process by which the miner loads coal by shovel rather 
than machine.
pillar. - An area of coal left in a mine for the pupose of supporting the roof.
pillar extraction. - The recovery or mining away of the pillars o f coal left during 
the first (developing) operation of mining. As pillars are removed the roof is 
allowed to cave, relieving pressure from overlying strata.
room and pillar mining - Room and pillar mining involved driving (mining) 
tunnels into the coal seam, leaving solid blocks of coal on either side of the 
miner's working places. The room was the place where the miner and helper 
undercut the face, drilled and shot the coal, and loaded it into cars to be hauled 
away.
timber setting. - The operation of setting timber supports in mine workings or 
shafts.
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